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The difficulties of conceptualising and operationalising critical thinking through 





Critical thinking defines a university education. If universities are nurturing critical thinkers 
then this should be apparent from and demonstrated through assessment. This is 
challenging, however, because critical thinking is subject to wide interpretation, with little 
or no academic consensus as to its specification. Additionally, assessment in higher 
education has long been a challenging issue, particularly so for complex higher-order 
thinking. Research continues to demonstrate considerable variability across assessors 
and the literature affords many reasons for this, but hitherto unexplored is the potential 
role played by differing conceptualisations of critical thinking as applied to the task of 
assessing students’ work. In response, this thesis examines how participants - academics 
in a UK university business school - conceive of critical thinking in application to assessing 
undergraduate dissertations. 
 
A case study methodology is employed, with a qualitative approach to data collection 
(via semi-structured interviews involving document elicitation) and thematic analysis, 
underpinned by social constructionism. The findings illustrate the perceived facets of an 
undergraduate student as critical thinker, and identify how individualised approaches to 
assessment differ, questioning the effectiveness of mitigating institutional mechanisms. 
This thesis adds to our theoretical understanding of critical thinking in higher education, 
in demonstrating that participants conceptualise critical thinking as a set of skills, 
dispositions and originality, and in proposing a link between models of epistemological 
development and academics’ assessment related expectations of students’ critical 
thinking. Further practical contributions are offered through demonstrating what 
participants look for as evidence of students’ critical thinking and how this can influence 
assessment, together with the challenges to achieving consistency and averting grade 
variation. These could be of use to institutions, academics and students, subject to 
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In this thesis I report on my doctoral research project in which I have investigated how 
academics in a UK university business school conceive of ‘critical thinking’ in application 
to their assessment of undergraduate dissertations. There is a personal inspiration for 
this project. It comes from my own transition to academia from professional accountancy 
practice. I recall being immediately ‘thrown in the deep end’ of teaching students and 
assessing their work with little or no training or guidance to fall back on. I was therefore 
heavily reliant upon advice from more experienced colleagues. In particular, I remember 
receiving my first tranche of assignments to assess. Having worked through some of 
these with colleagues for the purposes of calibration I found myself picking up and 
repeating on their assessment language. The more assignments I assessed, the more I 
came to realise that in my written feedback I was repeating particular phrases ad 
nauseam which I had apparently acquired from said colleagues. Such phrases included 
‘lacks criticality’, ‘could demonstrate greater critical appreciation’ and ‘needs more critical 
thinking’. I had read these phrases in colleagues’ feedback to students, had heard them 
uttered in discussion and had seemingly absorbed them. I began to wonder what these 
apparently interchangeable stock returns actually meant and if, as academics, we were 
all effectively on the same page with our understandings. I did consider, as I do now with 
more confidence, that I knew what I was referring to and why. I also felt that I was not 
alone in this. Yet this left me wondering whether such understandings are shared across 
academics and, in particular, if we are all applying the same concept of ‘critical’ when 
assessing students’ work.  
What follows is a more detailed rationale for this study. In this, I provide relevant 
background formed with reference to views coming from the literature on critical thinking 
and assessment in higher education. I then frame the parameters of this study through 
consideration of research objectives, questions and the case setting in which I situated 
this research. I then acknowledge subjectivity and consider of my own reflexive position 






1.1 Background to the study 
 
1.1.1 Critical thinking in higher education 
 
In 1990, the American Philosophical Association declared critical thinking a vital 
underpinning to our democratic society (Lorencová, Jarošová, Avgitidou & Dimitriadou, 
2019). Three decades on our current world context is now even more complex, 
characterised as it is by the global knowledge economy, rapidly changing technology, 
political turmoil, economic crises, social volatility and climate change (Penkauskiene, 
Railiene & Cruz, 2019; Roohr, Olivera-Aguilar, Ling & Rikoon, 2019; Schendel & Tolmie, 
2017). In 2020 and 2021, we have also witnessed first-hand the complex political, social 
and economic difficulties caused by a global pandemic. We live then in a world that is 
both complex and subject to continual change, a world beset by difficult problems in 
need of complex solutions (Kek & Huijser, 2011). It is in this context that critical thinking 
is rightly labelled “an essential skill for 21st century survival” (Luk & Lin, 2015, p.67). 
This I submit foregrounds the importance of critical thinking in education. 
 
Critical thinking is “arguably the very essence of what higher education is meant to 
inculcate in students” (Rear, 2019, p.665). Indeed critical thinking has become the very 
hallmark of higher education and traditional university degrees, a concept that defines 
higher education no less (Barnett, 1997; Lincoln & Kearney, 2019). Critical thinking is 
thus widely promoted as a key educational aim (Bok, 2006; Luk & Lin, 2015; Pithers & 
Soden, 2000). Universities view developing students’ critical thinking as a primary 
objective; often professing that their students when they graduate will do so as critically 
reflective beings (Golding, 2019). Business schools are particularly concerned with 
developing critical thinkers, described as graduates who can “manage complexity, 
uncertainty, equivocality and value conflicts” (Rodriguez, 2009, p.523). The emphasis on 
critical thinking in higher education is evidenced by the prominence it is given in 
teaching, assessment and feedback. Critical thinking is embedded in the language of 
educational standards at all levels, and prioritised as a primary educational policy goal 
through the emphasis placed on graduate attributes and employability skills (inclusive of 
critical thinking) (Barrie & Prosser, 2004; Carrington, Chen, Davies, Kaur & Neville, 
2011; Cosgrove, 2011; Espey, 2018; Leong, 2013; van der Zanden, Denessen, 
Cillessen & Meijer, 2018). Subject knowledge taught at university will inevitably wane or 
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be superseded but the ability to think critically will endure (Terenzini, Springer, 
Pascarella, & Nora, 1995). 
 
In UK higher education, critical thinking is a key stated graduate outcome (Brennan & 
Osborne, 2005). Its significance to UK policy makers is made clear by the Department 
for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) (2016, p.5): “The skills that great higher 
education provides – the ability to think critically and to assess and present evidence – 
last a lifetime and will be increasingly in demand.” By virtue of granting degree awards, 
UK higher education institutions are necessarily confirming that students have met the 
learning outcomes for their programmes of study, learning outcomes that invariably flow 
from the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA) via the UK Quality Code for Higher Education 
– The Frameworks for Higher Education Qualifications of UK Degree Awarding Bodies 
October 2014. Here, there is clear support for critical thinking as a required outcome. For 
example, for level 5 qualifications (foundation degree) students must demonstrate 
“knowledge and critical understanding of the well-established principles of their area(s) 
of study”; the “ability to evaluate critically the appropriateness of different approaches to 
solving problems in the field of study”; and the ability to “undertake critical analysis of 
information” (p.23). Level 6 (honours degree) adds an expectation that qualification 
holders will possess the necessary skills of evaluation vis-à-vis “arguments, 
assumptions, abstract concepts and data…” (p.26). Thus, the importance of critical 
thinking is espoused, flowing from the QAA to HE institutions, evidenced also by the 
prominence of the word ‘critical’ and associated terms in the mission statements, 
programme literature, qualifications and grade descriptors of institutions (Moon, 2008).  
 
Support for critical thinking is not confined to policy makers. Academics also value 
critical thinking in their students (Leong, 2013; Moore, 2013). For example, over 90% of 
faculty members in one US-based survey declared the key goal of undergraduate 
education to be the development of students’ critical thinking (see Bok, 2006). Similarly, 
in a UK-based study in 2013, participating academics were clear in articulating a belief 
that critical thinking is central to their practice as educators and that students need to 
evidence this, albeit without those participating academics necessarily demonstrating a 





Critical thinking as a graduate attribute is also highly prioritised on employability 
agendas, important by the estimations of employers and students (Hinchcliffe & Jolly, 
2011; James, Hughes & Cappa, 2010; Leong, 2013; Tuononen, Parpala & Lindblom-
Ylanne, 2019). However, talk of critical thinking in this context narrowly considers it as a 
skillset. Featuring prominently here are skills of decision-making and practical problem 
solving (see, for example, Macpherson & Owen, 2010; Wilson & Howitt, 2018). These 
are apparently what employers’ prize most highly in graduates. Yet I will demonstrate 
through Chapter 2, the first of a two-part literature review, that critical thinking is a multi-
faceted concept that amounts to much more than this, encompassing skills, dispositions 
and more (Moon, 2008; Davies, 2015).  Barnett (1997) in particular would find the 
equating of critical thinking with employability skills as unnecessarily limiting, arguing 
that the purview of higher education should be the development of people who are 
critical beings, i.e. people who, being self-aware and reflexive, can through critical 
reasoning make critical decisions and take critical actions that benefit society. To focus 
on problem solving, which Barnett would regard as occupying the lower levels of critical 
thinking, arguably limits the development of truly critical thinkers. Nonetheless, 
observably much of the literature on critical thinking in higher education is focused on 
critical thinking as skills.  
 
Evidently, in higher education we expect students to move beyond passive reception of 
that which is given as known, pushing through to active engagement in higher-order 
thinking, even creation of new knowledge (Bok, 2006). This should be apparent from 
and demonstrated through evaluation of learning outcomes (Arum & Roksa, 2008; Klein, 
Benjamin, Shavelson & Bolus, 2007; Lee, Lee, Makara, Fishman & Hong, 2015). It is 
axiomatic that students who achieve higher grades necessarily demonstrate greater 
critical thinking (Dwyer, Hogan & Stewart, 2014; James, McInnis & Devlin, 2002; 
Stassen, Herrington, & Henderson, 2011). Yet the substance of critical thinking as 
concept is less than explicit in academic settings (Wendt & Ase, 2015).  
 
Critical thinking then is a difficult term to get to grips with (Williams, 1976). Although 
used pervasively in higher education, particularly with respect to assessment, it is not 
precisely specified nor clearly conceptualised (Baril, Cunningham, Fordham, Gardner & 
Wolcott, 1998; Harrell, 2011; Kuhn, 1999; Leong, 2013; Moore, 2013; Wendt & Ase, 
2015). Subject to wide interpretation, critical thinking has been defined in various terms 
carrying numerous meanings following from Glaser’s 1941 seminal piece An Experiment 
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in the Development of Critical Thinking. Critical thinking is intuitively learned by 
academics who claim to recognise it when they see it but who cannot easily define or 
explain what it is (Atkinson, 1997; Fox, 1994). There is no universally defined list of what 
constitutes critical thinking and no academic consensus as to its specification (Harrell, 
2011; Moore, 2013). It is not surprising then that critical thinking is apparently not well 
understood by academics (Moore, 2013). 
 
1.1.2 Assessment in higher education 
High stakes assessment is a central function of higher education and a crucial factor in 
determining future study and career opportunities (O’Hagan & Wigglesworth, 2015). This 
is in the context of the modern landscape of higher education, which is characterised by 
greater global student mobility, international competition for students, rising student 
numbers, larger class sizes and increasing pressure on student/staff ratios (Gu & 
Schweisfurth, 2011; O’Connell et al., 2016). Accountability and transparency are 
especially important in this context (Wendt & Ase, 2015). As a result, higher education 
assessment practices are located within an agenda of institutional accountability 
underpinned by quality assurance frameworks (Bloxham, Boyd & Orr, 2011). These 
cover the design and execution of assessment tasks and associated processes for 
evaluating and moderating student performance leading to justifiable assessment 
decisions backed by evidence (Bloxham et al., 2011; Grainger, Adie & Weir, 2016; 
Grainger, Purnell & Zipf, 2008).  
 
Producing any good piece of lengthy written work involves a student demonstrating skills 
of selection and evaluation in forming cogent arguments backed by supportive evidence, 
written within the customary academic genre, and suitably attentive to relevant academic 
conventions. This is a complex achievement that resists measurement and is therefore 
best assessed through judgement (Yorke, 2011). However, key concerns within the 
agenda of accountability are to reduce the apparent arbitrariness of assessors’ 
judgements and ensure that grades fairly represent student achievement (Sadler, 2009; 
Yorke, 2010). Professional judgements along the lines of ‘I know a 2:1 when I see it’ 
(Ecclestone, 2001 refers) are hard to justify in this context. Moreover, researchers 
continue to point to deficiencies in assessment systems in education settings; 
deficiencies which render universities seemingly incapable of producing comparable 
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grades between assessors on a reliable and consistent basis (Bloxham, den-Outer, 
Hudson & Price, 2016a; O’Connell et al., 2016).  
 
Significant efforts have been made to improve fairness in assessment through greater 
transparency (Jonsson, 2014). Publication and consistent application of appropriate 
assessment criteria are pivotal here (Bloxham et al., 2016a). Assessment criteria and 
rubrics or grading schemes are said to help assessors and students by clarifying 
standards of achievement at different levels, promulgating shared understandings, 
facilitating transparency and hence obviating assessors’ prejudices (Menendez-Varela & 
Gregori-Giralt, 2016). However, irrespective of how well defined criteria may be, 
research has demonstrated considerable variability in assessment, i.e. assessors 
applying the same criteria may still arrive at different grades for the same piece of work 
(Bloxham, 2009; Grainger et al., 2008). The literature offers a variety of reasons for this, 
which I cover in more detail in Chapter 3. These, however, do not specifically question 
the potential role played by differing conceptualisations of critical thinking held by 
academics as applied to the task of assessing students’ work.  
 
I reason that a varied academic base means conceptions of what is required or valued in 
dissertations is likely to vary, more specifically what critical thinking is and how it 
manifests in dissertations is likely to vary, and that this could affect assessment. When 
assessing students’ work, academics must hold the right concept of quality (of which 
critical thinking forms a part) for the assessment task and judge the work in relation to 
that concept (Grainger et al., 2008; Popham, 2005; Sadler, 1989). Academics must 
appreciate what critical thinking is in order to judge it. We know that critical thinking is 
difficult to define. It follows that it is difficult also to assess. Whilst assessing students’ 
content knowledge is relatively straightforward, assessing critical thinking most certainly 
is not (Bissell & Lemons, 2006). Is critical thinking, as Ebel (1965) suggested, simply too 
intangible an outcome to measure? Is critical thinking a concept that simply “cannot be 
assessed” (Bissell & Lemons, 2006, p.66)? Alternatively, is critical thinking, as Ennis 






If it is possible to assess critical thinking then, agreeing with Golding (2019) in relation to 
thinking more broadly, the fundamental assessment issue here seems to me to be one 
of discernment. How do academics actually discern when, how and to what extent 
critical thinking has occurred? How do they know what to look for? How do they 
recognise it? How do they evaluate it? How do judge its worth? How does this then 
affect the grade attributed as the assessment outcome? 
 
1.2 Research parameters 
1.2.1 Research objectives and questions 
From the foregoing, it would seem that major questions of what critical thinking actually 
is for academics and how they perceive and judge it when assessing students’ work 
remain unresolved. It is a given that the notion of critical thinking is important in higher 
education but what exactly is it, how is it understood, how is it discerned and how is it 
assessed? The uncertainty here points to a significant gap in the literature. There is a 
clear need for determining how academics understand what critical thinking is and how 
they operationalise this through assessment. These form the overall objectives for this 
study. Pursuant to meeting these, I constructed three broadly constituted research 
questions, RQ1-RQ3 inclusive: 
 
RQ1: How do business school academics conceptualise critical thinking?  
 
RQ2: How are business school academics’ conceptualisations of critical thinking 
operationalised through assessment practices?  
 
RQ3: What are the challenges to achieving consistency when assessing for critical 





1.2.2 The case study 
This research is located within a university academic faculty, specifically a business 
school. The university in question, a member of the Russell Group of British research 
universities, is a well-established, traditional and research-intensive city-based 
university. The host business school is highly ranked nationally and internationally for 
the quality of its research and for the standard of its academic programmes. It is one of 
an elite group of UK business schools holding triple accreditation from three 
internationally recognised quality assurance bodies: the Association of MBAs (AMBA), 
the European Quality Improvement System (EQUIS) and The Association to Advance 
Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB). The school offers courses on undergraduate 
and postgraduate degree programmes in the disciplines of accounting, economics, 
finance, business and marketing. It has in the region of four thousand students in any 
given year and employs upwards of a hundred and seventy faculty members (FTE) 
across the subject disciplines (excluding PhD students) (2020 figures).   
 
As the host business school is part of a research-focussed institution, the dissertation 
module, through which students demonstrate that they can undertake a significant piece 
of independent research, then takes on added importance. Dissertations provide the 
capstone of an undergraduate programme of study (Ashwin, Abbas & McLean, 2017; 
Webster, Pepper & Jenkins, 2000). This type of capstone module is a well-established 
feature of undergraduate degrees in the UK. Positioned at the culmination of a degree 
programme, it provides students with an opportunity to synthesise what they have 
learned and demonstrate their independence and higher-level capabilities including their 
critical thinking (Hammer et al., 2018; Lee & Loton, 2019). That dissertations are open-
ended and lack certain outcomes serves to encourage critical thinking in students 
(McQuade, Kometa, Brown, Bevitt & Hall, 2020). The student chooses the topic of 
investigation, thereby defining the focus of the piece, and conducts the investigation 
under academic supervision. The investigation necessitates collection and analysis of 
data, whether primary and/or secondary based, over an extended period. Students can 
show their maturity as independent learners through completing the most complex, 
substantial and independent piece of work required of them from their degree 
programme, and in so doing exhibit their readiness to graduate (Berheide, 2007; 





In this thesis, I employ undergraduate dissertations as a vehicle for examining how 
academics understand and operationalise critical thinking in assessment. All 
undergraduate programmes at the host business school require students to complete a 
research dissertation of up to twelve thousand words as a double-weighted final year 
capstone module. The module, including its constituent requirements and assessment 
guidance, is common across all programmes. The dissertation is a substantial piece of 
work involving detailed and critical examination of a particular topic chosen by the 
student. Empirical research is encouraged but not compulsory. Each student is allocated 
a supervisor who provides guidance and support through to submission via six 
supervisory meetings structured periodically throughout the academic year. The 
supervisor also assesses and offers feedback on a draft dissertation chapter as a piece 
of formative work.  
 
Performance is assessed against criteria. These, together with relevant policies and 
procedures, are published to staff and students in a dissertation module handbook. The 
host business school employs a generic set of grade descriptors applicable to all 
modules on undergraduate programmes in lieu of more detailed ‘assessment criteria’ as 
interpreted in the literature (I expand upon this in Chapter 2). These grade descriptors 
are the only criteria given to assessors to apply to the task of assessing undergraduate 
students’ work, including final-year dissertations. I understand this type of approach is 
common within pre-1992 universities. The grade descriptors (Appendix A) are split into 
bandings: First Class (70+), Upper Second Class (60-69), Lower Second Class (50-59), 
Third Class (40-49) and Fail (<40). First Class is segmented by Exemplary (86-100), 
Outstanding (76-85) and Excellent (70-75); Upper Second Class by Very Good (65-59) 
and Good (60-64); Lower Second Class by Adequate (55-59) and Fair (50-54); Third 
Class by Weak (45-49) and Poor (40-44); with Fail grades split across several segments 
ranging from Very Poor to Outright Fail.  
 
The word ‘critical’ first appears in Good (60-64) described thus: “Reasonably good 
knowledge and understanding, but little evidence of critical assessment or analysis. 
Coherent presentation but less well-structured than seen at higher grades.” Very Good 
(65-59) sees the removal of “reasonably” so that the requirement is for “good 
knowledge”, prefaces “understanding” with “thorough”, and adds a requirement for 
“evidence of broader understanding informed by wider reading”. Answers categorised as 
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Upper Second Class are demarked from First Class through students displaying a “less 
critical grasp of the subject”. As we move up the scale the requirement for the level of 
“knowledge” moves from “good” (65-69) to “detailed” (70-75), “comprehensive” (76-85) 
and “complete” (86-100). “Evidence of judgement in selection and critical analysis of 
relevant material” features at both 70-75 and 76-85. “Minor errors” are “acceptable” “if 
compensated by excellence in other areas” (70-75). Errors are not mentioned above 
this, implying that answers at or above 76 will be error-free. Outwith purely quantitative 
research this aspect must be incredibly difficult to achieve or indeed to assess. What, for 
example, is error-free when it comes to a subjective piece of interpretative research? 
“Structure” features at the First Class level, moving from “good” (70-75) to “logical” (76-
85). “Depth of understanding” further demarks 76-85 from 70-75. Work of Exemplary 
standard (86-100) shows “insight”, which is not referred to below this level. 
The assessment criteria are there to aid consistency. However, assessment criteria 
cannot achieve the necessary shared understandings that would underpin consistent 
application simply by virtue of their existence (Menendez-Varela & Gregori-Giralt, 2016). 
Communication, exchange and negotiation are pivotal. Hence, all undergraduate 
dissertation supervisors/assessors receive an invitation to attend an annual meeting at 
which the dissertation module leader details the policy and requirements for the module, 
including its assessment criteria. Having witnessed such a meeting I interpret this to be a 
didactic session, with little or no space given over to discussion. The assumption is that 
once communicated, anyone can apply the documented assessment criteria with the 
requisite consistency. Anecdotally, attendance at this annual meeting by supervisors is 
patchy at best. I would back this observationally, albeit from only one such meeting that I 
attended. I did find the meeting to be informative but limited as a vehicle for facilitating 
the sharing of knowledge and understanding.  
As a further aid to consistency, all undergraduate dissertations at the host business 
school are internally moderated via a process of ‘double marking’, also known as ‘double 
appraisal’ (per Sadler, 2013), whereby two academics assess a dissertation separately 
and without reference to each other. The two then meet to discuss their respective 
grades with the aim of reaching a consensus grade representing the student’s overall 
achievement vis-à-vis the criteria. That the two assessors meet to compare and discuss 
grades is arguably beneficial in that pairs of assessors can work through and jointly 
agree on the application of the assessment criteria to a dissertation leading to a finalised 
grade. This affords assessors opportunities to discuss and develop their knowledge of 
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the criteria as applied (Beutel, Adie & Lloyd 2017; Bird & Yucel, 2013; Price, 2005). This 
is better than and acts as a check on one assessor applying criteria, whilst it may further 
help to make individual tacit knowledge more explicit. The aim of such a practice is to 
build fairness, consistency, justification and defensibility into grading decisions 
(Bloxham, Hughes & Adie, 2016b). This, as with comparable internal moderation 
mechanisms, then offers inbuilt safeguards for institutions, assessors and students 
(Bloxham & Boyd, 2012; Hand & Clewes, 2000; Partington, 1994; Webster et al., 2000).  
 
However, in such a large business school separated along disciplinary lines there are 
inevitably a great many pairs of assessors leading potentially to a great many 
differences in interpretation and application of criteria. This means that the grade 
awarded to a dissertation is still materially subject to who actually assesses it. The 
assessment policy includes the requirement that should first and second grades differ by 
ten or more percentage points, or split a grade boundary, then the first assessor must 
complete a form explaining the difference and any action taken to come to a consensus 
view. Absent consensus, recourse to a third arbitrating assessor is made. Samples of 
dissertations from all grade band levels are referred to external examiners as a further 
check on the consistency and fairness of the assessment process. That these aspects of 
the policy exist at all recognises that differences do occur and need to be controlled for. 
Analogous to this, research has shown substantial yet seemingly inexplicable variation 
and limited reliability between first and second assessors (See, for example, Brooks, 
2012; Cannings, Hawthorne, Hood & Houston, 2005). Moreover, whilst Kuzich, Groves, 
O’Hare and Pelliccione (2010) would maintain that double marking processes serve to 
improve accuracy and inter-rater reliability, Bloxham (2009) and Cannings et al. (2005) 
would appear to contend otherwise. Whether two assessors can come together and 
agree on a grade that is better and more accurate than the sum of its parts is highly 






This is my thesis. I am the researcher. I am also a business school academic. I do not 
imagine that I can escape subjectivity here. This is inevitable given my immersion in the 
social world under investigation and through the way in which I conceived and executed 
this research. I therefore do not seek objectivity or claim to have achieved it. Instead, I 
have chosen to embrace and account for subjectivity as best I can, recognising that I am 
part of and therefore inextricably linked with the social world I am studying. Subjectivity 
is unavoidable, hence the imperative for demonstrable rigour throughout the research 
process and for vigilance through reflexivity on my part (Farquhar, 2012).  
 
1.3.1 Reflexive statement 
In embracing subjectivity, it is important that I am able to explore reflexively my 
relationship with the research (Brannick & Coghlan, 2007). I have employed a case 
study methodology, within which I have taken a qualitative approach to data collection 
(via semi-structured interviews) and thematic analysis, underpinned by social 
constructionist research philosophy, to examine a contemporary social practice situated 
within a specific setting. From a social constructionist viewpoint all meaningful reality is 
socially constructed (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2012). People as the ‘objects’ of this 
social world, unlike the objects of the natural world, are able to attribute meaning to their 
environment (Bryman, 2015). We actively construct the meanings that we attribute to our 
world as we engage with it (Crotty, 1998). Given the constructed nature of reality there 
ought to be differences, contradictions, struggles as to meanings and hence contested 
versions of reality which I as the researcher must seek to bring to the surface (Cohen, 
Duberley & Mallon, 2004). My aim then is to develop an understanding of my 
participants’ subjective realities, to access the world through their eyes, forming 
empathic understandings (Bryman, 2015). Appreciably, however, the picture I develop 
will inevitably be subject to my own perspectives and biases as a social actor. I must be 
critical then of my own place in this, aware of imprinting my own frames of meaning on 
the reality that I construct from the research data (Cohen et al., 2004). The case study 
methodology can help me with this, challenging rather than simply confirming my own 
biases, noting that the greater bias for Flyvberg (2011) is toward falsification rather than 




That I as the researcher am encouraged to be reflexive is a key strength of social 
constructionism (Johnson & Duberley, 2000). This translates as the need for me to be 
explicit about my own personal values and perspectives that could influence the study 
and to explore how my biography may have shaped it (Burr, 2003). I recognise that I am 
“integrally involved in the case” (Cohen et al., 2017, p.376). I am central to the way in 
which I have conceived and executed this study and necessarily complicit in the 
construction of the version of social reality presented (Cohen et al., 2004). I cannot 
pretend to be a detached observer, or that I have had no influence on the research, but 
what I can do is be reflexive, acknowledging my presence in the process (Hackley, 
1998). 
I should then declare my prior experience of the practice under investigation (Malterud, 
2001). I hold certain assumptions about the processes, practices and beliefs inherent to 
assessing dissertations, the importance of assessing for critical thinking in this and of 
how critical thinking is conceived and judged. This comes from my own experience. I 
began this chapter with an exposition of how the idea for this study formed from my 
transition to academia from professional accountancy practice. Prior to joining academia 
I had enjoyed a career spanning sixteen years in administration, auditing and financial 
management. I have been an academic since 2007, in which time I have taught and 
assessed students at undergraduate and postgraduate levels on a variety of accounting, 
finance, business and law related modules at two universities. I have supervised and 
assessed hundreds of research dissertations, predominantly on undergraduate degrees 
but also postgraduate degrees. I have also worked as an examiner for two professional 
accounting bodies and as an external examiner for universities other than my employer. 
I have then extensive and relevant experience of assessment practices.  
I conducted this research as a full-time academic and a part-time doctoral student. This 
insider dual-status brings some advantages but also presents certain issues. I have the 
advantages of pre-knowledge, experience and understanding of the setting (Bell, 2014; 
Saunders et al., 2012). I have the further advantage of pre-existing relationships with 
participants, albeit to varying degrees of contact and closeness, affording both 
approachability and goodwill. These proved useful in gaining primary access to the 
setting for research purposes and in building a sample of willing participants. 
Appreciably these came largely from what I would describe as the circle of the willing, in 
my estimation a motivated subset of the academic faculty of the host business school. 
Regrettably, some requests for engagement from outside this circle were as anticipated 
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either rebuffed or ignored. For richness, it would have been of value to include other 
voices, particularly those few anecdotally difficult characters who could have added 
different perspectives to the mix. As for those who did choose to participate, I know 
several of those involved, can estimate what they are thinking and can draw on my own 
experience in interview discussions to tease out responses, all the while accepted as an 
insider and hence, above suspicion, a colleague, a confidant and in some cases a 
friend. On the downside, I am of course open to accusations of being too close to the 
setting, of making assumptions and not probing deeply enough, of being incapable of 
observing the objectivity needed for valid research. However, this view is challenged by 
Brannick and Coghlan (2007) who argue that insider research can be valid and can yield 
useful information on organisational reality which traditional research approaches may 
struggle to unearth. Whether I am not sufficiently distant from the setting and hence, 
incapable of being objective is in any event moot. I have stated that I have embraced 
subjectivity and I have further set out my position on the rigour of this research in 
Chapter 4 (s.4.8). I accept that there are also ethical issues to contend with, not just in 
terms of maintaining confidentiality, etc. but also in recognising that interviews could get 
uncomfortable at times and that this may affect my relationships with participants going 
forward (Bell, 2014). Thankfully, whilst interview discussions ranged and I believe many 
honest things were said, I genuinely cannot recall any particular instances of discomfort 
and I have not observed any adverse effects on relationships. 
I have taken care to critically reflect upon my own stance, the “framework of meanings” 
which I hold (Hamilton & Corbett-Whittier, 2012, p.53), borne of my assumptions, my 
own constructed version of reality coming from my own experiences, etc., so as to avoid 
being too influenced when interpreting the data (Cohen et al., 2004; Vaismoradi et al., 
2016). I recognise that my background shapes my stance. Brought up in a staunchly 
religious family I am a practising Catholic. I have a degree in law. I am professionally 
qualified as an accountant. I have worked predominantly in the public sector. I hold to 
the importance of integrity, honesty, morality, justice and fairness. These manifest in the 
context of assessing undergraduate dissertations as a desire to assess as objectively 
and fairly as is possible. From experience, I would hold that others have varying 
perspectives and approaches to assessing undergraduate dissertations dependent upon 
their own backgrounds, sets of beliefs and priorities. Some of whom I have double 
marked with, and so brought assumptions as to their respective positions and 
approaches. Others I have not, and so I have no pre-conceived notions except perhaps 
general ones based on whether the participant was more or less research engaged, 
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epistemologies, methodological preferences, etc. Some participants’ views chime with 
my own, some jar, which could potentially cause disagreements and conflict.  
Embracing subjectivity notwithstanding, I looked to bracket out any pre-conceived 
notions I may have had about participants and their respective approaches to assessing 
undergraduate dissertations. Bracketing requires me to set aside any relevant views and 
preconceptions before tackling the data premised on the concern that these may 
influence and shape the data analysis (Tufford & Newman, 2012). I accept that true 
bracketing is virtually impossible. What I tried to do then before analysing the data is to 
access and reflect upon my tacit knowledge of the organisation and of participants, 
deeply ingrained through socialisation in the setting (Brannick & Coghlan, 2007), 
supported also by thematic analysis processes of decontextualizing and amalgamating 
utterances on like areas, which helped to take the individual out of it.  
I am acutely aware of my position as the primary research instrument (Mathews & Ross, 
2010). I, as the researcher, produced the data for this thesis through interactions with 
participants (Cooper & Morgan, 2008). I recognise that qualitative interviews are co-
constructed by researcher and participant (Brinkman & Kvale, 2015). It follows that 
participants’ responses will be affected by this interaction. Hence, different researchers 
would generate different interactions co-constructing different accounts. Experience 
suggests that research interviewing is demanding (Coolican, 2009). It is a craft, a 
complex set of skills to be learned and honed through practice and experience (Kvale, 
2007; Rubin & Rubin, 2012). I possess substantial experience of interviewing from an 
auditing background but not experience of research interviewing per se. Pilot interviews 
it is said can aid in developing interview techniques, particularly for those who are new 
to research (Sin, 2010). I would agree that the two pilot interviews I conducted did help 
with this. Moreover, I benefited from being an experienced business school  academic, 
possessing then extensive familiarity with the “theme and context of (the) inquiry” which 
Kvale (2007, p.49) would regard as preconditions for “expert interviewing”. I found the 
semi-structured format helped me to keep interview discussions on-topic, whilst giving 
participants the room to explore nuances and personal experiences connected with the 




I chose how to code and ultimately thematise the data, decontextualising and 
recontextualising it in the process (Nowell et al., 2017). I sought to unearth the 
experiences and understandings of participants. I wanted to be “a faithful witness” to 
their accounts (Novell et al., 2017, p.5). However, appreciably these emerged filtered 
through the lens of my own stance, formed from my personal perspectives, pre-existing 
thoughts and beliefs (Starks & Trinidad, 2007). Following the example of Braun and 
Clarke (2012), my thematic analysis combines inductive and deductive approaches. 
Inductive because I have coded directly from the data ‘bottom-up’, seeking therefore to 
access participants’ experiences, and deductive because I also draw on aspects from 
the literature and apply these ‘top-down’ to help me interpret and make sense of those 
experiences. In essence, I necessarily approached the data with some preconceptions 
derived from my background and from my reading of the literature, yet sought to remain 
open to new understandings that emerged whilst attempting to bracket out any 
preconceived notions I may have held of participants.  
Finally, as the sole interpreter I recognise that data interpretation is by definition 
influenced by me (Joffe, 2012). Hence, following Vaismoradi et al. (2016), at certain 
points during the process of thematic analysis I chose to distance myself from the data 
for periods. Immersion in the data was obviously essential for coding and thematic 
development, but I recognised at times the value of taking a step back from it, revisiting 





1.4 Organisation of the thesis 
I have structured this thesis across eight chapters. 
In this first introductory chapter, I have given the background to and rationale for this 
study with reference to my own personal starting point as a business school academic, 
together with relevant aspects of the literature on critical thinking and assessment in 
higher education. I have further delineated the parameters of the study through research 
objectives, questions and the case setting. Finally, I have acknowledged the subjectivity 
of this research and set out my own reflexive position in response.  
In Chapters 2 and 3, I present a two-part review of the literature base underpinning this 
study. In Chapter 2, I focus on how critical thinking in higher education may be defined, 
beginning with and expanding upon the consensus statement of the Delphi Project (see 
Facione, 1990), which sets out critical thinking in terms of skills and dispositions. In 
Chapter 3, I consider the difficulties of assessing for critical thinking in students’ work, 
situated within a broader discussion of assessment practices in higher education, with 
attendant issues of assessment variation and ways in which institutions look to mitigate 
this.  
In Chapter 4, I present my research philosophy, together with the methodology and 
methods I employed to develop answers to the research questions posed in Chapter 1. I 
provide brief descriptions of the study’s participants, together with detailed accounts of 
data collection and analysis. I also consider the limitations of this research, attendant 
ethical considerations, and of how I have sought to maintain rigour with reference to 
suitable criteria.     
In Chapters 5 and 6, I present the detailed findings of my analysis of the dataset, 
demonstrating the development of and support for the resultant themes. 
In Chapter 7, I present a discussion of the findings from the preceding two chapters with 
reference to my research questions, RQ1-RQ3 inclusive, and the literature base In 
Chapters 2 and 3 together with any further reading channelled from the data analysis.  
In Chapter 8, I present a brief overview of this thesis, offer a summation of the key 
findings in answer to my research questions, develop some theoretical and practical 
contributions, put forward suggestions for extension through further research, and 




2. Literature review (Part I) – critical thinking 
2.1  Introduction 
In the preceding introductory chapter, I questioned what we know of how academics 
conceptualise critical thinking. In context, critical thinking is a key goal for education 
according to the Davos World Economic Forum (2019). Higher education institutions 
place heavy emphasis on the development of this and other higher-order graduate skills, 
with critical thinking at the core of the intellectual mission of higher education globally 
(de la Fuente, 2009; Danvers, 2018). However, critical thinking is a contentious term that 
is subject to wide interpretation, is lacking in academic consensus, and which is then 
subject to multiple definitions (Moore, 2013; Wendt & Ase, 2015).  
 
Evidently, the business of assessing students’ work in universities is done year on year 
and for this to happen it stands to reason that if critical thinking forms part of the 
assessment then there must be a level of consensus of what this is. Internalised within 
academic discourses, academics absorb what critical thinking is into their practices so 
that they can recognise it when they see it despite the uncertainty and the apparent 
difficulties they have with defining and explaining what it is exactly (Atkinson, 1997; Fox, 
1994; Gee, 2015). How business school academics in particular conceptualise critical 
thinking is an issue I investigate through this thesis with reference to RQ1. However, as 
a precursor, and for comparative purposes, I draw on relevant literature here in Chapter 
2 to examine what critical thinking is with respect to higher education more broadly, 
developing a description of critical thinking as a practical concept for academics 





2.2 Defining critical thinking 
The term ‘critical thinking’ is used pervasively in higher education. It features strongly in 
institutional rhetoric. Yet, as I have stated, there is no definitive definition, no precise 
specification, no clear conceptualisation, and no commonly held view of what critical 
thinking is, with many interpretations forcibly advocated. Unsurprisingly then, Moore 
(2013, p.519) called critical thinking “a contested notion”, Moon (2008, p.63) a “messy 
concept”, and Brookfield (1987, p.11) a concept that is “exhortatory, heady and 
conveniently vague”. 
 
Critical thinking is a multi-dimensional concept (Liu, Mao, Frankel & Xu, 2016). At one 
level, critical thinking ‘as logicality’ encompasses the application of the rules of logic and 
reasoning in deconstructing arguments. Ennis (1993), for example, offers a detailed 
description that would link critical thinking with logic as a method for distinguishing 
correct from incorrect reasoning in arguments. At quite another level, critical thinking can 
embrace debates around critical pedagogy in education and critical citizenship in 
modern society; debates which I loosely categorise under ‘sociocultural views of critical 
thinking’. Barnett (1997), for example, argued that the purview of higher education 
should be the development of people who are critical beings, i.e. persons who, being 
self-aware and reflexive, can through critical reasoning make critical decisions and take 
critical actions that benefit society. What I have observed from looking across the 
literature are conceptual frameworks that present critical thinking in different ways by 
emphasizing certain aspects of critical thinking, for example philosophical ways of 
thinking including the application of logic and reasoning, the application of cognitive 
skills, attitudinal or dispositional requirements, and beyond to Barnett’s critical beings. I 
acknowledge the latter. However, whilst sociocultural views of critical thinking have value 
as part of a debated and comprehensive scholarly conceptualisation, they are of limited 
practical use as regards how academics actually operationalise critical thinking through 
assessment, with reference to the focus of this thesis. It follows that the literature 
considered here should centre on what Davies (2015, p.64) referred to as “the 
philosophical account of critical thinking”, comprised primarily of skills and dispositions 





2.2.1 The Delphi Project (1988-90) 
Facione (1990) provides a key starting point and an authoritative base for any 
definitional discussion of critical thinking. Facione conducted a research project 
sponsored by the American Philosophical Association – the Delphi Project (1988-90) - 
that had as its remit the investigation and preparation of a framework for critical thinking. 
This aimed to compile a definition of critical thinking through cross-disciplinary 
discussions involving many international experts (Lincoln & Kearney, 2019). This 
resulted in a “consensus statement regarding critical thinking and the ideal critical 
thinker” (p.3), which reads as follows: 
 
“We understand critical thinking to be purposeful, self-regulatory judgment which 
results in interpretation, analysis, evaluation and inference, as well as explanation of 
the evidential, conceptual, methodological, criteriological, or contextual considerations 
upon which that judgment is based. CT is essential as a tool of inquiry. As such, CT is 
a liberating force in education and a powerful resource in one’s personal and civic life. 
While not synonymous with good thinking, CT is a pervasive and self-rectifying 
human phenomenon. The ideal critical thinker is habitually inquisitive, well-informed, 
trustful of reason, open-minded, flexible, fair-minded in evaluation, honest in facing 
personal biases, prudent in making judgments, willing to reconsider, clear about 
issues, orderly in complex matters, diligent in seeking relevant information, 
reasonable in the selection of criteria, focused in inquiry, and persistent in seeking 
results which are as precise as the subject and the circumstances of inquiry permit. 
Thus, educating good critical thinkers means working towards this ideal. It combines 
developing CT skills with nurturing those dispositions which consistently yield useful 






This statement is rooted in the “critical thinking movement” of the 1970s and 1980s 
(Davies, 2015, p.42), which draws heavily from the disciplines of in particular philosophy 
and cognitive psychology. As a definition of critical thinking it is wordy and convoluted, 
which is symptomatic of the complexity of the subject, and Facione admitted that only a 
degree of consensus was reached with alternative lists proposed and at least one expert 
excluded by request from the consensus statement (Moore 2011a). Examining that 
consensus statement, I distinguish two core threads. Firstly, a cognitive skills outlook, 
i.e. the actions performed by critical thinkers pursuant to a task (qua argumentation and 
judgement formation), typically set out as cognitive skills, beginning with but not limited 
to the structured application of logic and reasoning (Rear, 2019; Swanwick et al., 2014). 
Secondly, a dispositions outlook, i.e. that critical thinkers possess the attitudes or 
dispositions necessary to motivate the exercise of said skills pursuant to critical thought 
(Davies, 2015; Halonen, 1995).  
 
2.2.2 Cognitive skills outlook 
2.2.2.1 Logic and reasoning 
Critical thinking is often connected with the application of the formal structures of logic 
and reasoning vis-à-vis argumentation (Swanwick et al., 2014). Siegel (1985), for 
example, makes links between critical thinking and logic. Facione (2011, p.20) refers to 
a “zealous dedication to reason”. Fisher (2001, p.13) too connects critical thinking and 
reasoning, describing the former as “a kind of evaluative thinking” that is “particularly 
concerned with the quality of reasoning or argument…” Ennis (1962, p.86) originally 
defined critical thinking as “correct assessing of statements”, referring to the application 
of the rules of logic to arguments, although he later augmented this with reference to 
reflective judgement. Kurfiss (1988, p.iii) defined critical thinking as the ability “…to 
detect and avoid fallacious reasoning and to analyse deductive and inductive 
arguments”. Halpern & Sternberg (2020, p.3) also speak of “overcoming fallacies”, i.e. of 
identifying faulty reasoning in arguments. Mulnix (2012, pp.464-465) similarly defines 
critical thinking as “acquiring, developing, and exercising the skill of being able to grasp 
inferential connections holding between statements”, effectively reducing it to a process 





For de Bono (1982), thinking more broadly and logic have long been associated 
because historically when students have been taught to think the focus has been on the 
formal rules of logic. However, whilst de Bono acknowledged logic as a useful tool for 
unpicking arguments, supported by Bernstein (1995, p.22) who deemed logic to be “a 
powerful guide for critiquing arguments”, he also considered thinking to involve much 
more than the application of logic to arguments. Meyers (1986) would further claim that 
the ability to think critically is not necessarily improved by learning logic. Certainly, an 
argument can be entirely logical as constructed but this does not necessarily mean that 
it is sound (de Bono, 1983). Moreover, there is a sense of the critical thinker as 
autonomous, as someone who works through things to arrive at appropriately judged 
conclusions and justifiable decisions. This would seem incongruous with slavishly 
following the rules of logic. Nonetheless, several authors note that logic and reasoning 
are implicit to argumentation and hence, to critical thinking (see, for example, Bailin & 
Siegel, 2002; Erikson & Erikson, 2018; Moon, 2008; Pithers & Soden, 2000; Swanwick 
et al., 2014). 
 
2.2.2.2 Skills of argumentation 
More broadly than logic and reasoning, critical thinking is invariably characterised in 
terms of cognitive and interpretive skills (see, for example, Halpern, 2014), or ‘mental 
processes’ (Bailin, Case, Coombs & Daniels, 1999a), connected with analysing the 
arguments of others. Butler & Halpern (2020, p.152) describe critical thinking as “good 
thinking that is well reasoned and well supported with evidence”. This would encompass 
inter alia “evaluating evidence, analysing arguments, inductive and deductive reasoning, 
identifying assumptions and hypotheses, drawing conclusions, extrapolating inferences 
and understanding implications” (Liu et al., 2016, p.678).  
Critical thinking as argumentation involves being able to determine the validity of an 
argument as structured, assessing the extent to which its premises may be relied upon, 
whether its reasoning is fallacious or valid, whether its conclusions follow logically, etc. 
(Davies, 2015). This understanding of critical thinking as argumentation is ubiquitous for 
many, particularly so in higher education where argumentation is regarded as a 
fundamental skill (see, for example, Andrews, 2015; Davies, 2013, 2015; Mitchell, 1994; 
Mitchell & Riddle, 2000; Scott, 2000; Wingate 2012). This view of critical thinking 
demands that higher education students are able to understand, reconstruct, assess and 
evaluate arguments (Carrington et al., 2011; Harrell, 2011). These are the cognitive 
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tasks inherent to ‘argument analysis’ (Ennis, 1985a; Fisher & Scriven, 1997; Kuhn, 
1991). In more detail, critical thinkers can recognise relationships, make suitable 
inferences and evaluate evidence; can track inconsistencies in reasoning; can pick apart 
arguments, root out central issues, question assumptions and assertions, synthesise 
information and interpret the validity of conclusions (Espey, 2018; Pascarella & 
Terenzini, 1991; Tsui, 2002). Critical thinking should also be evident in students 
constructing their own arguments (Moon, 2008). However, the lack of argument in 
students’ work, manifest in largely descriptive uncritical text, is a common complaint of 
academics (Du Boulay, 1999; Fox, 1994; Shafer, 2013). 
 
Mayer and Goodchild (1995) narrowly construed critical thinking in terms of the ability to 
understand and evaluate arguments. This is arguably prevalent given, for example, the 
emphasis on the skills of argumentation as critical thinking in the study skills approach 
adopted by student self-help guides (see, for example, Cottrell, 2017). Skills are likely to 
be the easiest facets of critical thinking for students to grasp because they are familiar, 
residing within their existing cognitive frames of reference (Moon, 2008). Consequently, 
these self-help guides focus on deconstructing arguments as a developmental skill. 
Students should be able to make inferences from analysis and synthesis of relevant 
sources because the ability to analyse a range of material and formulate balanced and 
supported arguments is a staple of high grades, particularly in the social sciences and 
the humanities (Tynjala, 2008; Wendt & Ase, 2015; Guo & Shi, 2016). Students who are 
thinking critically are able to develop their own viewpoints, informed by their 
interrogation, analysis and evaluation of the ideas and arguments of others (Ramage et 
al., 2009; Jonassen & Kim, 2010; Luque, 2011; Hammer, 2017). However, the focus on 
skills development in self-help guides is largely with respect to studying the arguments of 
others, sequenced as a series of analytical steps – identify, analyse and evaluate the 
lines of reasoning, propositions, conclusions, evidence, etc. This provides students with 
a generic blueprint to follow, the result of which should offer evidence of critical thinking 
for academics. Agreeing with Moon (2008), some emphasis, although arguably not 
enough, is also placed on students constructing their own arguments. Nevertheless, the 
cognitive models of critical thinking proffered by such guides are popular and in all 
likelihood underpin much of how we engage with critical thinking in higher education 
because of its distillation into a series of analytical skills and steps. This is easier to 
teach, easier to learn and easier to evidence than engaging with critical thinking as a 
way of thinking or being. This approach may have its limits, simplifying from the multi-
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dimensional concept that critical thinking is taking into consideration the literature as a 
whole. Nonetheless, it has been hugely influential – the multiple editions and volume of 
sales of such critical thinking guides would point to this – and is likely therefore to 
underpin students’ behaviour and academics’ expectations.   
From the literature base the many skills of the critical thinker may be summarised as 
describing, understanding, questioning, interpreting, analysing, synthesising, evaluating, 
reasoning, inference, problem solving, self-regulation and judgement (see, for example, 
Bissell & lemons, 2006; Davies, 2015; Facione, 1990; Halonen, 1995; Halpern, 2014; 
Ikuenobe, 2001; Kek & Huijser, 2011; Nicholas & Raider-Roth, 2011; Paul & Elder, 
2006; Rodriguez, 2009; Tapper, 2004). 
 
2.2.2.3 Reflection and self-correction 
Ennis emphasised the rational and reflective basis of the concept of critical thinking 
(Moore, 2013). Ennis’s (1987, p.50) description of “reasonable, reflective thinking 
focused on deciding what to believe or do” is widely cited as articulating the nature of 
critical thinking (Lai, 2012). However, this is subject to the criticism that in its apparent 
simplicity the definition fails to capture the complexity of interpreting what is ‘reasonable’ 
and what is ‘reflective’ in application to ‘thinking’ (Leong, 2013). McPeck (1981) refers 
also to ‘reflective scepticism’, reflective being of relevance here, scepticism I will return 
to (see s.2.2.3). Connectedly I would add “Skilful, responsible thinking that facilitates 
good judgement” (Lipman, 1988, p.39); “thinking aimed at forming a judgement” (Bailin 
et al., 1999b, p.287); and “discerning or discriminating thought characterised by careful 
analysis and judgement” (Cooper & Patton, 2009, p.2). I note that these descriptions 
would seem to focus less on the mechanics and skills of argumentation and more on the 
reflective basis for forming judgements and making decisions. Such references to 





Metacognition may be defined generally as thinking about thinking, or knowing what we 
know and what we do not know (Livingston, 1997; Mahdavi, 2014). Paul (1990, p.32) 
does not explicitly reference metacognition, although the inclusion of “the art of thinking 
about your thinking” within his list of facets of critical thinking could conceivably come 
within this. Elsewhere, it is suggested that to think critically we have to be self-regulatory, 
i.e. not just aware of our own thinking but actively monitoring and controlling our thinking 
(Facione, 1990; Griffith & Ruan, 2005; Hennessey, 1999; Martinez, 2006). Self-
correction – being “brave enough to risk being wrong, and wise enough to realize that 
much can be learned from errors and failed solutions” (Nelson, 2005, p. xiv) – is, per 
Lipman (2003), essentially metacognitive and is said to be necessary for thinking to 
qualify as critical. We can learn and improve by being alive to potential deficiencies in 
our thinking through constantly testing our rationality against differing perspectives 
(Brookfield, 1987). 
 
Some would argue that metacognition stands apart from critical thinking, whereas 
others, like Lipman (2003), see metacognition as important to developing an adequate 
understanding of critical thinking (see Davies, 2015; Halonen, 1995; Halpern, 1998; 
Jones, 2020; Kuhn, 1999; Kuhn & Dean, 2004; van Gelder, 2005; Willingham, 2008). 
Davies (2015), for example, argues that metacognition is integral to critical thinking as a 
necessary cognitive skill. Not a skill of argumentation per se, but one that is necessary 
for it. This, however, draws on only a limited body of research into cognitive 
development that specifically links metacognition or meta-knowing and critical thinking 
(see, for example, Kuhn, 1999; Olson & Astington, 1993). Moreover, Davies (2015) and 
Halonen (1995), who both advocate for metacognition as a cognitive skill for critical 
thinking, sought to build holistic conceptual models of critical thinking in higher education 
without having specific regard to its assessment. Metacognition is about self-
assessment, not academics’ assessment of students’ work, as is the focus in this thesis. 
This fundamental difference obviates further consideration of metacognition as a 





2.2.3 Dispositions outlook 
Added to the cognitive skills outlook are dispositions. Davies (2015, p.55) refers to these 
as elements of ‘propensity’, meaning “an inclination or tendency to behave in a certain 
way.” A person needs not only the skills to think critically but also the drive or propensity 
to use them (Ennis, 1987, 1996). Studies from education have shown that skills and 
dispositions relating to critical thinking are correlated (see, for example, Heijltjes, Van 
Gog, Leppink & Paas, 2014). Hence, students who think critically need to want to 
engage in critical thought (Bensley et al., 2016; Verburgh 2019; Wilson & Howitt, 2018). 
One can possess all the necessary skills for critical thinking but not apply them if 
disinclined to exercise those skills (Calma & Davies, 2020). The requisite dispositions or 
‘habits of mind’ thus form precursors to the exercise of the cognitive skills pursuant to 
critical thought (Brown & Rutter, 2006; Ennis, 1985b; Facione, 1990). Here now the 
critical thinker is intrinsically motivated, possessing the right “attitudes and a sense of 
psychological readiness of the human being to be critical…defined [I suggest with 
reference to Facione, Sanchez, Facione & Gainen, 1995] as a constellation of attitudes, 
intellectual values and habits of mind” (Davies, 2015, p.55). Passmore (1967) and 
Facione (1992) both capture this under the term “critical spirit”, manifest for Facione in 
“probing inquisitiveness” and “keenness of mind” (Facione, 1992, p.10). The literature 
offers several such dispositions inherent to critical thinking. These include open-
mindedness, fair-mindedness, creativity, flexibility, curiosity, inquisitiveness, persistence, 
objectivity, a desire to be well-informed, prudence in decision-making and a readiness to 
self-correct where needed (see, for example, Bailin et al, 1999b; Calma & Davies, 2020; 
Ennis, 1985b; Facione, 1990; Facione et al., 1995; Halpern, 1998; Halpern & Sternberg, 
2020; Paul, 1992). 
 
Critical thinking in higher education is fundamentally about making reliable and 
persuasive judgements substantiated through sound assessment of evidence from 
various sources (Moon, 2008). However, critical thinking is evidently more complex and 
involved than the skills outlook would suggest, characterised not only by analysis and 
argumentative reasoning but also by authority, a willingness to doubt and hence a 
degree of independent thinking (Fisher, 2001; Harrell, 2011; Wendt & Ase, 2015). This is 
underpinned by a propensity for scepticism towards authorities (Moore, 2013; Rear, 
2019). Students are expected to have the habit of mind to question and challenge, to 
examine alternatives, to strive for meanings and justifications (Moon, 2008). This 
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scepticism is controlled, putting it in a positive light in that ‘critical’ students are not 
wedded to their prior beliefs, nor do they accept information unquestioningly but exercise 
caution in absorbing knowledge and the ideas of others after carefully examining their 
reasoning, conclusions and evidence (Garside, 1996; Stanovich & West, 1997; Browne 
& Freeman, 2000). Linked with this, Paul (1981, p.2) differentiates “strong sense” from 
“weak sense” critical thinking. The latter refers to the process of applying the 
aforementioned cognitive skills to discover flawed reasoning, whereas the former 
acknowledges the complexity of situations, which invariably require choosing between 
different perspectives, and the importance of forming a judgement that is contextually 
situated. It is not just about being analytic therefore, although this is an important aspect 
of critical thinking, but also about possessing a “concern for truth” and being “open to 
new ideas” (Halpern and Sternberg, 2020, p.1). The critical thinker then is predisposed 
to “open-mindedness, fair-mindedness, independent-mindedness, an inquiring 
attitude…” (Lai, 2012, p.936). Being open to different interpretations, different 
perspectives, different approaches, enables the critical thinker to have greater 
appreciation of context and a deeper understanding of the position ultimately adopted 
(Browne and Freeman, 2000). 
 
Similarly, for Brookfield (1987) critical thinking involves much more than the exercise of 
cognitive reasoning, and goes beyond dissecting the logic of arguments and weighing 
the opinions of others. It requires a recognition of our own beliefs, our own behaviours 
and the assumptions which underlie these which lead to our making seemingly rationale 
judgements. It is then an emotional as well as a cognitive concept. Emotions, both 
positive and negative, can motivate critical thinking (Brookfield, 1987; Halonen, 1995). 
As critical thinkers, we can experience “joy, release, relief, and exhilaration as we break 
through to new ways of looking at our…world” (Brookfield, 1987, p.7). If well managed, 
our emotions can help us to respond critically and contribute to critical thinking becoming 
our habitual response (Halonen, 1995). Emotion is conceivably inherent to several of the 
aforementioned dispositions connected with critical thinking by the Delphi Project 
consensus statement and the respective models of critical thinking in higher education of 
Davies (2015) and Halonen (1995). Emotion then is potentially as important to critical 
thinking as cognitive and affective elements (Davies, 2015; Halonen, 1995; Halonen, 
Smith & Dunn, 2008). However, this is not necessarily reflected in the literature, for 





Returning now to McPeck’s (1981) ‘reflective scepticism’, I take this to mean firstly, 
being sceptical of conventional wisdom and dominant views (ala Mingers, 2000), and 
secondly, being open to alternative interpretations and perspectives (ala Paul, 1981), for 
the critical thinker tolerates ambiguity, appreciates individual differences and respects 
different viewpoints (see Bailin et al., 1999b; Facione, 1990). Invariably, thinking that is 
‘critical’ is applied with deep engagement to complex matters that are likely subject to 
different viewpoints (Moon, 2008). Critical thinkers take nothing for granted, analysing 
assumptions and considering alternative perspectives, questioning their own 
assumptions and those of others and of received wisdom (Barnet & Bedau, 2010; 
Carrithers & Bean, 2008; Perkins, Jay & Tishman, 1994; Jones, 2009; Walker & Finney, 
1999). For Brown and Rutter (2008), critical thinkers are not defensive and do not adopt 
a single-minded attitude but are instead open to possibilities. They have the courage to 
challenge orthodoxy but are not impulsive or precipitate in doing so, taking a prudent 
and thoroughly disciplined approach to thinking it all through and arriving at reasoned 
determinations (James et al., 2010: Jones, 2009; Mingers, 2000).  
 
Finally, creativity also has a dispositional role in critical thinking (Bailin et al., 1996b; 
Moon, 2008). Thinking critically is said to involve thinking creatively (Halpern, 2014). 
Being creative in the higher education context involves “producing something new” 
(Dumitru, 2019, p.870). It can involve exercising ingenuity and innovation (Anastasiadou 
& Dimitriadou, 2011) in doing something that is “novel and adaptive” (Brodin, 2016, 
p.972, drawing on Amabile, 1996 and Sternberg & Lubart, 1999), but which is also 
“relevant (valuable)” (Bennich-Bjorkmann, 1997, p.25), denoting for Anastasiadou and 
Dimitriadou (2011) the importance of creating new knowledge. Novelty can come from 
the context, participants and subject of research (Dumitru, 2019). This is likely to involve 
some imagination as well as taking on some risk (Sternberg & Kaufman, 2010). 
Creativity is thus said to embody originality (Brodin, 2016; Dumitru, 2019; Jackson & 
Shaw, 2006; Lovitts, 2008; Winter, Griffiths & Green, 2000). Originality is in turn closely 
associated with critical thinking (Simpkins, 1987; Holbrook et al., 2007). I have said that 
students in higher education are expected to move beyond passive reception of that 
which is given as known through to active engagement in critical thinking. This extends 
even to creation of new knowledge (Bok, 2006). Moore (2013) too highlighted the 
importance, as far as participating academics in his study were concerned, of students 
actually going beyond challenging the ideas of others to demonstrate some originality of 
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thought in producing their own ideas, of contributing to knowledge in some way, 
howsoever modest.  
 
2.2.4   The generalist versus specifist debate 
What critical thinking is, or how critical thinking is defined, is one substantial debate in 
the literature that I have sought to examine in this chapter. Another substantial debate, 
in the context of how critical thinking might best be taught and developed in students, is 
the debate highlighted by Davies (2013) between what he refers to as the ‘generalists’ 
and the ‘specifists’, i.e. whether critical thinking is a generic skill or a disciplinary specific 
one. On the one hand, the generalists subscribe to the view that critical thinking is 
largely if not wholly a generic ability which is transferable across disciplines and contexts 
(Ennis, 1962), and which can thus be taught and learned independently of disciplines. 
Whereas the specifists hold that critical thinking is a discipline-specific ability which is not 
so transferable (McPeck, 1981) and which cannot be taught and learned absent the 
relevant discipline. A “long-standing controversy”, this debate has continued more 
recently between Davies (2006, 2011, 2013), who advocates the generalist position, and 
Moore (2004, 2011b), who likewise supports the specifist position (Golding, 2011, 
p.360). I acknowledge this debate but need not enter into it here because as I indicated 
the discourse underpins a broader pedagogic debate about how critical thinking may be 
taught, rather than how critical thinking may be assessed.  
Nonetheless I was conscious of this debate when forming this research and in 
structuring my participant sample (refer to s.4.4.3 Participant sampling) with a view to 
potentially exploring this issue of critical thinking as generalist or specifist across the 
different subject disciplines of a business school. Ultimately, I did not place this in focus 
through the study’s research questions, concentrating therein on conceptualising critical 
thinking and examining how it is operationalised through assessment. Hence, I did not 
take this issue forward in this thesis. However, this is something I would hope to revisit 






Critical thinking is defined in the literature, albeit in multiple ways, but many of which 
converge on the same basic awareness of critical thinking as an amalgamation of skills 
and dispositions (Halpern & Sternberg, 2020). The Delphi Project, for example, did just 
that and the project’s consensus statement serves as an authoritative starting point for a 
definitional journey into critical thinking in higher education. 
 
Subsuming logic and reasoning, the skills outlook characterises critical thinking in terms 
of cognitive and interpretive skills connected with argumentation (Moon, 2008), i.e. skills 
of interpretation, analysis, evaluation, inference and metacognition, pursuant to 
judgement formation and decision-making. This corresponds to the first part of the 
Delphi Project consensus statement. In higher education, this is about students 
developing and applying their cognitive skills to deconstruct the arguments of others and 
to make reasoned arguments of their own, forming substantiated judgements or 
decisions. This skillset is of course of value across disciplines, particularly so in business 
contexts in which rapid complex decision making is often a necessity of working life.  
 
Critical thinkers are not solely reliant upon cognitive skills pursuant to critical thinking. 
The literature offers several relevant dispositions, e.g. open-mindedness, fair-
mindedness, creativity, curiosity, flexibility, self-correction, etc., noting that skills and 
dispositions coordinate for critical thinkers to achieve purposeful reflection in reaching 
judgements and making decisions (Payan-Carreira, Cruz, Papathanasiou, Fradelos & 
Jiang, 2019). One needs the skills but also the propensity to use them to engage in 
critical thought.  
 
In this chapter, the first of a two-part literature review, I have focussed on what critical 
thinking is as a practical concept with respect to higher education, linking with RQ1. In 
the following chapter, Chapter 3, I focus on how assessment practices accommodate 
critical thinking, why variation occurs by and across assessors and what institutional 





3. Literature review (Part II) – critical thinking and assessment practices 
3.1 Introduction 
In the preceding chapter, I sought to define what critical thinking is with regard to higher 
education, primarily as an amalgamation of skills and dispositions. This relates to RQ1: 
How do business school academics conceptualise critical thinking? 
 
In this chapter, the second of a two-part literature review, I extend my focus to how 
critical thinking may be assessed in higher education, situated within a broader 
discussion of higher education assessment practices. This relates to RQ2: How are 
business school academics’ conceptualisations of critical thinking operationalised 
through assessment practices?  
 
Assessing a student’s piece of work means attaching to it a grade, i.e. a level of 
achievement in a currency that is commonly understood as evidencing and 
communicating the academic capabilities of students, such as a percentage mark or 
other numerical or qualitative classifier (Sadler, 2009). In higher education, critical 
thinking invariably forms part of this assessment but as to how exactly and to what 
extent are unclear. I consider these points in relation to higher education assessment 
practices. I begin by problematizing critical thinking and assessment in higher education, 
distinguishing standardised tests of critical thinking from assessing for critical thinking in 
essays and dissertations, and highlighting the problems of and reasons for grading 
variation. Variation notwithstanding, it seems that ultimately in reaching examination 
boards there is apparent agreement between assessors. I put forward two explanations 
for this. Firstly, I make the case for models of epistemological development, examining in 
particular those of Perry (1970) and Baxter Magolda (1992), as potentially reflective of 
academics’ expectations of students with respect to critical thinking as assessed. 
Secondly, I consider the part played by key institutional mechanisms put in place to 
achieve consistency and hence mitigate variation, namely criterion-referenced 
assessment, internal moderation and external examination. This all links with RQ3: What 
are the challenges to achieving consistency when assessing for critical thinking in 





3.2 Assessment of critical thinking problematized 
If higher education institutions are nurturing critical thinkers then this should be apparent 
from and demonstrated through assessment of learning outcomes (Arum & Roksa, 
2008; Klein et al., 2007; Lee at al., 2015). Assessment can take many forms but higher 
education assessment practices are underpinned by a culture of testing (Medland, 
2016).  One way of evaluating critical thinking is through standardised tests. There is 
now an industry to this with several tests devised for this purpose. Evidently there is 
some value in these tests which, built on the critical thinking taxonomies of Ennis, 
Facione, etc., seek to evaluate skills of analysis, deduction, inference, evaluation, 
reasoning and so on (Rear, 2019). Their proliferation would suggest that assessment of 
critical thinking whilst difficult is nonetheless feasible (Ennis, 1993). However, this 
undoubtedly remains problematic (Black, 2012; Tiruneh, De Cock, Weldeslassie, Elen & 
Janssen, 2017). Ennis (1993), for example, highlighted several ‘traps’ for the unwary 
tester of critical thinking that serve to interfere with validity. Rear (2019, p.668) describes 
such tests as “limited in their extent”, based on restricted conceptions of critical thinking, 
assuming only correct/incorrect answers, which in itself appears uncritical, and 
“inauthentic” in being divorced from “real-world examples”. Of particular concern is the 
emphasis given to standardised tests as quantitative assessment instruments, with 
greater focus on qualitative aspects called for when assessing critical thinking (Puig, 
Blanco-Anaya, Bargiela & Crujeiras-Pérez, 2019). Measurement of learning forms the 
dominant discourse of higher education assessment culture - we measure outcomes and 
we certificate learning (Boud, 2007). However, Yorke (2011) argues that putting the 
emphasis on ‘measurement’, whether implicit or explicit, is inappropriate because grades 
are not true measures in the scientific sense. In any event, the assessment of critical 
thinking in higher education does not typically take the form of standardised testing 
given that there is often no correct answer or single way of demonstrating the 
achievement of complex learning outcomes. Assessment of higher-order tasks such as 
critical thinking is an exercise in quasi-measurement involving complex interpretive 





Students who achieve higher grades necessarily demonstrate greater critical thinking 
and achieve better grades than lower academic achievers (Dwyer et al., 2014; James et 
al., 2002; Stassen et al., 2011). However, whilst assessment is one of the most common 
duties performed by academics, it is also one of the most difficult duties to perform well 
(Whalley, 2016). Traditional signature assessment tasks leading to single rather than 
multiple outcome measures are insufficient to assess the complexity of critical thinking 
(Spicer & Hanks, 1995). Hence, Academics possess significant autonomy concerning 
assessment, and where complex work is involved student responses are generally open, 
diverse and given considerable latitude (Bloxham, 2009; Bloxham et al., 2011).  
 
Essays are set as a means of fostering analytical thinking and independence in students 
and are commonly employed in assessing undergraduate students for complex learning 
aspects such as critical thinking (Wendt & Ase, 2015). Argumentative essays, a genre 
associated with higher order thinking, are particularly valued as mechanisms by which 
critical thinking can be assessed (see, for example, Andrews, 2003; Hammer, 2017; 
MacLellan, 2004; Prosser & Webb 1994; Scott, 2000; Smith, Campbell & Brooker, 
1999). This is especially observable in so-called ‘soft disciplines’, i.e. non-science 
subjects, to include business-related subjects (Ylonen, Gillespie & Green, 2018). Essays 
are thought able to offer insights into students’ critical thinking because they demand 
careful analysis and critique of the views of others, evaluating their arguments and 
providing supporting evidence (Leong, 2013; Schendel & Tolmie, 2017; Tapper, 2004). 
However, students may tackle an essay question in different but equally effective ways. 
This necessarily lends to subjectivity, causing problems for reliability between assessors 
(Baume, Yorke & Coffey, 2004; Bloxham 2009; Yorke, 2011). Students also find it 
difficult to produce essays that show suitable levels of critical thinking (Hammer & 
Griffiths, 2015). Assessing this consistently is thus no easy task. Of course any claims to 
comparability and consistency make assumptions that academics hold shared 
conceptions of academic standards as applied to students’ work, assumptions which 





That higher education assessment is inconsistent and unreliable is well observed, 
researched and reported (see, for example, Bloxham et al., 2016a; Ecclestone, 2001; 
O’Hagan & Wigglesworth, 2015; Yorke, 2008, 2011). With undergraduate numbers rising 
leading to larger assessment teams inconsistencies have become more apparent 
(Mulryan-Kyne, 2010; O’Hagan & Wigglesworth, 2015). Even in the context of large-
scale standardised tests, studies have shown that assessor variability is a concern (see, 
for example, Barkaoui, 2010; Lumley, 2005; Weigle, 2002; Wolfe, Kao & Ranney, 1998). 
Considerably more variation is observed when it comes to assessing complex higher-
order thinking through essays, for example, because unlike standardised tests these are 
open to individual interpretation and resist direct measurement (Bloxham et al., 2016a; 
O’Connell et al., 2016). Variation is similarly observed, with particular reference to this 
thesis, with respect to the assessment of dissertations (see, for example, Bettany-
Saltikov et al., 2009; Pathirage, Haigh, Amaratunga & Baldry, 2007).  
 
3.2.1 Grading variation 
Assessor reliability is observably low for essays in cases outwith pure knowledge recall 
(Elton & Johnson, 2002). O’Hagan and Wigglesworth (2015) found distinct variability in 
grades awarded to the same essay by different assessors, in line with previous studies 
of a similar nature (see, for example, Laming, 1990; Read, Francis & Robson, 2005). It 
seems that complex qualitative performances simply cannot be reduced to that which 
can be measured with certainty or reliability (Bloxham, 2009; Knight & Yorke, 2003; 
Yorke 2008). The open nature of an essay or a dissertation renders it more difficult to 
achieve reliability compared with more clearly defined closed assessment tasks such as 
multiple-choice tests (Huot, 1990; O’Hagan & Wigglesworth, 2015). Essays that involve 
the human world, as opposed to the world of the natural sciences, necessarily rely more 
heavily on assessors’ subjective judgments (Knight, 2006). However, studies in the field 
of cognition have shown that characteristics inherent to complex decision-making cause 
inconsistencies in academic judgement (Brooks, 2012). Healey (2013), referencing 
Webster et al. (2001), suggests that variation is often higher for dissertations than seen 






Why variation occurs is undoubtedly a complex matter (George-Williams, Carroll, Ziebell, 
Thompson, & Overton, 2019). To begin with, mistakes or ineptitude cannot be ruled out 
(Dalziel, 1998; Heywood, 2000). Research has also shown that variation can be 
ascribed to differences in implicit beliefs, i.e. what each academic individually considers 
of importance or worthy of particular attention when judging the academic worth of a 
piece of work (Hunter & Docherty, 2011). Academics have different backgrounds, 
knowledge, values, expertise, experience, etc. and may as a result differ in the 
importance each attaches subjectively to particular aspects or qualities of assessed work 
(Bloxham, 2009; Bloxham, Hudson, den Outer & Price, 2015; Bloxham et al., 2016a; 
O'Hagan & Wigglesworth, 2015; Read et al., 2005; Smith & Coombe, 2006). That 
assessors operate from such different reference points is perhaps also reflective of 
different levels of socialisation into disciplinary and/or local assessment communities 
(Johnston, 2004; Yorke, 2011; Yorke, Bridges & Woolf, 2000). Assessors may, for 
example, not sufficiently understand the published assessment outcomes; or have 
differing conceptions of what assessment actually involves; or differing expectations of 
what constitutes achievement at various levels (Baume et al., 2004; Ekstrom & Villegas, 
1994; Grainger, Purnell & Zipf, 2008; Hand & Clewes, 2000; Yorke, 2011; Yorke et al., 
2000). Any of these factors may lead to variation.  
 
Despite these observed issues, academics are considered expert assessors (Bloxham, 
2009). Due to their knowledge, formed from their background, education, expertise, 
experience and understanding of the standards of their discipline borne of disciplinary 
socialisation, academics are appropriately positioned to make sound and reliable expert 
assessment judgements (Bloxham et al., 2011; Ecclestone, 2001; Sadler, 2013). This is 
implicit to non-standardised elements of higher education assessment. Expert assessors 
reach a point through experience where they acquire “practical mastery” of assessment 
systems through which they are able to judge students’ work, albeit often struggling to 
articulate the basis of that judgement (Bloxham, et al., 2011, p.658). The more proficient 
expert assessor is able to intuitively judge and explain the derivation of that judgement 
with reference to assessment criteria (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 2005). In the main, people 
become better at something with practice and experience. However, experience of 
assessment is no guarantee of consistency. With respect to the consistent application of 
assessment criteria, for example, studies have found no apparent difference between 
novice and experienced assessors, notwithstanding the apparent greater propensity of 
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novice assessors to be more rule governed (Bloxham et al., 2016a; Ecclestone, 2001; 
Price, 2005).  
 
As learning increases in complexity, and with it chosen modes of assessment, the more 
assessors rely on what Eisner (1985) referred to as ‘connoisseurship’ over measurement 
in judging students’ work (Bloxham, 2009). Academics rely less and less with experience 
on the application of artefacts such as predefined assessment criteria (Jansson, Carle, 
Gunnarsson, & Ekbrand, 2019; Sadler, 2005; Yorke, 2011). Academics as connoisseurs 
rely on their innate judgement having cultivated mental assessment models that they 
apply irrespective of assessment criteria (Ecclestone, 2001). This, however, tends to be 
unconscious, intuitive and tacit, making it elusive and its articulation and discernment 
troublesome (Golding, 2019; O’Donovan, Price & Rust, 2004). Moreover, expertise is no 
guarantee of quality. Expert subjective judgements can still be “poorly based, erratic and 
unreliable” (Sadler, 2013, p.14). Given these factors, it seems unlikely that assessors 
relying upon individual connoisseurship will give similar judgements, particularly of 
learning outcomes such as critical thinking that resist quantification. However, research 
has shown that development of shared understandings can work over time to calibrate 
judgements and reduce variability within teams (Adie, Lloyd & Beutel, 2013; Beutel et 
al., 2017; Elwood & Klenwoski, 2002; Sadler, 2011, 2013). Hence, less variability would 
be anticipated amongst assessors who frequently assess together. If connoisseurship is 
located within a local assessment community then the more experience an assessor has 
within that community the more likely it is that assessors’ judgements will align more 
closely.  
 
Notwithstanding the issues highlighted here, and the evidence pointing to variation, the 
reality is that everything settles down in time for grades to be processed through 
examination boards. There is a tendency towards agreement with the grades submitted 
to examination boards outwardly agreed between assessors. In practice, this means that 
a second assessor has reviewed a sample of the grades awarded by the first assessor 
and professed agreement with these. Alternatively, that the second assessor has re-
assessed the sample, the respective grades of first and second assessors are compared 
and final grades agreed. Local consensus is generally reached therefore, premised on 
academics having similar views of what is required of students’ work for assessment 




I put forward two possible explanations for this. The first revolves around models of 
epistemological development in higher education. Knowledge is an important aspect of 
critical thinking in higher education as assessed. Subject knowledge, of course, because 
critical thinking requires a deep knowledge of the subject (Halpern & Sternberg, 2020). 
Also epistemological development, which I focus on in more detail in s.3.3, because how 
students perceive knowledge is important to their critical thinking abilities (Moon, 2008), 
and I suggest to the demonstration of such abilities through assessed work and 
academics’ expectations of this. However, I am conscious that whilst academics may 
claim to agree grades in advance of examination boards research has questioned 
whether they do so for the same reasons, and there are apparently issues of shared 
interpretation of standards that work against consistency (Bloxham et al., 2015; Bloxham 
et al., 2016a; Pathirage et al., 2007). Appreciably, if the thinking that underpins 
assessment is individually tacit, unarticulated and unshared, then assessors will not 
develop the necessary shared understandings (Golding, 2019). This is where 
institutional mitigating mechanisms come into play. I offer these as a second explanation 
because they purportedly help to develop understandings and facilitate agreement 
between assessors. I cover this in more detail in s.3.4.   
3.3 Academic expectations – the case for epistemological development 
When seeking to explain apparent agreement between assessors I extended my 
literature search along various lines. One of these brought me to the concept of 
epistemological development. Empirical research has long linked epistemological 
development and critical thinking (see, for example, Brabeck, 1983; King & Kitchener, 
1994; Kitchener & King, 1981; Kuhn, 1991, 1992). Kuhn argues that epistemological 
knowing is crucial to critical thinking. This rests on “an individual’s broader 
understanding of knowledge and knowing” (Kuhn, 1999, p.18). Similarly, for Battersby 
(1989), also King and Kitchener (2004), both referencing McPeck (1981) and Siegel 
(1985), critical thinking has epistemic cognition at its theoretical foundation. Models of 
epistemological development in higher education – focussing in particular on Perry 
(1970) and Baxter Magolda (1992) – propose that students progress through several 
development stages in how they perceive knowledge. This is relevant because a 
person’s epistemological development and their capacity for critical thinking are thought 
to be related (Kuhn, 1999; Moon, 2008). More recently, some education based studies 
of critical thinking – see, for example, Mingers (2000), Phillips and Bond (2004), Chen 
and Rattray (2017) – have findings that would seem to draw on epistemological 
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development, and in particular Baxter Magolda’s (1992) model. Chen and Rattray (2017) 
actually included epistemological development, with reference to Baxter Magolda’s 
(1992) model, in their working definition of critical thinking in higher education. I regard 
these papers as tangential to this thesis because their focus is invariably pedagogical, 
i.e. on the development of critical thinking in students rather than assessing for it. 
However, I reason that these models of epistemological development, built with 
reference to higher education students, could resonate for assessment in higher 
education because their descriptions of knowledge and knowing at progressive levels 
are potentially reflective of academics’ expectations of what is and is not critical re 
students’ thinking as demonstrated through their assessed work. 
 
Baxter Magolda’s (1992) Epistemological Reflection Model builds on the prior work and 
modelling of Perry (1970). The two provide comparable portrayals and common paths of 
progression in ways of knowing (West, 2004). Perry (1970) postulated that students 
move through four broad epistemological stages – dualism, multiplism, relativism and 
commitment to relativism – segregated further into nine progressively more sophisticated 
positions, effectively moving from absolute to interpretive knowledge stances (Brownlee, 
2004). Baxter Magolda’s (1992) Epistemological Reflection Model similarly has four 
domains of awareness, described as “ways of knowing” (p.29). The four domains – 
‘absolute knowing’, ‘transitional knowing’, ‘independent knowing’ and ‘contextual 
knowing’ – are sequenced as a continuum representing growth in epistemic positions 
(Ostorga, 2006).  
 
At the lower end of Perry’s scale (dualist) are students who hold absolute interpretations 
of the world. Things are black or white, right or wrong, good or bad (Carroll, 2007). Truth 
can be known, facts are taken as read, and learners are passive seeking certainty and 
absorbing knowledge from authority figures or experts such as teachers whose role is to 
communicate the truth (Brownlee, 2004; Carroll, 2007; Hofer, 2001). Similarly, in Baxter 
Magolda’s first domain (absolute knowing) knowledge is viewed as certain. Learning is 
gaining knowledge from experts who “have all the answers” (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997, 
p.98). Experts know what is true and offer certainty in what they say (Baxter Magolda, 
2002). The student accepts and absorbs the knowledge provided in the certainty that it 





In Baxter Magolda’s second domain (transitional knowing) the learner’s perception of 
knowledge as certain is weakened. Some knowledge remains certain and some now is 
uncertain (Baxter Magolda, 1992; Carroll, 2007). Faced with areas of uncertainty, 
transitional knowers work on their understanding of the knowledge rather than simply 
looking to acquire it (Baxter Magolda, 2002). Moving through Perry’s positions, students 
become “more relativistic in their point of view” (Carroll, 2007, p.214). They gain 
awareness and recognition of multiplicity, acknowledging that experts can hold different 
views, that there is not necessarily a right or a wrong, that not everything can be known 
with certainty (Brownlee, 2004). There is evaluative recognition that multiple 
perspectives and conflicting viewpoints can exist and have validity, yet not all views are 
equally valid and some are better than others (Hofer, 2001). Students move towards 
forming and justifying their own opinions in the midst of uncertainty, opposing viewpoints 
and alternative frames of reference (Moon, 2008). Similarly, students in Baxter 
Magolda’s third domain (independent knowing) recognise that knowledge is largely 
tentative and uncertain, that individuals carry their own beliefs and have the right to hold 
their own views, and that experts are not the only source of knowledge (Brownlee, 2004; 
Carroll, 2007; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Moon, 2008). Independent knowers are open to 
multiple perspectives (Baxter Magolda, 2002). They may not challenge them as such but 
will choose between them (Baxter Magolda, 1992). They think for themselves, now 
generating their own perspectives and holding these as equally valid (Baxter Magolda, 
1992; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997).  
 
Fuller epistemological development in Perry’s model would categorise students in a 
relativist position. Here, students see knowledge as not absolute but actively constructed 
(Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; King & Kitchener, 1994). Truth is seen as relative to 
contextualised individual interpretations, and a point of view is developed consistent with 
the justification for it (Brownlee, 2004; Carroll, 2007). Similarly, in Baxter Magolda’s 
fourth and most sophisticated domain (contextual knowing) knowledge is seen as 
constructed and understood in its context, legitimised and evidenced by that context 
(Baxter Magolda, 2002; Evans, Forney, Guido, Patton & Renn, 2010). Contextual 
knowers are highly analytical and highly critical persons who sift multiple perspectives in 
constructing their own perspectives judged in context and on the evidence (Baxter 
Magolda, 2002; Carroll, 2007; Evans et al., 2010; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Moon, 2008; 
Ostorga, 2006; West, 2004). They consider issues from all sides and with regard to all 
aspects and perspectives both expert (objective) and personal (relational) (Brownlee, 
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2004). If we think of knowledge as being absolute then it is unquestionable and 
accepted as just so and no critical thought can be applied to it (Kember, 2001; Kuhn, 
1999). However, if we see knowledge as constructed, are alert to the complexity of that 
construction and open to questioning it, then critical thought can ensue. As I see it, this 
is far more indicative of students being ‘critical’.    
 
A key point to take from these models is that a student’s capacity for critical thinking is 
likely to be refined as they progress through the stages of epistemological development. 
It is anticipated then that new undergraduates will reside at the absolutist end of the 
scale (Baxter Magolda, 2002). Their capacity to think critically is necessarily limited 
because their epistemological beliefs are relatively undeveloped at this stage. Also 
generally anticipated is that students will progress gradually away from an absolutist 
position, moving towards a position that recognises knowledge as constructed and 
relative. Their capacity for critical thinking grows as their epistemological beliefs develop 
(Moon, 2008). I see this as relevant to this thesis, with the emphasis on business school 
academics’ views on assessing for critical thinking in final year undergraduate students’ 
dissertations and their expectations of students at that level. 
 
The models of Perry (1970) and Baxter Magolda (1992), together with related works 
(see Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger & Tarule, 1986; King & Kitchener, 1994; and Kuhn, 
1991) evidently view personal epistemology in terms of staged progression. Individuals 
who move through the stages develop in sequence seeing knowledge more and more 
as constructed and reflecting a growing ability to manage both objective and subjective 
parts (Hofer, 2004). In all these frameworks there is a trajectory envisaged, a 
progression from absolutism to relativism. I note too that they occupy a significant 
portion of the literature relating to personal epistemology (Hofer, 2001). However, at this 
point I should acknowledge that these models do not constitute a singular accepted view 
of epistemological development as concept and as pedagogic practice. There is 
evidently much debate around this with alternative views proffered and a significant 
challenge coming from the concept of ‘epistemological beliefs’ proposed by Schommer 
(O’Donovan, 2017). Schommer (1990), in contrast to staged development models, 
proposed that personal epistemology should be considered more a collection of beliefs 
about knowledge and learning that can operate together but which exist more or less 
independently. Hence, they do not exist in an integrated, sequential framework (Hofer, 




Schommer, building in particular on the work of Perry, engaged in a series of linked 
studies (see Schommer 1990, 1993, 1994; Schommer & Walker, 1995). These resulted 
in five constituent epistemological beliefs, each cast as continua in themselves, and 
each relatively independent, challenging then the notion that personal epistemology 
develops in fixed, sequential stages (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). These beliefs are (1) 
Source of knowledge (“From knowledge is handed down by omniscient authority to 
knowledge is reasoned out through objective and subjective means”; (2) Certainty of 
knowledge (“From knowledge is absolute to knowledge is constantly evolving”; (3) 
Organisation of knowledge (“From knowledge is compartmentalised to knowledge is 
highly integrated and interwoven”); (4) Control of learning (“From ability to learn is 
genetically predetermined to ability to learn is acquired through experience”; and (5) 
Speed of learning (“From learning is quick or not-at-all to learning is a gradual process” 
(Schommer, 1994, p.301). As for dimensions in the staged development models, each of 
Schommer’s epistemological beliefs is relevant to critical thinking and its development 
(Moon, 2008). Given, however, the claimed independence of these beliefs, it seems that 
students as learners (and as critical thinkers) could be sophisticated in some beliefs but 
less so in others (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). Evidently also for Schommer (1994, p.302), 
“epistemological beliefs do not necessarily develop in synchrony.” 
 
Regardless of the modelled approach, development (e.g. Perry, 1970 and Baxter 
Magolda, 1992) or beliefs (Schommer, 1994), personal epistemology is portrayed as 
consisting of specified dimensions that encompass individual ways of knowing. The key 
difference is whether these dimensions are seen to evolve in sequenced progressions, 
or independently and not ‘in synchrony’ as Schommer put it. I note that Hofer and 
Pintrich (1997) questioned the reasoning and methodology underpinning Schommer’s 
work, indicating also that the weight of evidence in the literature is on the development 
side, with Schommer’s counter view arguably in need of more evidence to establish its 
veracity. That said, they did acknowledge the usefulness of having such challenges to 
existing views of personal epistemology (Moon, 2008). I agree with this. However, whilst 
acknowledging Schommer, the sense I have from my reading of discussions with 
participants is of academics’ expectations aligning with staged development in 
connection with critical thinking (I consider this further in s.7.2.4.1 Epistemological 





A further key point then is that these models may speak to what is and is not ‘critical’ in 
students’ work, reflecting academics’ expectations. This is of particular relevance to 
assessment in higher education. Critical thinking in higher education is fundamentally 
about making reliable and persuasive judgements substantiated through sound 
assessment of evidence from various sources (Moon, 2008). Academics expect work 
from students which shows independent research, is analytical and which argues 
positions effectively, yet lament the standard of many submissions often labelled merely 
‘descriptive’ or ‘opinionated’ (Hounsell, 2005 ; MacLellan, 2004; Olsen & Statham, 2005; 
Wendt & Ase, 2015). Students as critical thinkers should be able to make inferences 
from analysis and synthesis of relevant sources because the ability to analyse a range of 
material and formulate balanced and supported arguments is a staple of high grades, 
particularly in the social sciences and the humanities (Guo & Shi, 2016; Wendt & Ase, 
2015). Students do not simply accumulate knowledge but must work to overcome 
resistance and uncover that which is hidden (James et al., 2010). Ultimately, they move 
beyond deconstructing the arguments of others to find patterns and make meaningful 
connections in developing their own arguments, reasoned appropriately to explain and 
persuade others (Buskist & Irons, 2008; Jones, 2004; Lundquist, 1999). They are able to 
develop their own evidence based viewpoints, informed by their interrogation, analysis 
and evaluation of the ideas and arguments of others (Hammer, 2017; Jonassen & Kim, 
2010; Luque, 2011; Ramage, Callaway, Clary-Lemon, & Waggoner, 2009). This would 
place them in the more developed stages of the models of Perry (1970) and Baxter 
Magolda (1992), with greater capacity for critical thinking. 
 
3.4 Academic expectations - institutional mitigating mechanisms 
Criterion referenced assessment practices and systems of internal moderation and 
external examination are considered to have important roles in mitigating the issues 
raised in the preceding sections leading to assessment variation.  
 
3.4.1 Criterion referenced assessment practices 
Academic standards in UK higher education are outcome focussed, i.e. defined in terms 
of achievement levels that students must attain for an award (Bloxham et al., 2015). 
Achievement is demonstrated by performance enacted through assessment (Alderman, 
2009). Outcomes-based approaches to assessment are invariably based on criterion 
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referencing. This developed from the work of Glaser and Klaus (1962) who first coined 
the term ‘criterion referenced measurement’, now firmly established in the assessment 
lexicon. Although Wiliam (1996) claimed this is an inadequate regime for achieving an 
authentic evaluation of performance, others are supportive. Gipps (1994), for example, 
argued that conscious inclusion of assessment criteria that cover higher-order cognitive 
skills serves to place the spotlight on this ensuring adequate attention is given. Criterion 
referenced based assessment is also said to be more objective and therefore a more 
ethical assessment practice (Sadler, 2009). 
 
I stated in Chapter 1 that higher education assessment practices are located within an 
agenda of institutional accountability underpinned by quality assurance frameworks 
(Bloxham, 2009; Medland, 2019). This accountability paradigm assumes that student 
work is most appropriately assessed with reference to criteria (Bloxham et al., 2011). 
This is now common practice across the tertiary sector (Grainger et al., 2008; Lok, 
McNaught & Young, 2016). Publication and consistent application of assessment criteria 
are pivotal to the transparency required, outwardly serving to obviate academics’ 
prejudices and promulgate shared understandings between academics, and between 
academics and students (Andrade & Du, 2005; Bloxham et al., 2016a; Menendez-Varela 
& Gregori-Giralt, 2016; Venning & Buisman-Pijlman, 2013). Such efforts build 
confidence, confidence that is needed by academics and greatly appreciated by 
students (Jonsson, 2014). However, this confidence may be more assumed than real 
(Bloxham, 2009). Certainly, publication of assessment criteria is only part of the story. If 
criteria are not actually read and absorbed then their publication is seemingly wasted.  
 
Each student’s work is judged individually against the assessment criteria, in isolation 
from his or her peers, to minimise the effects of personal judgement and increase 
assessment consistency and reliability (Grainger et al., 2008; Lok et al., 2016). However, 
views on whether this works in practice are mixed. Assessment reliability has been 
shown to improve from the use of criteria, if only to a small extent (see, for example, 
Jonsson & Svingby, 2007; Peeters, Schmude & Steinmiller, 2014). Criteria provide a 
supportive crutch to lean on, particularly for novice assessors, but are relied upon less 
and less with experience (Jansson et al., 2019; Crisp, 2008; Yorke, 2011). Other studies 
highlight much assessor discrepancy in the application of assessment criteria to 




Outcomes with relatively low-level cognitive demand generally have clear definition and 
are simple to measure. These, however, are not generally the preserve of higher 
education, where outcomes such as critical thinking that are more cognitively demanding 
are not easily defined or measured (Lok et al., 2016). It is possible to construct criteria 
for this but very difficult to interpret them consistently, particularly absent from the 
relevant context (Neil, Wadley & Phinn, 1999; Woolf, 2004). Criteria are built from words, 
and words need a framework to imbue understanding, a framework which is necessarily 
contextual and situation-specific (Bloxham, 2009; Yorke, 2011). It is thus questionable 
whether complex learning can be adequately described in assessment criteria to avoid 
varying interpretations (Bloxham, 2009). In Grainger et al. (2008), for example, a group 
of assessors were shown to draw on the same overarching criteria but differences in 
interpretation led to variance in grades.  
 
Words often used in assessment criteria which purport to denote levels of performance 
for assessment purposes such as ‘good’, ‘excellent’, ‘comprehensive’ or ‘adequate’ are 
relative terms that are invariably open to subjective interpretation (Grainger et al., 2008). 
Criteria that are loosely defined or too subjective are obviously difficult to interpret 
(O’Donovan et al., 2004). Constructing clear, concrete assessment criteria and scaling 
different standards of achievement or outcomes against these is evidently challenging 
(Lok et al., 2016). So criteria need to be clearly defined and contextualised for assessors 
to appropriately interpret them (Bird & Yucel, 2013; O’Donovan et al., 2004). Still, 
interpretations are rarely incontestable (Bloxham et al., 2016a).  
 
Adding to the confusion here, in this context of criterion-referenced or ‘criteria-based’ 
(Sadler, 2005) assessment practices, it seems that ‘criteria’ and ‘standards’ are often 
confused and apparently used interchangeably (Bloxham, et al., 2011; Sadler, 1987, 
2005). Sadler (2014, p.275), however, would refute this, viewing the two as distinct, 
related certainly but clearly distinguished, i.e. “A criterion is a property or quality used in 
appraising student responses to assessment tasks, whereas a standard is a minimum 
achievement level used as a reference point when judging the quality of a student’s 
work.” Criteria underpin standards (Sadler, 2014). Standards provide a “framework for 
making categorical attributions”, enabling statements about the quality of a student’s 





For Bloxham et al (2011), Sadler’s ‘standards’ are thus analogous to the grade 
descriptors typically employed by universities and specifying the quality of students’ 
achievement at progressive grade levels. I see the parallels here with the generic 
undergraduate grade descriptors of the host business school. These descriptors are not 
criteria specific to a given piece of assessment; rather they are standards applicable 
across the board for undergraduate students. They form what Sadler (2005, p.185) 
would describe as “verbal grade descriptions…with a separate description for each 
grade level.” Akin to ‘standards-based assessment rubrics’, which are said to provide 
qualitative descriptions of what is expected of students at different levels (Kite & 
Phongsavan, 2017), these grade descriptors provide statements of academic 
achievement standards (levels of quality) at different grades, comprised of expected 
qualitative properties that characterise selected levels. Such qualities or characteristics 
as listed must be present for the student’s work to reach a particular standard (Sadler, 
2014). Criteria are embedded within the descriptions of achievement at each grade 
(Sadler, 2005). Effectively then, criteria are amalgamated into predetermined fixed 
standards against which each student’s work is judged (Lok et al., 2016). 
 
Whilst I acknowledge Sadler’s work, and the crossover between his description of 
‘standards’ and the grade descriptors of the host business school, I will be using the 
term assessment criteria going forward, acknowledging its apparent use as a catch-all 
term in much of the literature, and that this is how participants in this study referred to 
the grade descriptors.  
 
Efforts at improving assessment consistency are often directed at increasing the detail 
and clarity of published criteria (O’Connell et al., 2016). That this should largely solve the 
problem of inconsistent assessment is implicitly endorsed by the QAA, on the 
assumption that criteria can be written unambiguously and then applied consistently to 
non-standard assessments (Tan & Prosser, 2004; Yorke, 2011). This assumption does 
not hold, which is the fundamental problem with the process. Criteria are of limited 
power as agents of consistency because their meaning is “fuzzy” (in the words of Sadler, 
1989, p.124), and so not effectively or reliably communicated (Bloxham, 2009; Bloxham 
et al., 2016; Ecclestone, 2001; Price & Rust, 1999; Sadler, 2009). Reconstruction of 
criteria using language that is more detailed does not necessarily bring fuzzy standards 




Criteria may be codified but this masks the complexity involved. The challenge of 
assessing against and across several overlapping criteria is severe (Yorke, 2011). 
Irrespective of how detailed assessment criteria may be, that a degree of professional 
judgment is exercised is inescapable, if only to resolve the aforementioned fuzziness of 
the criteria (Bloxham, 2009; Yorke, 2011). Moreover, criteria are interpreted through the 
lens of the assessor’s personal experience by reference to inter alia “specialist 
knowledge, assessment by others, students’ work, involvement in moderation and 
examiners’ feedback” (Bloxham & Price, 2015, p.204). Inevitably, understandings, 
interpretations and the ways in which criteria are combined can and do vary, as do 
habitual assessment approaches (Sadler 1987, 2005, 2009). Of particular note for this 
thesis, Webster et al (2000) demonstrated this specifically with respect to assessment of 
dissertations, highlighting considerable variation and ambiguity in assessors’ 
understandings of criteria as worded. 
    
Irrespective then of how well defined criteria may be, academics may still arrive at 
different grades for the same piece of work whilst applying the same criteria (Grainger et 
al., 2008). Variability may also occur because academics hold different conceptions of 
the criteria; or they may weight and balance criteria components differently; or they may 
disagree on the use of the criteria and so fail to adopt it; or they may simply ignore it, 
choosing to apply their own personal standards or tacit or internalised criteria (see, for 
example, Baume et al., 2004; Bloxham, 2009; Bloxham et al., 2016a; Ecclestone, 2001; 
Hunter & Docherty, 2011; Price, 2005; Price & Rust, 1999; Orrell, 2008; Read et al., 
2005; Shay, 2005; Smith & Coombe, 2006; Webster et al., 2000; Woolf, 2004). Tacit or 
internalised criteria are a particular barrier to consistency because these are “locked 
inside the marker’s head” (Grainger et al., 2008, p.135). Formed from each academic’s 
predilections, these are not necessarily taken from official documentation, not espoused 
nor shared with colleagues, and it is not possible to render explicit the tacit knowledge 
involved in assessor judgements (Baume et al., 2004; Hunter & Docherty, 2011; Orr, 
2007; O’Donovan et al., 2008; Sadler, 2009; Sambell & McDowell, 1998). Thus, 
attempts at externalising knowledge that is essentially tacit and interpretive through 




These issues obviate reliance on assessment criteria, howsoever clearly stated, as the 
route to achieving comparable and consistent judgements (Bloxham et al., 2015; Yorke, 
2011). However, several authors promote socialisation processes as solutions, 
processes that facilitate the diffusion of tacit beliefs and knowledge within a local 
assessment community (see, for example, O’Donovan et al., 2004; Price, 2005). This 
brings me to internal moderation.     
 
3.4.2 Internal moderation 
Internal moderation processes are fundamental to the mechanisms involved in quality 
assuring the cycle of teaching, learning and assessment in higher education institutions 
(Beutel et al., 2017; Klenowski & Wyatt-Smith, 2013). Moderation, in a broad sense, is 
the comparative practice of two or more academics appraising students’ work with the 
aim of improving consistency in assessment and ultimately assuring that the grade 
awarded to each student is independent of which academic actually completes it 
(Grainger et al., 2016; Sadler, 2013).  
 
Moderation operates through academics discussing and debating the quality of 
assessed work (Klenowski & Wyatt-Smith, 2013). This can involve ‘second marking’, 
where an academic assesses a set of students’ scripts that are then reviewed on a 
sample basis by another assessor; or ‘double marking’, where two assessors each 
assess the same set of students’ scripts before comparing grades. Both approaches 
involve collective engagement by pairs or teams of academics who may therefore 
develop shared interpretations of standards and shared understandings of what 
constitutes evidence of performance at different grades (Grainger et al., 2016; Smith, 
2012). Moderation thus forms an important element of socialisation processes through 
which academics learn of and collectively develop local standards (Reimann et al., 
2010).  
 
All that being said, studies have shown that moderation fails to eradicate discrepancies 
between academics, with inter-assessor correlations observably low where empirically 
tested (see, for example, Jonsson & Svingby, 2007; Meadows & Billington, 2005; 
Williams & Kemp, 2019). Additionally, substantial differences in grades awarded in 
isolation by separate academics for an essay are common (Partington, 1994). 
Moderation arguably then fails to meet its objectives (Bamber, 2015). Power imbalances 
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appear to form a key constraint to effective moderation (see, for example, Bloxham, 
2009; Bloxham & Boyd, 2007; Orr, 2007; Partington, 1994; Sadler, 2009, 2010, 2013; 
Reimann et al., 2010). Inevitably, more senior/authoritative/experienced academics hold 
sway over more junior colleagues who often adopt a safety first approach of simply 
converging their grades (Partington, 1994). Similarly, in larger groups with multiple 
assessors inexperienced members have been observed to go with the majority. Is this 
acculturating to a local assessment community? Or is it toeing the line of “fairly much 
what everybody else was awarding” (Handley, den Outer & Price, 2013, p.894)? Either 
way, it seems that for less senior/authoritative/experienced academics their own 
judgements are of secondary concern (Grainger et al., 2016). I have also said that 
academics draw on their connoisseurship when assessing students’ work. This further 
serves to exacerbate imbalances in experience, and so power relations, in forming 
differing individual conceptualisations that inhibit agreement (Ecclestone, 2001; Grainger 
et al., 2016; Sadler, 2009). This then threatens the equity so needed and called for in 
academic judgements (Bloxham et al., 2016b).  
 
3.4.3 External examination 
In the UK context, professional self-regulation of assessment standards in higher 
education is provided by a system of external examination. This assurance system is 
longstanding and well established as a means of validating the credibility of assessment 
standards (Bloxham et al, 2016b; Silver & Williams, 1996). It is widely admired for the 
part it plays in defending and assuring standards (Bloxham & Price, 2015). With external 
examiners held in high esteem, and the system described as “a leading example of best 
practice around the world” (Universities UK, 2011, p.5), it is unsurprisingly in widespread 
use in many jurisdictions including the UK (Bloxham & Price, 2015; Bloxham et al., 
2015).  
 
External examination focusses directly on the quality and fairness of assessment 
processes and assessed outputs (Bloxham & Price, 2015; Gaunt, 1999). Exact roles and 
remits can vary, however ordinarily this involves “inter-institutional peer review of 
assessment” whereby an academic in one higher education institution acts as an 
external examiner for another (Bloxham et al., 2015, p.1071). Through independent 
review of assessment tasks and students’ work (usually by sample) external examiners 
offer institutions a “reassuring presence” (Webster et al., 2000, p.78) and provide a 
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“‘public defence’ of their assessment processes and standards” (Bloxham et al., 2016b, 
p.647).   
 
However, the system of external examining is subject to claims, at least by some 
authors, of unreliability and ineffectiveness (see, for example, Price, 2005; Silver, 
Stennett & Williams, 1995). One of the major criticisms levied is that external 
examination relies upon shared knowledge of standards that are socially situated, co-
constructed and calibrated locally (Bloxham et al., 2015; Shay, 2005). It follows that 
academics from one institution, when charged with reviewing the processes by which the 
grades have been arrived at in another institution will draw upon their own practices and 
expertise and hence, will not necessarily possess the same understandings of 
institutional standards (Beutel et al., 2017). They will instead apply their own 
interpretation of standards (Bloxham et al., 2011). This is where the importance of 
assessment criteria comes in, at least in theory to equalise any such differences leading 
to reliable and consistent approaches (Colley & Silver, 2005). I have previously covered 
the concerns over reliance on assessment criteria as a panacea for assessment 
consistency. Here too research has shown that assessment criteria are insufficient in 
and of themselves to facilitate congruence between internal markers and external 
examiners (Bloxham et al., 2015). To summarise relevant aspects from prior discussion, 
this is partly because of deficiencies in criteria as written, partly because assessors 
interpret criteria differently, and partly because not all assessors actually draw on these 
in whole or in part. External examiners are not excluded from these factors, with 
evidence pointing to reliance on personal experience over the documented criteria of the 
host institution (Colley & Silver, 2005). This is why some claim that external examination 
gives only an impression of external review, which challenges the notion of and 
confidence placed in it as integral to UK mechanisms for providing quality assurance of 






That assessment in higher education is inconsistent and unreliable is well observed, 
researched and reported. Even large-scale studies of standardised tests have shown 
assessor variability is a concern. Considerably more variation is observed when 
assessing complex higher-order skills such as critical thinking through, for example, 
essays and dissertations which, being open ended and reliant upon complex interpretive 
judgment, resist direct measurement. Notwithstanding the causes and evidence of 
variation highlighted in the body of this chapter, in reality there is a tendency towards 
outward agreement between assessors in advance of examination boards. However, 
assessors may not necessarily agree on grades for the same reasons, with questions 
over shared interpretation of standards, which are much less likely to develop if the 
thinking that underpins assessment is individually tacit, unarticulated and unshared.  
 
Subject knowledge is important for critical thinking, as is how knowledge is perceived. 
Critical thinking involves making judgements and this in turn relies upon a recognition 
that knowledge is constructed and hence fluid and contestable rather than fixed and 
absolute. Drawing on the epistemological development models of Perry (1970) and 
Baxter Magolda (1992) can provide some practical indicators of critical thinking in 
students’ work, for example, in the challenging of extant knowledge, the weighing of 
different opinions and the determination of a position. These models speak then to what 
is and is not ‘critical’ in students’ work, reflecting academics’ expectations. 
 
Institutional mitigating mechanisms such as criterion referencing, internal moderation 
and external examination purportedly help to develop understandings and facilitate 
agreement between assessors thereby reducing variability. The accountability paradigm 
assumes that students’ work is most appropriately assessed with reference to criteria; 
that this minimises the effects of personal judgement, increasing assessment 
consistency and reliability. However, the research picture is mixed concerning the 
effectiveness of this. Internal moderation involves collective engagement by pairs or 
teams of assessors who can develop shared interpretations and understandings, 
calibrating judgements and reducing variability over time. However, studies have shown 
that moderation fails to eradicate discrepancies between assessors, with issues of 
experience, power and connoisseurship working against consistency. External 




Critical thinking forms an important component of assessed work, however assessment 
is done by academics whose individual conceptualisations of critical thinking, and whose 
individual approaches to assessment, may vary. The systems implemented as ways and 
means of mitigating assessment variability are subject to pros and cons, their 
effectiveness arguably limited. Perhaps standardisation is impossible to achieve 
(Bloxham, 2009; Bloxham et al., 2016a). Perhaps, given the complexity of assessing for 
critical thinking, we simply have to accept the “subjectivity of judgement” (Clegg & Bryan, 
2006, p.224) and live with the inevitable variation. Regardless, what this and the 
preceding literature review chapter have shown is that there is a clear need for 
determining how academics conceptualise critical thinking and how they operationalise 
this through assessment. In the next chapter, I explain how I progressed this research 
detailing my research philosophy, methodology and methods, and taking into 




4. Research philosophy, methodology and methods 
4.1 Introduction 
Here, in Chapter 4, I present this study’s research philosophy, methodology and 
methods. I begin by outlining social constructionism as the philosophical perspective that 
underpins and informs the choice of methodology, i.e. case study, and qualitative 
approach taken to data collection and analysis via semi-structured interviews and 
thematic analysis. I then look to establish the integrity of this research as planned and 
executed with reference to its limitations, discussion of ethical considerations attendant 
to this research, and consideration of criteria for rigour befitting of qualitative research. I 
end this chapter with a brief summary and look ahead to the findings in Chapters 5 and 
6.    
 
4.2 Social constructionism 
Social constructionism holds that the social world is not a fixed, objective, observable 
reality. Actors through their social practices create it (Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2017). 
Knowledge then is not simply out there waiting to be discovered, but is actively 
constructed and constantly reconstructed by social actors through their everyday 
interactions (Andrews, 2012; Cunliffe, 2008; Schwandt, 2003). Reality is what people 
make of it, and people and reality are inseparable. “Ideas, thoughts and actions are thus 
the result of ongoing processes of interactions and interpretations between human 
beings” (Lindgren & Packendorff, 2009, p.30). Hence, a social practice, such as 
assessing for critical thinking in the dissertations of undergraduate students (hereafter 
referred to as ‘the practice’) is built from the perceptions, actions and interactions of the 
social actors involved, and is subject to constant revision as new experiences and 
meanings are socially reproduced (Burr, 2003).  
 
It follows that the focus of social constructionist research is not on individual cognitive 
processes but on knowledge constructed through social interactions, with the emphasis 
on investigating social action and deriving meaning from interpreting participants’ 
accounts (Berger & Luckmann, 1991; Young & Colin, 2004). This study, characteristic of 
qualitative research within a social constructionist paradigm, is exploratory, experiential 
and focussed on accessing the socially situated contextualised accounts of human 
participants with respect to a social practice with which they are engaged (Braun & 
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Clarke, 2006). The practice is not an objective entity with a reality external to the social 
actors involved. It is not something that I can observe, measure and document in 
detached fashion in the positivist tradition (Bryman, 2015). Moreover, my concern is not 
with what the practice is per se (a first-order perspective) but on how participants 
experience it (a second-order perspective). If I were to adopt a first-order perspective, 
which is typical of research underpinned by an objectivist stance, I would seek to 
examine the practice directly and describe it as it is. However, as an investigation of how 
participants interpret their social world, it is their perspectives rather than mine that orient 
this research (Yates, 2004). I have sought to study their social world from within not 
abstracted from it, engaging with social actors in their natural setting, attempting to 
interpret the practice and make sense of the meanings which they attach to it (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2008). Taking a second-order perspective is consistent with social 
constructionism because I seek here to access participants’ subjective lived 
experiences, to ascertain how they understand their world and how they would describe 
their reality with respect to the practice (Andrews, 2012; Steedman, 2000).  
 
Social constructionism is a perspective that is said to favour a qualitative research 
approach (Coolican, 2009). Qualitative research draws on the hermeneutic tradition and 
is thus concerned with subjectivity, with locating meanings and rich, socially situated and 
contextualised behavioural insights (Guba & Lincoln, 2005). Qualitative research 
methods, such as observation and interviewing, enable the researcher to get closer to 
participants’ lived experiences and reality relative to more remote quantitative methods 
that can produce artificial and sterile findings that bear limited applicability to our 
everyday lives as human beings (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008).  
 
Applying the thinking of Lindgren & Packendorff (2009), knowledge of the practice under 
investigation, as socially constructed, is knowledge pertaining to how relevant actors 
(business school academics in this case) individually and collectively recognise, define, 
construct and re-construct that practice. Discourse, which I delineate simply as textual 
and verbal communications, is crucial because knowledge is constructed through 
discourse. People construct meanings and understand their world through language and 
communication (Burr, 2003). Operating also on the assumption that socially mediated 
accounts of reality can be accessed through language (Madill, Jordan & Shirley, 2000) 
the emphasis in this study is on language-mediated communication and the meanings 
that are attributed in words. This is evident in the qualitative approach taken to data 
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collection (via semi-structured interviews) and analysis (via thematic analysis) within the 
overall case study methodology. 
 
I recognise that my choice of research approach and methods should fit with my 
research questions (Punch, 2005). In fact, these helped guide me in the process of 
choosing appropriate data collection and analysis methods. Questions drawn 
qualitatively, as here, open-ended rather than specific or measurable, seeking to explore 
human perspectives on a socially constructed practice and concerned with the 
interpretation of meanings, beg for qualitative methods of data collection and analysis 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2008). The semi-structured interview format facilitated discursive 
exploration of the practice, imposing a degree of structure to maintain relevance but also 
allowing conversations to move flexibly. Thematic analysis, being independent of 
epistemology and not aligned with any particular theoretical frameworks, is compatible 
with a range of research paradigms and questions (Clarke & Braun, 2013, 2017; 
Maguire & Delahunt, 2017). Applied to interview data, this was appropriately open-
ended with structuring and conceptualisation occurring through the analytical phase, 
typical of qualitative research (Punch, 2005).  
 
4.3 Case study Methodology 
Case study has become a mainstay of social science inquiry and, of particular relevance 
to this thesis, of education research (Hamilton & Corbett-Whittier, 2013; Thomas, 2011a; 
2013). Case study is not a research method as such but a “strategy for understanding” 
(Punch, 2005, p.144), a design frame for inquiry that can take in a variety of methods 
(Simons, 2009; Thomas, 2013). Stake would agree describing case study as not a 
methodological choice per se but more a choice of what to study by whatever methods 
are appropriate (Stake, 2005; Starman, 2013; Thomas, 2010). Case study is a valuable 
means by which we can develop as full an understanding as possible of a case or cases 
and so gain an understanding of a complex phenomenon and key insights into local 





A single case study approach, as differentiated from multiple or cross-comparison case 
studies, entails a thorough examination of a particular case in depth and in situ, 
appreciating its context and complexity as integral to our understanding (Punch, 2005; 
Stake, 2005; Yin, 2011). The case is “an individual unit (as a person or community)” 
(Merriam-Webster’s dictionary, 2009; cited by Flyvberg, 2011, p.301). This is further 
described as “a unit around which there are boundaries” (Merriam, 1998, p.27), a 
“functioning specific” or “bounded system” (Stake, 2008, pp.119-120), or “a bounded 
entity” (Yin, 2011, p.6). Such a unit could be a particular person or event, or more 
commonly an organisation or a location, for example a university or one of its constituent 
faculties or departments, or a social phenomenon (Bryman, 2015; Farquhar, 2012; Yin, 
2011). The researcher observes but does not control the situation (Yin, 2018). 
Particularisation of the case and understanding it in detail are core concerns (Stake, 
2005). The aim is to generate a detailed and contextualised understanding of a case 
situated within its specific bounded real-world context (George-Williams et al., 2019; 
Hancock & Algozzine, 2017; Yin, 2018). The case supplies the appropriate context, 
which is vital for understanding, and blending description and analysis of the case helps 
in answering the research questions (Cohen et al., 2017; Creswell & Poth, 2018; Yin, 
2011). This is typically achieved through ethnography or, pertinent to this thesis, by 
qualitative interviewing (Bryman & Bell, 2011).  
 
I have taken a case study approach in this thesis in order to develop an in-depth 
understanding of academics’ conceptualisation of critical thinking and its 
operationalisation through assessment of undergraduate dissertations in a specific 
higher education setting. This then is the individual unit of study within its bounded 
context. Following Yin (2018), as a unit of analysis this is suitably concrete, i.e. a real-life 
phenomenon. In addition, the sort of complexity here, also following Yin (2018), would 
point to the value of taking a case study approach. This value is, as here, in examining 
pertinent questions of a contemporary phenomenon in a practical, real world setting 
(Farquhar, 2012). In so doing, I aim to produce the sort of “concrete, context-dependent 
knowledge” that others can learn from and which Flyvberg (2011, p.302) contends a 





I would categorise the case as ‘intrinsic’ according to Stake’s (2005) typology, because 
“the case itself is of primary interest” (Gray, 2013, p.266), the fundamental aim being to 
gain understandings of and insights into that particular case, the “particularities of a 
situation”, its “uniqueness” and “complexity” (Bryman & Bell, 2011, pp.60-61). All are 
arguably key strengths of the case study approach (Lee, Collier & Cullen, 2007). This is 
akin to Merriam’s ‘particularistic’ case study categorisation, with the focus on a particular 
event or, as here, a particular phenomenon or practice, and the concern for practical 
input to “questions, situations, or puzzling occurrences arising from everyday practice” 
(Merriam, 1998, p.29). I also regard this case as ‘instrumental’ per Yin (2018). Here, I 
am focussing on a practice and have selected a case to illustrate this, i.e. the case is 
used as a tool to illuminate the practice (Creswell & Poth, 2018; Thomas, 2013). The aim 
is not just to understand better the particular case (intrinsic or particularistic) but to 
examine issues of critical thinking and assessment in higher education through that case 
(instrumental).  
 
I chose the particular case because, following Stake (2005), I considered it offered an 
opportunity to learn about the practice under investigation in a setting where I 
anticipated that learning would be great. In addition, I consider the case may be 
indicative of broader higher education assessment practices, exemplifying a larger set 
(Bryman, 2015). I say ‘may’ because the inability to generalise from a case study is a 
long-standing criticism of the methodology (Flyvberg, 2011). Appreciably the findings, or 
‘assertions’ per Stake (2005), are not generalizable in the traditional sense, i.e. 
statistically. However, this is in any event not the purpose of case study research and 
does not need to be (Bryman & Bell, 2011; Farquhar, 2012; Thomas, 2011a). 
Knowledge may transfer from the case context to others even though not strictly 
generalizable (Flyvberg, 2011). The lessons learned, the themes developed from this 
case, may transcend to others through the “force of an example” (Flyvberg, 2011, 
p.305), or more formally through ‘analytical generalisation’ (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Yin, 
2018), or more appropriately, as I am not looking to generalise the findings to theoretical 
proposals, on a comparative case-to-case basis through ‘naturalistic generalisation’ 





4.4 Data collection 
4.4.1 Qualitative research interviews 
Kvale (2007, p.1) adroitly put it thus, “If you want to know how people understand their 
world and their life, why not talk to them?” Interviewing follows logically from seeking to 
gather participants’ experiences and conceptual understandings of a social phenomenon 
or practice (Sin, 2010). Interviewing thus plays a central role in qualitative research as 
an accepted way of accessing human experiences, perceptions, meanings and realities, 
i.e. the ‘lived worlds’ of participants (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015; Joffe, 2012).  
 
4.4.2 Semi-structured interviews 
Semi-structured interviewing is an especially common format in qualitative social 
research, being particularly suited to gathering data on participants’ perspectives in their 
own words, and effective in delving down beneath the surface to make sense of how 
participants actually experience, understand and behave in relation to the practice under 
investigation (Matthews & Ross, 2010). The format follows a common interview script, 
protocol, guide, agenda or schedule (Creswell & Poth, 2018; Kvale, 2007). Whilst such 
terms appear interchangeable, my own preference is for ‘guide’ which I will employ from 
herein and by which I mean a document comprised of a limited number of key 
predetermined questions to cover (Creswell & Poth, 2018). These follow from the study’s 
research questions and are, as is often the case, derived from a detailed review of the 
literature (Zucker, 2009). The guide helps structure the interview, concentrating attention 
where it needs to be, guiding the interview so that the object of study remains in focus 
and that key aspects are covered (Joffe, 2012; King, Horrocks & Brooks, 2019). 
Semi-structured interviewing can also usefully combine with other methods of data 
collection (Matthews & Ross, 2010). In addition to being interviewed I asked for two 
actions from participants: firstly, to complete and return a questionnaire comprised of 
open ended questions in advance of a face-to-face interview; and secondly, at interview 
to provide two recently assessed dissertations of their choice which for them exhibit 
contrasting levels of critical thinking. My aims, supported by these mediating artefacts, 
were to facilitate reflection both before and during the interview thereby encouraging 
meta-awareness in participants to help elicit insights into their experiences. 
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The semi-structured interview format engineered a degree of commonality across 
interviews but remained usefully open to surprise, affording the flexibility to cover 
common questions or topics in different ways and in different orders and to proceed 
down differing paths to bring out fresh perceptions, and potentially answers to 
unintended questions (Matthews & Ross, 2010). I certainly found that I could probe for 
elaboration, encourage ongoing reflection and tailor questions to each participant’s 
concerns and interests in the course of discussion (Yates, 2004). Through active 
listening and critically following up on initial responses, I funnelled down to tease out 
more detail and specifics on points of interest, probing for meanings and understandings 
(Kvale, 2007). I asked questions in different and overlapping ways around the core 
issues of critical thinking and assessment covered by the guide, hunting for richer 
descriptions and further mitigation of my own bias. Prima facie this may seem tedious 
but I would agree with Koole (2012) that asking similar questions in alternative ways and 
from different angles on and around the core concerns can help to both clarify meaning 
and elicit different views. 
 
4.4.3 Participant sampling 
I determined a need to interview people who would know a great deal about the practice 
under discussion and who were positioned to offer some insights into that. This meant 
purposively sampling participants from a bounded population (Farquhar, 2012), i.e. 
academics in a host business school. Hence, people who were of specific interest, who 
have experience of the practice, who were likely to possess the necessary information 
content, and who were best placed to answer the interview questions and by extension 
the research questions (Bryman, 2015; Creswell & Poth, 2018; Flyvberg, 2011; Joffe, 
2012;).  
Interview-based studies commonly comprise 15 +/- 10 participants (Kvale, 2007), 
although there is no universally applicable sample number. I deemed the sample should 
comprise as many relevant participants as necessary to get the answers needed and 
that I should continue to interview until reaching a point of saturation, i.e. the point at 
which “further interviews yield little new knowledge” (Kvale, 2007, p.44). In practice, this 
is where interviews become repetitious and fresh insights cease to accrue (Malsch & 
Salterio, 2016), A dozen appropriately selected interviews may be sufficient (Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985). Beyond this could tend towards redundancy (Dai, Free & Gendron, 2019). 
I note similarly from interview-based studies in my own professional field of auditing, for 
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example, that saturation is often claimed to have been reached after twenty interviews, if 
not before (Malsch & Salterio, 2016).  
In my experience, a university business school is a complex social world comprised of 
several academic disciplines that co-exist under the umbrella of ‘business’ but which 
exhibit commonalities and discordances running along fiercely independent disciplinary 
lines. Conscious of this, and of the desire to draw from a pool of people who could 
potentially offer a spread of relevant experiences, I sought to include participants from 
across the five disciplines of the host school, namely Accounting, Business and 
Management, Marketing, Finance and Economics. Ever the pragmatist, I pursued as 
many as were willing to be interviewed (twenty-one in total). The resultant dataset 
totalled nearly thirteen hundred minutes of audio-recorded data, averaging some sixty 
minutes per interview. As the interviews progressed, I did get a sense that later 
interviews were re-treading previously covered ground, which I took as indicative of 
having reached saturation from my standpoint as the researcher. This is not to say that 
the knowledge here is exhausted and further insights would not be forthcoming but I had 
to draw a line under the process, cognisant of the inevitable trade-off between adding to 
the richness of participants’ accounts versus the diminishing returns of bearing witness 
to repeated points.  
I conducted all of the interviews in the academic year 2017/18. Relevant background 
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4.4.4 Pilot interviews 
I conducted two pilot interviews with current academics. The first was situated in Durham 
University School of Education (Pilot 1) and the second in the host business school 
(Pilot 2). Having gained their preliminary verbal acceptance, I subsequently sent pilot 
participants a Participant Information Sheet (Appendix B). This explained the aims of the 
study, the interview process and covered information necessary to obtain informed 
consent. Completion of a pre-interview questionnaire preceded each pilot interview.  
 
For Pilot 1 the pre-interview questionnaire (Appendix C) comprised four open questions 
focussed on what critical thinking is, how critical thinking is evidenced in students’ work 
and how this had come to be known. I reviewed the return shortly prior to interview, 
annotating with comments and follow-up questions that then informed the discussion. I 
further subsumed the pre-interview questionnaire within the interview guide. This 
covered three main areas: firstly, the assessment process; secondly, critical thinking; 
and thirdly, a discussion of assessed pieces of students’ work. 
 
For Pilot 2 I subsequently expanded the pre-interview questionnaire (Appendix D) to five 
questions covering the same areas as before but with added emphasis on how 
understanding of critical thinking had developed over time, which was something 
interesting that came out of Pilot 1. This change was accommodated in the guide which 
otherwise remained unchanged save that the reference to ‘undergraduate students’ 
work’ was amended to ‘undergraduate dissertations’. I always intended undergraduate 
dissertations to be in focus for this study. That Pilot 1 centred upon ‘undergraduate 
students’ work’ more broadly was simply a practical imperative with Pilot 1 engaged in 
assessing assignments not dissertations. This notwithstanding, I derived much value 
from the pilot stage as a dry run of the interview process.  
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Conducting pilot interviews enabled me to check that I would be communicating with 
sufficient clarity and friendliness of tone and that data collection would cover relevant 
areas. Feedback and review served to establish the trustworthiness of the pre-interview 
questionnaire and interview guide. In particular, following Yin (2018), I considered the 
focus and nature of the questions I was asking to determine if the process was likely to 
elicit relevant responses and to refine the interview guide accordingly. Notably, the two 
pilot participants provided apparently disparate levels of response to the pre-interview 
questionnaire. Pilot 1 offered quite considered and detailed responses to the original 
four set questions, whereas Pilot 2, who described the enlarged five-question format as 
cumbersome and repetitive, provided only minimal responses. I therefore reverted to 
four questions. I also thought, with the benefit of hindsight, that some of the interview 
questions, whilst comprehensible, seemed lengthy and somewhat formal, noting that I 
had abridged these on an ad-hoc basis during the course of the interviews. I was at least 
comforted that the questions were scheduled in a logical order as intended to help 
maintain the structure and flow of the interview in moving from point to point (Saunders, 
Lewis & Thornhill, 2012; Yates, 2004).  
 
4.4.5 Main interviews 
I made initial targeted requests for participation across the host business school. Where 
preliminary verbal assent to participate was received, I followed this up with an email 
invitation that included a copy of the Participant Information Sheet and pre-interview 
questionnaire. I subsequently arranged interviews at each participant’s convenience. In 
all I might have had up to thirty participants, however scheduling interviews proved 
difficult in the case of several initially willing respondents. I made a decision not to 
persist beyond two further polite email requests. I issued each of the twenty-one 
participants in the main interviewing phase with a copy of the pre-interview 
questionnaire. Seventeen participants completed and returned this. 
 
I took appropriate advantage of the flexibility offered by the semi-structured interview 
format so that whilst each interview started from the same point and loosely followed the 
interview guide (Appendix E), I did not feel constrained by that and did not allow it to 
inhibit the conversation. I let interviews flow in whatever direction the participant chose to 
pursue whilst at appropriate junctures reverting to the guide to keep things on track. 
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Consequently, no two interviews were structurally identical. However, I did seek to cover 
all areas of the guide in the course of each interview.   
 
I structured the guide along three progressive sections. The first served a number of 
important purposes. It anchored the interview firmly in a situated context and oriented 
the early part of the discussion around assessment in higher education and more 
specifically of undergraduate dissertations. The first question also served as a relatively 
gentle introduction to the interview, offering participants an open invitation to talk about 
their personal background, which is something they would obviously know about 
(Matthews & Ross, 2010). This helped with rapport building and with putting participants 
sufficiently at ease to engage in a hopefully honest and open discussion. The second 
section reprised the pre-interview questionnaire. Here, the interview turned towards 
critical thinking, revisiting the areas covered by the questionnaire, seeking to draw out 
how participants would define and characterise critical thinking both generally and with 
respect to undergraduate dissertations. The third section built on the first two, turning 
attention to assessing for critical thinking in undergraduate dissertations, placing the 
focus firmly on the practice under investigation. This was facilitated by document 
elicitation (refer to s.4.4.6 for more detail). I concluded each interview with brief thanks 
for taking part and reiterated assurances of confidentiality (Matthews & Ross, 2010). 
 
4.4.6 Document elicitation  
Document elicitation draws on photo elicitation as an interview-based method for gaining 
insights into participants’ conceptions and approaches (Buswell & Berdanier, 2020). 
Photo elicitation developed in the disciplines of anthropology and sociology. Harper 
(2002) provides a detailed account of this and explains how he used the technique to 
good effect in his research by showing photographs to interviewees and asking them 
questions whilst doing so in order to evoke feelings, memories and responses that may 
not otherwise develop from discussion alone. Similarly, I sought to use dissertations as 
documents which participants could refer to and talk me through, thereby delving deeper 





Wherever possible I timed interviews to coincide with undergraduate dissertation 
assessment in the academic calendar. Beforehand I asked participants to identify two 
examples of recently assessed undergraduate dissertations, one of which for them rates 
highly for critical thinking and one of which rates less so. At the document elicitation 
stage of the interview, I would say to the participant along the lines of, “For each of the 
two dissertations you have identified, can you describe the differing levels of critical 
thinking, how this is evidenced for you and how this has influenced your grade?” In the 
main, I allowed the participant to speak at this stage, only interjecting where the 
conversation lulled or where further probing was needed as the conversation developed.   
 
Buswell (2018) in her study found document elicitation to be a very useful way of 
drawing out rich information of the teaching conceptions held and methods employed by 
assistant engineering professors. Indeed, she claimed that the elicitation stage of each 
interview was comparatively more revealing than other stages, professing it “extremely 
successful in capturing a “thick description”” (p.6). This interviewing technique shows 
promise and I anticipated then that this would prove a fruitful part of each interview. 
However, this did not quite turn out to be the case, with the technique not working as 
hoped for this study. In the two findings chapters I have identified utterances from the 
document elicitation stages of the interviews via the use of a description in square 
brackets […]. These utterances are often enlightening but disappointingly few. In part 
this was due to not all participants having assessed dissertations to hand for the 
interview, my attempts at timing notwithstanding. However, I submit the greater fault lies 
with timing in interviews. Situating the document elicitation stage at the end of each 
applicable interview meant that it became something of a victim of interview fatigue. 
Consequently, participants gave this stage less attention than they might have done if I 
had foregrounded document elicitation earlier in the interview guide and made it more a 





4.5 Data analysis 
4.5.1 Thematic analysis 
Thematic analysis is an analytical method that provides a transparent and systematic 
approach to interpreting qualitative data (Joffe, 2012; Nowell, Norris, White & Moules, 
2017). Put simply, it offers a way of meaningfully processing raw qualitative research 
data (Matthews & Ross, 2010), comprised in this study of semi-structured interviews. 
Processing involves organising the data through coding and making interpretations, i.e. 
“making sense of the data” (Creswell & Poth, 2018, p.195), with the prospect of 
identifying, analysing and interpreting patterns leading to the construction of themes 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
 
The approach might be classed as inductive, with themes driven by what is in the data 
unencumbered by “extant theoretical frameworks” (Vaismoradi, Jones, Turunen & 
Snelgrove, 2016, p.106) or any “analytical preconceptions” or a “pre-existing coding 
frame” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p.12). The researcher thus derives meaning from the data 
from the ‘bottom-up’ as opposed to a ‘top-down’ application of existing theory (Braun & 
Clarke, 2012). The analysis is then grounded in the data and the researcher frequently 
returns to the raw data to check the interpretations and to reconsider linkages formed 
(Matthews & Ross, 2010). However, the development of themes is in reality likely to be 
informed by theory, as research is not conducted within a vacuum. The researcher will 
have done some reading, the extent of which can vary, but this will inevitably inform their 
interpretation of the data leading to themes (Howitt & Cramer, 2014).  
 
In practical terms the approach falls somewhere between ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’, 
with coding and subsequent analysis combining the two to a greater or lesser extent 
subject to the epistemological orientation and exact approach of the individual 
researcher (Braun & Clarke, 2012). Certainly, whilst I strived to analyse my dataset 
inductively for themes, my analysis was inevitably informed by extensive prior reading of 
the literature and its themes. I actually see this as an advantage. Not only did this help 
sensitise me to subtleties within the data (Tuckett, 2005), it enabled me to appropriately 
devise research questions for the study and adequately make sense of the data with 
respect to those questions. These things follow from understanding the literature and 
grounding the study in that understanding. Appreciably, however, this needs to be 
balanced with allowing participants’ accounts to speak, taking suitable care to enable 
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that without forcing a literature-led interpretation. For me, the benefits outweigh the 
potential downsides of narrowing my analytical scope to that which I might anticipate 
from my reading of the literature, and which would potentially inhibit my ability to develop 
themes (Vaismoradi et al., 2016). In effect, immersion in the literature allowed me to 
engage in a more learned and critical analysis, building on what might otherwise have 
stalled at the simplistic and the observational. 
 
Braun and Clarke (2006) offer a robust, sophisticated, systematic and comprehensive 
framework for thematically analysing qualitative data in relation to research questions. 
This framework involves six phases: (1) familiarising yourself with the data; (2) 
generating initial codes; (3) searching for themes; (4) reviewing themes; (5) defining and 
naming themes; and (6) producing the report. These phases proceed linearly but it is 
recognised that I as the researcher will revert back to earlier phases repeatedly and 
throughout to clarify and refine themes (Howitt and Cramer, 2014; Vaismoradi et al., 
2016). 
 
4.5.2 Phase 1: Familiarising yourself with the data 
In Phase 1, I started the process of getting to know my data, gaining initial familiarity 
through reviewing pre-interview questionnaires and then personally conducting each 
interview. This also followed from conducting a relatively detailed if incomplete literature 
review. I came then to the task of analysing the data with a degree of prior knowledge 
and some preliminary thoughts (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Some formative pattern 
recognition did occur as interviews progressed and each new one built on the former 
and I made notes of my ideas as they formed. These did not prejudice full analysis of the 
data subsequently but served as useful starting points for data coding and later 





4.5.2.1 Transcribing interviews 
Interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed into text form for the purposes of 
analysis, as is common in qualitative research (Kvale, 2007). This was a fundamental 
part of the process of my becoming familiar with the data (Bird, 2005; Howitt & Cramer, 
2014). To be exact, I conducted all of the interviews and transcribed the pilot interviews 
and the first eight main interviews in full. A transcription provider initially transcribed the 
thirteen remaining interviews. I then checked these in full for accuracy against the 
original recordings, amending extensively as required. This occupied a lengthy period 
and was at times tedious and frustrating in equal measure, but served to inform my 
understanding of the data benefiting the early analytical stages.  
 
Following the example set by Braun and Clarke (2012) I read the full set of transcripts 
twice, and following Clarke and Braun (2013, 2014) I listened again to each interview, 
making jottings in the margins and notes of any initial observations. This active process 
of repeat reading and listening helped me to become sufficiently immersed and ready for 
the next phase of analysis (Maguire & Delahunt, 2017; Nowell et al., 2017). 
 
4.5.3 Phase 2: generating initial codes 
In Phase 2, analysis begins through data coding (Braun & Clarke, 2012). Initial coding 
involves the researcher working through transcriptions systematically, interview by 
interview, line by line, scrutinising what the data is saying and summarising key aspects 
with “pithy label(s) that capture something interesting about the data” (Clarke & Braun, 
2014, p.6627). At this stage, the intention is not to capture themes but simply to highlight 
sections of text that are of interest, labelling and indexing any features that are 
potentially pertinent (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Highlighting ideas usefully goes beyond 
counting words or phrases in the nature of content analysis (Namey, Guest, Thairu & 
Johnson, 2008). Data is thus aggregated and clustered into significant groupings 
enabling connections to be made across the data (Tuckett, 2005; Vaismoradi, Turunen 
& Bondas, 2013).   
 
My initial attempt at coding was open and wide ranging and involved tagging data 
portions with simple descriptive codes of single words or short phrases, with only limited 
interpretation. This generated a list of fifty-eight initial codes (Coding 1st round – see 




4.5.4 Phase 3: searching for themes 
In Phase 3, analysis progresses from codes to themes (Braun & Clarke, 2012). This 
involves sorting and aggregating the long list of codes, inclusive of all relevant data 
excerpts, into a limited number of common themes (Creswell & Poth, 2018). Themes are 
“patterns of meaning” (Braun & Clarke, 2012, p.57) and “key characters in the story we 
are telling about the data” (Clarke & Braun, 2018, p.108). Themes should have 
something important to say about the data, providing insights in relation to a study’s 
research questions (Spencer et al., 2003; Vaismoradi et al., 2016). 
 
Meaning is developed from analysing across the dataset, with themes drawing from 
shared content, experiences and patterns in the data (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Analysis 
is, however, an active process of discovery. Themes are not passively revealed. They do 
not exist in the data simply waiting to be found. Nor do they just emerge from analysis 
(Packer, 2017). Themes are actively synthesised from the data by the researcher, grown 
organically through processes of coding and thematic development (Braun & Clarke, 
2006).  
 
In practical terms, my initial coding structure was repeatedly revisited and revised. Initial 
codes were combined. Areas of difference, similarity, overlap, consensus and conflict 
were considered. Relationships within and between codes were identified and major 
patterns were formed, building to higher levels of coding which offer greater coherence 
and meaning than the initial descriptive codes represent (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 
2006; Nowell et al., 2017). There was a degree of intuition at play as I devised themes, 
however, this is tempered through layers of interpretation, “a coding of codings” so to 
speak (Howitt & Cramer, 2014, p.383). 
 
Starting with the initial list of fifty-eight codes, I expanded, reworked and restructured this 
formulating ninety codes under four main headings and twelve sub-headings (Coding 2nd 
round – see Appendix G). Some codes were discarded, new codes were formed, 
superordinate and subordinate headings accrued as analytical ideas developed and 
relationships in the data and nuances in meanings became more apparent. I then 
reviewed this second round of coding at length, reading collected codes in isolation but 
also moving back and forth to the original data for context and understanding (Braun & 
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Clark 2006). This next round was a refinement of the previous, more with the tagging of 
interviews / data excerpts than with the coding structure which remained much the same 
and therefore still overly long and complex (Coding 3rd round – see Appendix H). 
Agreeing with Howitt & Cramer, 2014, I saw these early rounds very much as a process 
of trial and error, finding them increasingly over-coded, thereby obscuring what the data 
really had to say and complicating rather than simplifying the picture. I worked then on 
decluttering and simplifying, collapsing and amalgamating codes to form a much 
reduced structure comprised of five main headings, constituting early themes, with 
between seven and nine codes attached to each heading totalling forty codes (Coding 
4th round – see Appendix I) with near nine hundred data excerpts tagged to those codes.  
 
4.5.5 Phase 4: reviewing themes 
Phase 4 is a review phase. Here, themes are reconsidered with reference to the data as 
coded and the dataset in its entirety. This is effectively a quality control mechanism. It is 
a self-check on the themes as I have interpreted them from the data (Clarke & Braun, 
2013).  
 
At this point my tentative themes needed refining and re-examining against the data to 
ensure each held a coherent pattern (Nowell et al., 2017). I scrutinised them in detail, 
judging for evidence, i.e. examining whether the data really supported the themes, as 
well as coherence and fit, both at the level of each theme’s constituent coded data 
excerpts and with respect to the dataset as a whole (Maguire & Delahunt, 2017). 
 
This phase spanned several repeat reviews as I sought to delineate what makes each 
theme distinctive and how the themes operate together to form a coherent whole. I 
developed the results of this into a further round of coding (Coding 5th round - see 
Appendix J). This process of review, reflection and re-working was invaluable, helping 
me to focus on the salient meanings, and in seeing and judging my early efforts in 
developing themes as precipitous and in need of further thinking. As a result, I gained in 
confidence that I have not forced a particular coherence upon the data and that the story 





4.5.6 Phase 5: defining and naming themes 
In Phase 5, I was aided in further reviewing, refining and clarifying the themes through 
the thought put into defining and naming them. Defining here means detailing the 
analysis of each theme, identifying its essence, explaining what each theme is about 
and how the themes fit together, in short form within a concise and informative name 
(Clarke & Braun, 2014).  
 
A key aspect here was ensuring that themes are distinct, that each is well focussed, that 
each can stand alone, and that each can be differentiated in terms of what it is and is not 
through allocated definitions and names (Clarke & Braun, 20144). Again, it was 
important for me to revert to the original data and test revised themes for efficacy and fit 
and to corroborate the findings (Braun & Clarke, 2012; Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006).  
  
Careful thought and much revision was given to naming themes, conscious of the need 
for brevity yet also the need to give the reader a clear and immediate sense of what 
each theme is about (Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
 
In summary, I synthesised two distinct themes: 
 Theme 1: Facets of an undergraduate student as critical thinker (reported in 
Chapter 5); 
 Theme 2: Approaches to assessing undergraduate dissertations: convergence, 





4.5.7 Phase 6: producing the report 
Phase 6, the writing up stage, accounts for the results of the prior phases leading to 
defining each theme and determining how the themes interrelate. This account draws on 
collated data excerpts for each theme to construct a detailed, coherent, analytical and 
explanatory narrative, individually and collectively, i.e. the story that each theme tells 
situated within the overall story (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Themes collectively narrate the 
story of the data as interpreted and as applied to the research questions (Clarke & 
Braun, 2014). Hence, themes should clearly relate back to the research questions posed 
at the outset of the study (Howitt & Cramer, 2014). This is important because the 
process does not entail analysis for analysis sake. It must have a purpose, which is to 
answer research questions through finding and examining patterns of meaning across 
the dataset that are relevant to those questions (Vaismoradi et al., 2016).  
 
Data excerpts should appropriately support the analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2012). In 
Chapters 5 and 6, I have woven interview quotations into the analytical narrative, 
sufficient to illustrate the themes and confirm the links between my interpretation and the 
evidence (Clarke & Braun, 2013; Greenhalgh & Taylor, 1997). I attribute quotations to 
individual participants, each by their allocated pseudonym, and presented in italics. On 
occasion my own input as interviewer is included in square brackets […] simply to 
situate quotations within interview dialogue, for example, where a participant’s response 
makes indirect references which require prefacing to aid the reader’s understanding. 
 
In Chapter 7, I have further refined my analysis through consideration of the themes in 
the context of the extant literature base and this study’s research questions. 
Engagement here was fundamental to me challenging my own interpretations in light of 
potential alternatives and in developing the meanings and implications of the themes 








Interviewing is, as stated, often the data collection method of choice for the qualitative 
researcher (Rands & Gansemer-Topf, 2016). However, reliance on interviews is not 
without criticism. For example, the weight placed on interview data is of particular 
concern (Saljo, 1997). Saljo (1997, p.176) refers to the failure of researchers to 
recognise the “primacy of talk”, i.e. what interviewees say and what they actually think 
may not necessarily accord. It is possible, for example, that what interviewees say is 
what they think the interviewer wants to hear, or expects to hear, or is an attempt to 
preserve face rather than give an honest answer (Saljo, 1997). Yin (2011, p.13) further 
refers to participants potentially “echoing the same institutional “mantra”, developed over 
time for speaking with outsiders” rather than giving honest accounts of their practices 
relative to the organisation’s practices. Interview data should be approached with 
caution then as utterances may simply embody ways of speaking rather than be 
indicative of actual experiences.  
Interviewing is essentially a social interaction through conversation necessitating direct 
communication and interaction between researcher and participant (Rubin & Rubin, 
2012; Warren & Karner, 2015). Interviews by their very nature often exhibit asymmetric 
power between interviewer and interviewee (Saljo, 1997). The fear is that the interviewer 
may overly influence the discussion, leading participants rather than allowing them to 
impart their experiences unfettered. This is a weakness of the method which I, following 
the example of Sin (2010), looked to counter by listening empathetically and attentively; 
by giving interviewees time and space to respond to questions, resisting where possible 
the urge to leap in and fill pauses too soon; by verbalising any assumptions I made 
during the discussion and asking for clarification with follow-up questions; and by trying 
to avoid asking leading questions. My intention was to focus on the practice as 
experienced, to give participants space to explore detail and nuances, to resist leading 
or conditioning their responses.  
 
I further sought to cover issues in repeat fashion and from different angles where 
possible, through reprising main questions from the pre-interview questionnaire and 
through probing. Comparisons could then be made of what interviewees said in relation 
to particular issues. In addition, I strived to build rapport and maintain an attentive, 
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interested and respectful atmosphere conducive to openness (Kvale, 2007). My efforts 
were directed at overcoming the primacy of talk and achieving good correspondence 
between researcher and participants in the account, adding to the credibility of the 
research (Bryman, 2015). 
 
4.6.2 Transcription 
With all due respect to Kvale’s concerns as to the reliability of written transcriptions, as 
decontextualized from oral interviews, and Barnacle’s concerns as to communicative 
reduction from the translation, how reliable transcription is really depends upon its 
purpose, i.e. the uses to which the transcribed interviews are to be put. My analytical 
focus is on participants’ experiences and their meanings as conceptualised and 
understood by them, hence, verbatim transcription is appropriate, acceptable and 
perfectly suited to the task of thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006). More complex 
transcription systems, for example Jefferson, which provide much greater transcribed 
detail, are not necessary for this (Howitt & Cramer, 2014). The additional information 
provided is simply not required to answer the research questions of this thesis, hence, 
the extra effort would be wasted and is therefore to be avoided. My focus is on what was 
said not how. It is unnecessary therefore to construct transcriptions with pauses, 
disfluencies, tonal inflections, body language, etc. What was important is that the words 
as spoken were accurately captured in transcription because this formed the basis of 
analysis. 
Analysing transcriptions is fraught with challenges too. Transcription converts verbal 
discourse into written text. This is itself an interpretive act. Kvale (1996) describes 
transcription as an act of translation through which interviews are decontextualized 
leading to the loss of essential meaning. There are structural and operational differences 
of speech and written text according to their respective communicative rules and 
conventions. Kvale (1996) therefore warns that meanings are contextual and may not 
adequately translate with the change of medium. Meanings may also be lost because 
aspects of experience may not or cannot come across from the written text compared 
with face-to-face interaction, which offers a much richer communicative event (Barnacle, 
2005). Dortins (2002) argues that meaning is not just lost, rather the researcher actively 
re-contextualises the interview effectively opening up different interpretations. Thus, in 




Following Sin (2010), I took steps to mitigate this by reflecting on each interview shortly 
afterwards, making appropriate contextual notes, and by personally engaging with the 
transcription having listened to each audio recording several times. Repeat listening also 
formed part of the data analysis process as a means by which contextual features could 
be brought in to facilitate and check for appropriate interpretations and understandings. I 
also produced updated transcripts of each interview having redacted personal identifiers 
and any information that could potentially be used to identify participants (Matthews & 
Ross, 2010).  
 
4.6.3 Sampling 
As outlined in s.4.4.3, I sought to construct a sample of participants from people who 
would know a great deal about what was being investigated and who were suitably 
positioned to offer some insights into that. This meant purposively sampling participants 
from a bounded population, i.e. academics at the host business school. From initial 
targeted requests for participation across the school I might have had up to thirty 
interviews, although for various reasons this settled on twenty-one actual interviewees. 
This is still a substantial number. Moreover, during the course of conducting the 
interviews I felt I had reached saturation, i.e. the point at which “further interviews yield 
little new knowledge” (Kvale, 2007, p.44). One nagging doubt remained, however. The 
participants were people whom I might have anticipated would agree to take part. They 
came from what I would regard as the circle of the willing, i.e. academics, whether 
research and/or teaching focussed, who are generally positive about students and the 
student experience, who were interested in my research and who were likely to be 
prepared to get involved. There are others at the host business school perhaps whose 
reputations as interesting, eccentric, even difficult characters precedes them. Their 
voices, their perspectives would no doubt add to the richness and colourfulness of the 
dataset. Unfortunately, despite targeted efforts I could not garner any participatory 






The case study method necessitates the collection of sufficient data to enable the 
exploration of major aspects of the case and to support interpretations offered by the 
researcher (Bassey, 1999). Hancock and Algozzine (2017, p.16) describe case studies 
as “grounded in deep and varied sources of information”. Yin (2011, 2018) talks of the 
likely need for multiple sources of data and data collection methods forming triangulated 
evidence, for example interviews combined with observational data, without which the 
trustworthiness of the data may be open to question, or at least difficult to test for. 
Triangulation would strengthen confidence in the data as interpreted by the researcher 
(Bassey, 1999; Creswell, 2018; Farquhar, 2012).  
 
My approach did not involve the triangulation of different data sources to the extent 
advocated by Yin (2018). Moreover, from my epistemological standpoint I do not accept 
that convergence of evidence though triangulation necessarily leads to ‘facts’ or the 
‘truth’. I acknowledge, however, that a degree of triangulation can potentially add to the 
richness of the picture portrayed by the research and therefore my understanding of it 
(Remenyi, 2013). To that end, I did bring certain institutional documents into my 
interpretations of the data collected through semi-structured interviews. I also attended 
and observed an annual dissertation supervisors’ communication meeting. I also 
employed mediating artefacts – a pre-interview questionnaire and recently assessed 
dissertations - to facilitate reflection both before and during interviews, encouraging 
meta-awareness in participants to elicit insights into their experiences. I did consider 
asking participants to ‘talk aloud’ whilst assessing dissertations, also asking for 
permission to observe meetings between first and second assessors to discuss 
dissertation grades, so that I could observe assessment processes in play. However, 
operational limitations notwithstanding, I felt this would have impinged on participants’ 
goodwill, potentially reducing the sample. On balance, I determined that incorporating a 
discussion of recently assessed dissertations into interviews would produce relevant 
data for my purposes. Ultimately, I feel that twenty-one interviews yielding almost 
thirteen hundred minutes of transcribed data, comprised of different voices on the same 
or similar issues and hence offering a degree of ‘informant triangulation’ (Remenyi, 
2013), provided a sufficiently rich dataset for analysis and interpretation. I submit that 
collectively the approach has supplied information and evidence enough to facilitate my 





The value of a piece of research, its usefulness in my estimation, can be measured in 
terms of its generalisability, i.e. the extent to which its findings are applicable beyond the 
study at hand more broadly to other contexts, situations, etc. (Cohen et al., 2017). 
Meanings are not context free and cannot be extrapolated beyond the context of a case 
study (Schwandt, 2003). However, “knowledge may be transferable even where it is not 
formally generalizable” (Flyvberg, 2011, p.305).  
In this thesis, I have taken a case study approach in seeking to develop an 
understanding of the conceptualisation of critical thinking and its assessment in 
undergraduate dissertations by business school academics. The value of the approach 
is here in examining pertinent questions of a contemporary phenomenon in a practical, 
real world setting (Farquhar, 2012). Appreciably my findings, what Stake (1995) would 
regard as merely ‘assertions’, are not generalizable in the traditional statistical sense, i.e. 
“in the usual sense of nomic generalisation, based upon data representative of some 
population” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p.120). However, this is not my intention. What I can 
aim for is a degree of ‘transferability’ (s.4.8.3 refers). The themes developed and the 
lessons learned from this case might transcend to others through, for example, analytical 
generalisation (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Yin, 2018). Alternatively, and more appropriately 
here, through naturalistic generalisation (Stake, 2005), by which readers can examine 
similarities and differences with their own circumstances, judging whether and to what 
extent the findings from one study may serve as a guide to what might happen in other 
situations (Kvale, 2007; Thomas, 2013). The findings may resonate then with readers’ 
experiences, their ‘phronesis’ (Cooper & Morgan, 2008; Thomas, 2011b), helping them 
to make connections with their contexts and build their own situated understandings 
(Zucker, 2009).   
 
My findings are localised to a single case setting. I have examined the matter under 
investigation in a particular institutional context and portrayed the ways in which the 
participants experience this as I have interpreted them. So whilst my findings may have 
little in the way of general applicability in the traditional sense, they can shed some light 
on the assessment of undergraduate dissertations and the conceptualisation of critical 
thinking and the role this plays therein, albeit in a single case context. Conceivably, the 
findings could speak for what may be happening in related settings if they resonate with 
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others (Hamilton & Corbett-Whittier, 2013; Robson & McCartan, 2016). I of course make 
no specific claims to transferability. Rather, I have provided suitable contextual 
information of the case, and of how the fieldwork and analysis proceeded, so that 
readers can judge transferability for themselves. I hope that readers, through engaging 
in their own reflection on the findings of this case study relative to their own 
circumstances can make parallels with their own contexts. In this way, this case study 
can contribute to understanding at a broader level, allowing others to learn from it and 
potentially informing decision-making, policy and practice (Simons, 1996, 2009). 
 
4.7 Ethical considerations 
That the nature of this investigation and the dissemination of its findings could potentially 
cause harm to participants was something that I took into consideration. Conceivably, 
participants could suffer reputational harm if my findings were to paint them, their 
practices or their professionalism in a negative light. The host business school, and the 
host university by extension, could suffer reputational harm. Broader still this could bring 
higher education into disrepute leading to a loss of faith in the sector and its assessment 
practices. I considered this when portraying the findings.  
For degree purposes, I appropriately obtained consent from Durham University School 
of Education’s Research Ethics Committee. I then sought organisational gatekeeper 
consent from the Dean of the host business school before approaching prospective 
participants. I issued participants with a detailed Participant Information Sheet, which 
provided relevant information about the research to enable informed choice over 
whether or not to participate. This information was revisited at the commencement of 
each interview to ensure consent was given. Repeat emphasis was given to participation 
being voluntary, that this could be withdrawn at any stage, that interview questions could 
be declined and that the interview could be terminated at the option of the participant 
(Kvale, 2007; Yates, 2004). I kept consent under constant review, watching in interview 





Attending to confidentiality, together with the steps taken to obtain informed consent, 
would give participants sufficient confidence to take part. I recognise that protecting 
participants’ confidentiality is clearly important (Cohen et al., 2017; Saunders et al., 
2012). I made two transcriptions of each interview. The first represented a full and 
accurate verbatim transcription. The second I adjusted in order to preserve participants’ 
confidentiality. Adjustments included redacting any references to employers or places of 
work, specific academic departments, colleagues, modules, etc. – essentially any 
attributive detail that could serve as identifiers. I allocated each participant an 
anonymous code for storage purposes. Audi-recorded interview data files (mp4 format) 
were held electronically on a secure server, with access password-protected. I tagged 
interview transcripts to anonymous codes to preserve confidentiality, with the list of 
codes filed separately from the participant list. I allocated each participant a pseudonym 
for reporting purposes, following a well-established research tradition. I stored all data 
confidentially and in compliance with both Durham University regulations and UK data 
protection law.  
4.8 Research rigour 
4.8.1 Trustworthiness 
Rigour is a prerequisite for any piece of credible research. Traditionally characterised by 
validity and reliability, a study that exhibits both will have findings that are reflective of 
the object under investigation (Sin, 2010). Internal validity (how sound the conclusions 
generated are), external validity (how generalizable the findings are) and reliability (how 
accurately the study and its findings can be replicated) are some of the key criteria by 
which the quality of much research, in particular quantitative research, can be assessed 
(Bryman, 2015). Qualitative researchers, however, come from a greater mix of 
ontological, epistemological and methodological traditions (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). 
Social constructionism, underpinning this thesis, does not have as its purpose the 
discovery of objective facts or verifiable truths (Burr, 2003). All accounts of social actors 
are situated socially, historically and culturally. All knowledge derived from social 
constructionist research is temporary and open to interpretative challenge (Burr, 2003). 
This means that for my research positivist concepts of validity and reliability are not 





This of course does not give me an excuse to abandon rigour. Alternative ways of 
achieving rigour in research do exist. ‘Trustworthiness’ is concerned with the integrity of 
qualitative research (Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Lincoln & Guba, 1985) and may be split into 
aspects which match traditional criteria for research rigour. These include ‘credibility’ 
(are the findings believable?) mirroring internal validity; ‘fittingness’ or ‘transferability’ 
(can the findings be applied to other settings?) mirroring external validity; ‘auditability’ or 
‘dependability’ (can the findings be replicated?) mirroring reliability; and ‘confirmability’ 
(has the researcher sought to mitigate the impact of his biases and values?) mirroring 
objectivity (Bryman, 2015). These are pragmatic choices that enable the researcher to 
demonstrate the rigorous way in which qualitative research has been undertaken to allay 
concerns over the acceptability of the findings (Nowell et al., 2017).  
 
4.8.2 Credibility 
Establishing credibility involves conducting research in accordance with good practice, 
demonstrating consistency between object, data and conclusions (Sin, 2010).  
Context has an important role to play in addressing credibility concerns. Qualitative 
research is situated and people are often studied in their natural settings (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2011; Punch, 2005). Early studies in the phenomenographic tradition, for 
example, put participants firmly in situations which contextually were meaningful to them 
and which allowed interviewer and interviewee to jointly share in the experiences of the 
latter. The results become meaningful when the interviewee is placed in a situation of 
looking to achieve something within their own context, rather than being targeted with 
questions in abstract (Saljo, 1997). In this study, I interviewed academics situated in 
their own business school setting and adjacent in timing to the process of assessing 
dissertations. 
 
To help maintain interview context both the original audio recordings and the transcribed 
interviews were uploaded to QSR NVivo, a qualitative coding and analysis software 
package. This was so that I could move repeatedly between the two, comparing and 
checking for understandings. Using NVivo helps in managing the data by enabling the 
tagging and collation of data excerpts through coding. This made searching and sorting 
the data easier, helped by organising through structuring into groups of similar subjects 
and ideas and encouraging active reading of the data, thereby aiding comparisons and 
pattern recognition and hence the depth and intricacy of the analysis (Joffe, 2012; 
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Nowell et al., 2017). NVivo also provides an audit trail covering the stages of analysis. 
This evidences rigour, helping to establish the aforementioned trustworthiness of the 
findings. Note, however, that NVivo is simply a tool for organising, structuring and 
reviewing a relatively large dataset. I as the researcher, not the software, do the actual 
coding and categorising (Creswell & Poth, 2018). Nvivo would make no judgements and 
nor would it transform the data through to themes (King, 2004). It simply helped me to 
perform these vital tasks and to an extent freed me to do “the hard analytical thinking” 
(Marshall & Rossman, 2016, p.228). The only downside I found, agreeing with Creswell 
& Poth (2018), was the time investment required to get up to speed with NVivo, which I 
did via an introductory workshop, which I attended twice, and working through several 
guidance books. Even so, this was limited because I concentrated on operating only the 
basic functions that served the necessary purposes. I did not engage with functionality of 
the software at a more sophisticated level than I needed. A further argued downside is 
that of putting some distance between researcher and data, with the data mediated 
through a software program (Bazeley & Jackson, 2013). I sought to mitigate this through 
prior reviewing and annotating of transcripts.  
 
4.8.3 Transferability 
Transferability in qualitative research surrogates for generalisability in quantitative 
(Nowell et al., 2017) – “knowledge may be transferable even where it is not formally 
generalizable” (Flyvberg, 2011, p.305). 
A small-scale qualitative study by its very nature is particularly prone to the criticism of 
lacking much if any generalisability (Bryman, 2015; Flyvberg, 2006, 2011; Thomas, 
2010, 2011b; Yin, 2011). However, qualitative research findings are not meant to be 
statistically generalizable and no such claims are made. Is this then an appropriate 
criterion by which to judge qualitative research? Schwandt (2003) argues not, on the 
basis that social phenomena are complex and context-specific. Meanings are not 
context free and cannot therefore be extrapolated beyond the context of a study. 
However, qualitative research may aim for a degree of ‘transferability’, i.e. that the 
findings may be extended beyond the immediate investigative setting through 
application to other contexts on a case-to-case basis (Malterud, 2001; Sin, 2010; Tobin 





Reliability relates to the extent to which findings can be replicated. True replication of 
qualitative research is difficult if not impossible to achieve because of the instability of 
the social world and the contextualised nature of the research (Sin, 2010). Qualitative 
studies may exhibit elements of commonality but vary in approaches to data collection 
and analysis. The process is not standardised. The researcher is the main instrument of 
data collection and analysis, and the approach taken depends upon the particular 
researcher’s own predilections (Bryman, 2015). It follows that researchers may do things 
differently, may concentrate on different aspects and may arrive at different conclusions. 
In addition, researcher and participant co-construct qualitative interviews (Brinkmann & 
Kvale, 2015). Semi-structured interviews offer flexibility meaning no two interviews are 
necessarily alike (Marshall & Rossman, 2016). Responses will be affected by the 
interaction; hence, different researchers will generate different interactions co-
constructing different accounts. This too works against replicability and hence, reliability.  
For dependability, the process of qualitative research should be “logical, traceable and 
clearly documented” (Nowell et al., 2017, p.3). It frequently is not (Bryman & Burgess, 
1994). In order to establish dependability, paralleling reliability, Lincoln and Guba (1985) 
suggest the researcher should keep complete and accessible records, including a 
detailed audit trail at every stage of the study from formulating the research questions 
through to sampling participants, interviewing, data analysis and drawing-up 
conclusions. This adds transparency to the process of developing themes, negating the 
need for replicability in the traditional sense. Following also the recommendation of 
Guba and Lincoln (1981) for inclusion of verification schemes, the integrity of the 
research process and the conclusions so developed can also be audited by peers 
(Bryman, 2015). Mine is a doctoral research study and is necessarily subject to a degree 
of auditing through internal supervisory mechanisms and progress reviews, and external 






Confirmability involves showing how the researcher has interpreted the data and 
reached corroborated conclusions, recognising that participants have put their trust in 
the researcher’s integrity to portray their perspectives (Bell, 2014; Tobin & Begley, 
2004). 
‘Bracketing’ requires the researcher to set aside any relevant views and preconceptions 
before tackling the data premised on the concern that these may influence and shape 
the analysis (Tufford & Newman, 2012). However, effective bracketing is thought to be 
virtually impossible and hence, data interpretation will inevitably be subject to a degree 
of partiality. However, this does not preclude a lone researcher conducting high quality 
qualitative research, to include the present thesis, which as doctoral research is of a 
solitary nature, if suitable precautions are taken (Rands & Gansemer-Topf, 2016). In any 
event, the problem as regards objectivity is not that subjectivity exists but rather when its 
influence is ignored and/or left unaddressed (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Malterud, 2001). A 
commitment to reflexivity throughout the research process is important to addressing 
this. I included my thoughts on this in Chapter 1, reflexively setting out my philosophical 
positioning and assumptions, and highlighting any preconceptions and potential biases 
that could influence this research (see s.1.3.1).  
Confirmability may also entail obtaining feedback from participants to assess if I have 
accurately interpreted and understood their experiences (Sin, 2010). I claim partial 
compliance in this, having taken great care in accurately transcribing interviews and 
having sent transcripts to participants for comment. The difficulty and my point of 
departure comes in not seeking verification of the findings. These derive from my 
interpretations of interview data whereby individual utterances are collated, 
decontextualized, re-contextualised and ultimately reduced to form themes. How 
faithfully my themes describe participants’ experiences is mediated through my 
interaction with the data, limited by my linguistic abilities (Koole, 2012). My themes 






Social constructionism holds that the social world is not a fixed, objective, observable 
reality; rather it is social actors who create it through their social practices (Cohen, 
Duberley & Mallon, 2004). Qualitative research draws on the hermeneutic tradition and 
is thus concerned with subjectivity and with locating socially situated and contextualised 
meanings (Guba & Lincoln, 2005). Characteristic of qualitative research within a social 
constructionist paradigm, this study is exploratory, experiential and qualitative, focussed 
on accessing the socially situated contextualised accounts of human participants with 
respect to a social practice.  
Interviewing is an accepted way of accessing human perceptions, experiences, 
meanings and realities (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015; Joffe, 2012). I sampled twenty-one 
participants from across the five subject disciplines of the host business school, drawing 
from a pool of academics who could offer a spread of relevant experiences. This 
followed two pilot interviews that helped with refining the main data collection process. 
Interviews took semi-structured form comprised of a series of open questions with 
unstructured prompts. This format is especially common in qualitative social research 
because it is particularly suited to gathering data on participants’ perspectives in their 
own words (Matthews & Ross, 2010). Two mediating artefacts supported the interviews: 
firstly, a pre-interview questionnaire completed in advance by the majority of 
participants; and secondly, two recently assessed undergraduate dissertations 
professedly exhibiting differing levels of critical thinking. These artefacts facilitated 
reflection before and during the interview to encourage meta-awareness in participants 
and elicit insights into the essence of their experiences. I transcribed the interviews, 
some in full, others by way of comprehensive review, to assist with familiarisation as the 
first step in performing detailed and systematic thematic analysis leading ultimately to 





I have explained the attendant limitations, and ethical considerations, and the steps 
taken to mitigate or meet these. That this is qualitative research obviates the application 
of validity and reliability as traditional measures of research rigour. In preference I have 
detailed the issues concerned with and the steps taken to establish the rigour of this 
research through the application of ‘trustworthiness’ criteria applicable to qualitative 
research (Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Ultimately, this study is 
legitimised through my integrity and honesty (Sin, 2010) and the detailed processes as 
documented through which I formed and executed this research. 
In the two chapters that follow, Chapters 5 and 6, I set out my findings from the thematic 
analysis. In reporting only two themes, I have strived to develop an optimal and 
parsimonious number of themes that together capture the key aspects and essence of 
the dataset. In each interview, I asked participants to describe what critical thinking is for 
them. I sought to explore this firstly, in general terms; secondly, with reference to 
undergraduate dissertations; and thirdly, more specifically with reference to sample 
undergraduate dissertations which for participants would demonstrate disparities in 
critical thinking. Discussions here fed into Theme 1 (refer Chapter 5). In each interview, I 
further asked participants to describe how they go about assessing undergraduate 
dissertations, discussing individual approaches, factors of importance and institutional 





5. Theme 1 – Facets of an undergraduate student as critical thinker 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 is the first of two chapters in which I report my findings derived from thematic 
analysis of the data as described in Chapter 4. Here, I develop Theme 1 – Facets of an 
undergraduate student as critical thinker.   
 
Questions 5-8 of the interview schedule looked to draw out participants’ definitions, 
understandings and conceptualisations of critical thinking. Whilst more often than not 
responses characterised critical thinking with particular focus on undergraduate 
dissertations, some also made references that are more direct. Collectively this enabled 
me to build a picture of business school undergraduate students who are critical 
thinkers, as perceived by participants, which I have condensed into facets comprised of 
one key composite skillset, that of argumentation (encompassing structural and 
evidential aspects); dispositions; and aspects of originality.    
5.2 Skills of argumentation 
Eighteen of twenty-one participants collectively acknowledged that students should 
possess a developed skillset that enables them to argue well:   
 
Theodore: I think to present a critical picture you need to argue a particular point.   
 
Olivia: …argument is important because it brings you on board as a reader, and to 
be able to buy into what the study is about, why it's important, the 
interpretation of the results, all depends upon the quality of the argument 
that's being put forward. So I think it's very, very important. 
 
These quotations from Theodore and Olivia appear representative of the group and 
come from two highly experienced members of faculty. Both are Associate Professors 
but on different tracks. Theodore is on teaching track, his role focussed on management 
and teaching; Olivia on research track, her role focussed on research and teaching. 
They had fifteen and twenty-one years’ experience in academia respectively at the time 
of interview. Regardless, the message is the same, i.e. the skills of argumentation are 
fundamental to students who engage with and demonstrate critical thinking.  
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There are several aspects to exactly what for participants would make for good 
arguments. I have grouped these under the headings of ‘structure’ (s.5.2.1) and 
‘evidence’ (s.5.2.2).  
5.2.1 Structure 
The first area of argumentation that came out strongly in discussions is that students 
who are thinking critically should be able to construct appropriately structured 
arguments, i.e. valid and believable arguments that avoid contradictions and which build 
from legitimate premises through to sensible and substantiated conclusions: 
 
Zhao: It’s about how they actually engage with the arguments. So I do care about 
not only the contents but also how the arguments are structured. 
 
Of the participants who discussed argument specifically, the majority considered how 
this operates at the level of individual arguments within a piece and at the composite 
level of a dissertation as a whole. The latter should not present as “a collection of 
chunks” (Hanna), rather it should present as coherent and logically structured. Structure 
helps to bring out and make accessible the depth and perceptiveness of students’ 
arguments. However, structuring arguments is something that students often have 
difficulty with: 
 
Aidan: …you’ll be surprised how many students basically struggle to understand 
how these components have to be sequenced, and they lose sight of the 
broader view of what goes into structuring a research argument which is a 
dissertation. 
 
If this structure is lacking or deficient, then the messages that students want to convey 
are at best diluted or at worst lost altogether: 
 
Fiona: If a dissertation doesn’t flow well, if it’s not linked together, then it’s not 
really conveying the message convincingly. 
 
References to logic featured heavily where participants discussed argument during the 
course of interviews. Logic seemingly provides the spine, enabling an argument to flow 




Isaac: I expect to see critical analysis in the mid to high 2:1s, but it’s that depth, 
that perceptiveness, that logical structure to the argument that really makes 
the difference. 
 
Logic provides the structure to a dissertation as a whole and its constituent arguments. 
Reasoning is the glue that holds it all together, signposting the route from the initial 
formulation of the research through to its conclusions: 
 
Evelyn: And what we both liked was this was not without its challenges, this was 
messy, but what she wrote up was not messy and you could follow the logic 
of how you got there… [This came from the document elicitation part of 
the interview, in which Evelyn referred here to an example dissertation 
that as described demonstrated a logical structure] 
 
Evelyn: …so in there for me it’s partly about structure, so there isn’t a structure to 
the logic that’s robust enough to defend the conclusions, and in places it 
was kind of hard to wonder where the hell it came from in the first, you’re 
sort of reading going I just, there are some seismic jumps from here to there 
with you going but actually you haven’t, without the evidence to back it up. 
[This also came from the document elicitation part of the interview, in 
which Evelyn referred here to an example dissertation that as 
described contrastingly lacked a logical structure] 
This comparison by Evelyn of two dissertations shows the worth of structure. With the 
former, Evelyn as supervisor was clearly aware of the difficulties faced by the student in 
pulling together a challenging and quite “messy” (Evelyn) piece of research, but was 
impressed at just how well the student was able to convey the overall argument because 
it flowed logically. The latter, in contrast, appeared to lack sufficient structure so that it 
did not flow logically, with the conclusions not necessarily following from or properly 
drawn from the premises. Evidently, that the overall argument progresses logically is 





Zhao: Critical thinking should be in the form of arguments at the surface but we 
want to see how good the arguments are. I mentioned logic, that means 
logic it's a way of thinking but in the piece of work it's how the student 
actually expresses his or her view. The logic has to be smooth flow. It 
represents how well the student actually thinks, argues.  
 
If the logic and reasoning that justify the conclusions are clear and evident then this will 
go some way to satisfying the reader who can then track the progress of the argument: 
 
Ella: It [logical argument] has to be, I think it has to be, yes I think if it's just really 
unstructured so you do not have that clear pathway of how did you come up 
to, so I need to be able to find out how ideas formed and then how they 
made up their statement or conclusion. 
 
Viola, an economist with a background in quantitative research that involves the 
construction of mathematical models of economic phenomena, equates logic with a 
scientific approach to research: 
 
Viola: … you have to link and be able to interpret that logic that I was saying 
before. It's fundamental, otherwise it's not science. We follow the scientific 
methods, the mathematical methods. Otherwise, it's not science. 
 
In economic modelling you have assumptions, and within these assumptions you build a 
model through which you generate results, which you then criticise in terms of the 
assumptions. Mathematics underpins economics as a discipline and provides a ready-
made ‘scientific’ logic for Viola’s research:  
 
Viola: And this is how mathematics works as well, right, when you prove a 
theorem and so on? So yes that helps a lot. You look like that, given these 
assumptions you find these results, but if you relax the assumptions 
something else might come up. They understand that it is this process. I will 
say, yes, in this mathematical logic helps a lot and it clarifies lots of things. 




Evelyn, an accountant with an undergraduate degree in chemistry and a background in 
qualitative research, also equates logic with a scientific approach: 
 
Evelyn: So I am a chemist first and then I’m a chartered accountant, both of which 
are disciplines of rigour in thought and logical progression and making sure 
that what you claim at the end of it is absolutely what you’ve got firm 
evidence for and you don’t over claim, if that makes sense. 
 
For Evelyn, analytical thinking in science is much the same as critical thinking in 
accounting and other business-related disciplinary contexts: 
 
Evelyn: …it was only when I came in to academia did I realise that I did it [critical 
thinking] anyway. So I’d never called it critical thinking. I thought it was 
being logical, that’s what I thought it was. 
 
Viola and Evelyn are two highly experienced members of faculty, with nineteen and 
twenty-four years in academia respectively. They come from different disciplines, 
economics and accounting respectively, and have different academic backgrounds, yet 
both are of the fundamental view that a scientific approach, and the logic inherent to this, 
are important for argumentation and hence demonstrating critical thinking. 
In summary, participants view structure as important to effective argumentation and the 
rules of logic provide the necessary structure.  
5.2.2 Evidence 
The second area of argumentation that came out strongly in discussions is that students 
need to win the argument on paper as it were. To do so they need to substantiate their 
(logically structured) arguments with evidence. The credibility of the arguments put forth 
will diminish if students are unable to offer suitable supporting evidence for their 
conclusions and thereby convince the reader of the efficacy of their arguments: 
 
Arthur: They have to put together an argument and draw on evidence, find different 




Florence: …throughout I expect students to be able to present a well-referenced, 
supported argument. I think the whole credibility of an argument can be let 
down if the student isn’t actually able to provide suitable and relevant 
referencing to help support the points they are trying to make. 
 
Arguments need evidence. Conclusions need backing. In part, as Florence suggests, 
evidence takes the form of referencing appropriate academic sources. Simply 
referencing sources is not sufficient, however. Half of the participants who discussed this 
advised that evidencing skilled argumentation requires the ability to engage with and 
evidence ‘critique’ of sources: 
 
Evelyn: …really critique and evidence that critical thought… 
 
It would seem that students are expected to add weight to their arguments, displaying 
their critical thinking through not only referencing sources but also critique of the views 
and arguments therein. Participants’ comments here were generally contextualised to 
undergraduate dissertations with, according to approximately half of commenting 
participants, students expected to evidence that they have engaged in detailed 
evaluative reviews of the extant literature on their research topics through critique of 
published academic works. Here, students must demonstrate their understanding of the 
state of knowledge on their research topic. Hence, they have to read. They have to gain 
an initial understanding of what has been done and they have to acknowledge the 
existing work as a starter. They should not stop there, however. Critique, incorporating 
interpretation, analysis, evaluation and inference, must progress beyond simply 
describing the views of others. Most commenting participants discussed the importance 
of students comparing and contrasting sources, for example, suggesting that this would 
evidence critical thinking and so be worth crediting: 
 
Oliver: I would still be willing to give a first class mark if it was simply comparing 





The majority of participants, Oliver included, expect to find that students have compared 
and contrasted sources in the literature review part of the dissertation. The corollary to 
this is that the absence of comparing and contrasting of sources would present as 
‘descriptive’ rather than critical (refer to s.5.4.3 for a discussion of what ‘descriptive’ 
means for participants and why this is viewed as uncritical). For Oliver, an accounting 
academic of forty years’ experience, comparing and contrasting sources in itself could 
evidence a level of critical thinking commensurate with a first class grade; at least as far 
as the literature review aspect of the dissertation is concerned. Whereas for the bulk of 
participants this by itself is unlikely to be enough. There seems to be a graduation in 
critical thinking from acknowledging sources through to comparing and contrasting 
sources through to critique and synthesis of the literature. Comparing and contrasting is 
a necessary step, a foundation, a rung on the critical thinking ladder, but not one that 
takes you to the top:   
Oliver: …if a dissertation was more of a narrative description of the views of the 
established authors without at least an attempt at a critique of those authors 
then I wouldn’t give it a first class mark. 
 
Here now Oliver is explaining that critique of sources is clearly important to attaining a 
first class grade. At first glance this seems at odds with his prior comment that he “would 
still be willing to give a first class mark if it was simply comparing and contrasting the 
views of authors” (Oliver). Working on the premise that critique is more than comparing 
and contrasting, it is possible that Oliver was contradictory here. An alternative 
interpretation is that for Oliver ‘comparing and contrasting’ and ‘critique’ are 
synonymous. However, I do perceive a difference in these terms across participants, 
with the latter building on the former. Students who are able to critique are not simply 
acknowledging sources, not just describing them, not uncritically accepting of sources as 
representative of the current state of knowledge. They are making links between them, 
comparing and contrasting points, unpicking arguments, examining areas relative 
strengths and weaknesses, evaluating findings, identifying tensions and questioning 
apparent or accepted positions, i.e. students who are thinking critically will critique the 





Aidan: Because you are critiquing, right? You’re critiquing the state of the 
knowledge and this is because you have thought through the logic of it and 
intuitively, or from your past experience, you know that this is insufficient, or 
it can actually do better. So that that’s what it means to be critical. Critical 
means non-accepting of what is the current state of the knowledge. 
 
The literature review provides students with an opportunity to synthesise all of this 
critique. Students who take this opportunity are then showing that they have not just 
evaluated individual papers in isolation but importantly have synthesised knowledge 
across the literature base, making links and finding synergies:   
 
Olivia: …I would want to see at least some synthesis of the literature as a basic 
critical skill. So not just listing different bits of literature but being able to 
synthesise it and put it together in a way. 
Fiona: …it’s the difference between being able to synthesise academic literature 
rather than having a paragraph about each article connected together. 
That’s one skill which is to my mind very good and demonstrates critical 
thinking. 
Olivia offered an interesting metaphor to explain this idea of synthesis: 
 
Olivia: I always use the metaphor of a jigsaw puzzle and a literature review is a 
jigsaw puzzle. And you've got the box, but you don't have a picture on the 
top, so you've got all these pieces and you need to figure out how they fit 
together and what picture that it makes. And it may be that the picture has 
bits missing or one piece that fits there but then there's a whole bunch of 
pieces that link together over here. What their literature review is, is to try 
and put that picture into words. To describe if this is the topic what does it 




It seems that students who are thinking critically are able to synthesise the picture from 
its parts and put this into words. To do that they need to understand what the different 
pieces are, how they relate to one another and how they link together. The pieces are 
not just discrete. In some cases, studies can appear disparate but there are 
relationships between them to be uncovered. If students can figure out what those 
relationships are then they can start to make sense of the literature and synthesise this 
into a coherent picture.  
This issue of synthesis applies similarly to students’ developing their own findings from 
their research:  
 
Olivia: …you shouldn't just describe the data because just describing the data, to 
be honest, anyone could do that with a vague, no subject or not. You’re 
trying to provide a different reading of the data because you have 
developed a knowledge and an understanding of a concept, so you’ll look at 
that in a different way. 
Credible positions are defensible. Poorly explained findings, misunderstandings or 
errors, unsubstantiated assumptions and claims will all inevitably detract:  
Hanna: I say well you need to be careful that in the end you don’t end up with a 
conclusion that you cannot back up. You cannot say all the evidence points 
in this direction or the theories point in this direction and then I will say I 
don’t care, I’m going to be Donald Trump. That shouldn’t happen. 
Absent synthesis of findings and literature, what may come across is conjecture, 
students’ own opinions, potentially ill thought-through, lacking in evidential support and 
hence lacking in critical thinking. Students should demonstrate that they have used the 
literature base as a lens through which to interpret the data and as a means of providing 
evidential support:  
Zhao: This is definitely what we expect at this level. They are not just accepting 
knowledge. They are thinking. They are using the current bundle of 




Oscar: So there’s no links back to the literature but more worryingly, or I would say 
or why this is less good, is that it’s quite descriptive. It doesn’t try and pick 
up a concept or a theory that might help explain this. It just says this is the 
way it is, these are all of these motives. Well ok but is there not a theory that 
might try and explain this and then think a bit more broadly beyond that? 
[This came from the document elicitation part of the interview, in 
which Oscar referred here to an example dissertation that he chose as 
being evidentially low in critical thinking] 
Self-critique is important too in this context. Critique need not be limited to an 
examination of the works and views of others but should encompass critique by students 
of their own findings: 
Milo: And then when they’re coming up with results, there’s just this idea that it’s 
an ongoing discussion and this is what I have found and this is how my 
finding is different or is the same or is, and again it’s the idea that they’re 
critiquing not only those studies that have gone before but also their own 
study. 
At one level, students can show where their analysis and interpretation of the data is 
consistent with evidence from the literature. Better dissertations will show where these 
are consistent and inconsistent. Better dissertations still will tease out how and why 
consistencies and inconsistencies exist: 
Evelyn: …why in my data would I get a different perspective from what is going on 
here or why is my data different from the pre-existing literature and yet stills 
gives us the same answer? 
Therefore, there should not just be a simple presentation of results but a deeper 
engagement considering why the findings are what they are, and how they compare to 
expectations drawn from the literature. This being the case it really should not matter, or 
it should matter much less, whether the assessor actually agrees or not with the 
student’s point of view. What should matter is that the student has supported his or her 





Olivia: It doesn't necessarily have to be my view, because very often I'm quite 
happy for them to have a different perspective, but as long as that's why I 
like you and that's convincing, and that use of the data to do that and 
they’ve supported their interpretations through the literature, then I think 
that's what we're looking for. 
In summary, students who are thinking critically will produce arguments that are 
appropriately structured and supported by suitable evidence. This relies not only upon 
acknowledgement, critique and synthesis of sources, but also upon adroit synthesis of 




“Scepticism is great doubt about whether something is true or useful.” (Collins English 
Dictionary Online, 2020).  
 
That critical thinking is underpinned by a propensity for scepticism, a willingness to doubt 
towards authorities and received wisdom, was highlighted by thirteen of twenty-one 
participants. Scepticism then is viewed as significant to the ability of students to think 
critically: 
Harry: The natural sciences don't really, they have a hefty scepticism, so we 
should have the same at least in social sciences. 
 
Universities ought to be facilitating the development of ‘sceptical’ students who as they 
graduate can go out into the world and ask questions of things. Regrettably, however, at 
least for Viola, such scepticism is not readily apparent from undergraduate students’ 
dissertations: 




Viola seems to feel that many of her students are all too accepting of what they read and 
that they fail to question sufficiently, apparently lacking the necessary scepticism. 
Presumably then evidence of scepticism, if desired but purportedly rare, would serve to 
mark out the higher performing, more critical students. Students who are sceptical 
demonstrate critical thinking because they do not just take things for granted or as given 
but are inquisitive, they ask questions, they doubt and they probe to uncover how and 
why things are the way they are: 
 
Mason: … what's my definition if you like of critical thinking? Not taking things at 
face value… 
 
Olivia: I think that those are stuff that if you've got an inquiring or questioning mind, 
that you will look at the world in a different, and you’ll start to ask questions. 
Participants invariably saw scepticism in a positive light:  
Aidan: …you might develop a cynical attitude, but the fact that you develop a 
cynical attitude means you actually have been thinking about some things 
otherwise you’re not able to then challenge how the world is, right, in order 
to develop that cynicism. 
Aiden talks of “cynicism” here. Cynicism is listed as a synonym for scepticism (Collins 
English Thesaurus Online, 2020). However, cynicism and scepticism may be 
distinguished because the former has negative overtones whereas the latter does not. 
Scepticism here is viewed very much in a positive sense. Thus, students who are critical 
thinkers should possess a healthy scepticism, the habit of mind to doubt, to question, to 
challenge, to strive for meanings and justifications. With this mind-set comes a reticence 
to accept the current state of knowledge and importantly a willingness and a confidence 
to challenge received wisdom: 
Isaac: Yes, it would be being inquisitive. The text book says this, it’s been in the 
text books for years. Well, I’m not just going to accept that. I want to have a 
look at the evidence. I want to challenge that if it needs challenging. 
Reuben: Now critical thinking is when they stop and you can see the cogs going 
around. So that’s why critical thinking is to me looking at alternative 
explanations and not just taking things on that face value. 
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Sceptical students are also not simply accepting of orthodoxy. They think it all through, 
using the current bundle of what is known to figure things out for themselves. The scope 
of scepticism is not, however, limited to challenging knowledge, cynically or otherwise. 
This is an important aspect in context but the sceptical student moves beyond this, 
opening up and seeing the world not just in a more questioning way but also for Reuben 
in a more personal way:  
 
Reuben: I've given you an example of that in the student just was sitting on my 
module and said well I just totally disagree with this because that's not my 
real lived experience. And then what she did was she took her real lived 
experience of working in, shall we say a low cost supermarket chain, and 
said well they don't have inspirational leaders they have very directive 
leaders, and she explored that through the course material she was getting. 
I thought that was a great example of critical thinking. 
Scepticism may also be revealed in students being alive to and aware of the limitations 
of their research. Sceptical students will acknowledge these and be constructively self-
critical, exercising suitable caution with respect to any claims made in light of the 
limitations whilst recognising that it is possible for alternative explanations to exist:  
Mason: So again, going back to the criticality, it’s all part of being critical. It's not 
only not accepting anything at face value, which in a sense includes your 
own work, think of being critical of that.  
Penelope: And then they’ve thought quite deeply about what the analysis is telling 
them in relation to the question, but they’re not afraid to say actually there’s 





“If you describe someone as open-minded, you approve of them because they are 
willing to listen to and consider other people’s ideas and suggestions.” (Collins English 
Dictionary Online, 2020) 
Fourteen of twenty-one participants referred to what in combination I have interpreted as 
the need for critically thinking students to be ‘open-minded’. Students who are open-
minded are curious and inquisitive, are appreciative of the fact that they do not know 
everything, are able to recognise what they do not know and are accepting of the need 
to work on this, whilst open objectively to different possibilities: 
Reuben: It’s almost that critical thinking is a journey really, you don’t know what you 
don’t know and sometimes it’s, critical thinking to me is trying to find out 
what you don’t know, that’s the real thing about really trying to turn the rocks 
over and see what’s there... 
 
Penelope: An openness and not taking everything at face value. Yes, being open to 
look at things at a deeper level, an attitude of being open to learning more, 
going into things in more depth… 
Participants plainly look for students to adopt a position and argue effectively for this. 
Evidently, any position taken by students needs justifying. It requires alternative views to 
be considered, showing an awareness that people may have different views. Students 
are not expected to adjudicate in the debates necessarily but should make an informed 
judgement as to where they feel the power and efficacy lie, recognising where views 
oppose and offering evidence to support and/or contradict those views, and showing that 
they understand the theoretical, methodological and contextual perspectives that 
underpin these in coming to their own positions: 
Theodore: So a well-reasoned argument is something where I think the student would 
carefully articulate why they are taking a particular position, and they would 





Positionality then is about students being able to work through multiple perspectives, 
addressing the positions taken by others, recognising that there is not necessarily a right 
way of interpreting something, and ultimately developing and making clear cases for 
their own positions. Being open to different interpretations, different perspectives, 
different approaches, enables open-minded students to have greater appreciation of 
context and a deeper understanding of the positions they ultimately adopt. This requires 
openness yes, but also fair-mindedness and disciplined thinking. Open-minded students 
are not impulsive or precipitate in taking positions; they think it all through and arrive at 
reasoned determinations: 
Olivia: But that blind kind of no this is my position, I don't care what anyone else 
says, that doesn't demonstrate a level of inquiry and open-mindedness and 
curiosity. It's just blind if that makes sense? Oh this is my way of seeing it 
and there can't be another way. 
Olivia: What I would expect to see in a critically informed approach to doing that 
would be a consideration of different perspectives, but a strong case made 
for the perspective that's being pursued, rather than a blind let's ignore 
everything that doesn't fit with the position that I want to take and just make 
this particular case. 
One further aspect of open-mindedness, which came up in conversation with around a 
third of participants, was the idea that students should be able to see beyond what is in 
front of them. Beyond, for example, the immediate context and narrow confines of their 
own research through to greater concerns. Open-minded students can “see the big 
picture” (Fiona). For example, they can place their studies into the larger portrait of 
which they form just a part: 
Fiona: …there are people who can see the big picture and relate different things to 
each other, and there are people who can’t do that very easily, they can’t 
see that big picture, and I guess that’s a different dimension of critical 




This is not to suggest that open-minded students must be ‘blue sky thinkers’ necessarily, 
rather that students should be sufficiently open-minded to show that they can think 
through the wider issues and implications of their research and can determine where 
that fits into the greater overall research landscape: 
Evelyn: …there must be an ability to see the wider implications of what’s going on 
and to make those sideways steps that go actually I was looking for this but 
just look at that, hang on a minute that matters. 
 
5.3.3 Flexibility 
“Something or someone that is flexible is able to change easily and adapt to different 
conditions and circumstances as they occur.” (Collins English Dictionary Online, 2020).  
With critical thinking comes the flexibility needed to ‘get the job done right’. Students can 
also demonstrate flexibility in that having sifted multiple perspectives, and weighed up 
the evidence, they have the presence of mind to self-correct, to change their views and 
reform any position they have taken in light of fresh perspectives and new evidence: 
 
Evelyn: Logic and robustness and open mindedness I always thought that, but then 
there was a phrase in my Cert Ed which said critical analysis or critical 
thinking is knowing why you think what you think, what assumptions there 
are behind that and therefore if you are shown that your assumptions are 
wrong you are able to change your mind. 
Conducting research is seldom without its trials and tribulations. Students who think 
critically can demonstrate their flexibility through the dissertation process. For example, 
flexible students are persistent; they are unfazed by problems in having to reform their 
research questions or methodologies midway through the process where issues present 
and adjustments are necessary. Academics recognise that the research process is 
“messy” (Evelyn) and seldom runs straight and true. Students who are flexible are 
upfront about this and demonstrate how they have dealt with the pitfalls along the way:  
Arthur: Flag up your own weaknesses. You won’t lose marks. Suggest a solution, 
you might gain a few in the process. If you point out your own weaknesses 
and suggest a solution you can sometimes end up, depending how well you 
do it, with more marks than if it had just worked perfectly.  
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Students can thus demonstrate flexibility and hence critical thinking by recognising the 
limitations of their research, showing that they have given due consideration to what 
went wrong and why but also what action they took in response. That is a rich part of the 
research process and students should feel comfortable in reporting this, being critical of 
their own research approaches and adaptable in finding solutions to problems. Some 
things simply do not work as anticipated or planned. That is the nature of research. 
Academics know this. Honesty and flexibility are seen as positives: 
Oscar: I quite like where there is an element of reflexivity about a struggle that has 
gone on, particularly with some projects. It shows a good appreciation of the 
research process. Some things don’t work but it doesn’t mean they’re wrong 
it just means that they haven’t worked, but to then pretend that they didn’t 
exist and everything is you know very smooth is not being truthful to the 
research process. 
5.4 Originality 
Originality is defined as “the quality or condition of being original”, or “the ability to create 
or innovate” (Collins English Dictionary Online, 2020), or “the quality of being special and 
interesting and not the same as anything else” (Cambridge Dictionary online, 2020). 
Seventeen of twenty-one participants raised issues and aspects of originality in 
connection with critical thinking in undergraduate dissertations. In particular, participants 
discussed this in terms of what for them originality is, i.e. creativity, making a contribution 
and original thinking, but not ‘descriptive’ accounts or ‘replication-style’ studies.   
5.4.1 Creativity 
That thinking critically involves thinking creatively was discussed by twelve of twenty-one 
participants. Creativity, in this context, relates to students thinking differently about their 
research topics and the problems at hand, evidenced perhaps by going beyond the 
norm in their approaches to research or in their thinking: 
Zhao: Like what we ask our students to do we have to push the boundary and 
perhaps into another space, so that’s creativity… 
Viola: Their thought might be more beyond the curriculum, which is always very, 
very nice, seeing a student who is engaged and there is creativity. 
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Zhao is I think suggesting that students should go beyond the mundane and formulaic 
but how does this lend itself practically to research? How exactly can students evidence 
that they have pushed the boundaries? How can they demonstrate that they have in 
effect shown some creativity? It would seem that one of the main ways of showing 
creativity is for students to be able to recognise what is new, what is novel, and that they 
are able to bring some element of this into their research: 
 
Fiona: It can be a really novel idea. It can be a bold way of doing something.  
Zhao: …we simply talk about novelty. Being novel means that you have to be 
critical. 
Viola: I think it is part of being critical, exactly, because without being critical you 
cannot recognise what is niche, what is new. 
Novel/novelty/niche – this can come anywhere in the dissertation, including its context, 
subject and methods. The setting of research objectives and/or questions (hereafter 
referred to as questions for brevity) to frame a dissertation study is one area in which 
students can demonstrate their creativity. This is not something that students can 
necessarily get from a textbook. Yes, a book can detail what a critical question might 
look like, but creative students will be asking themselves different types of questions, 
inquisitively pushing for something, developing imaginative questions as a way into and 
of progressing their research. Creativity then can in practical terms with respect to 
dissertations manifest in the novelty of research questions: 
Viola: So the research question is very important. It must be somehow engaging 
for them and niche. I like that. Their thought might be more beyond maybe 
the curriculum, which is always very, very nice seeing a student who is 
engaged and there is creativity. I like that. 
However, although participants may desire creativity in research questions it is perhaps 
less often seen, to the detriment of the piece:  
Olga: I know that they will be using certain data analysis methods but the 
research questions that they choose tend to be from a very limited 
range…maybe it is unfair to expect from them, given what they learn in the 
programme, to come up with a very different topic. But then this for me is a 
lack of critical thinking because they just take what they…low-hanging fruit. 
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That said, whilst creativity can manifest in the creativity of the questions, the lack thereof 
does not necessarily mean that the piece will lack critical thinking. This could equally be 
apparent in the creativity with which the questions are pursued. Even a study based on a 
well-trodden path with familiar research questions can be interesting and exhibit 
creativity in the way in which the student has gone about fulfilling these: 
Aidan: …but they have then a set of theories up front, so in that case I think critical 
there means you know how you’re going to interpret your results given that 
they’re different and what are the kind of questions that you will need to ask. 
So it’s being able to show that you’re able to ask intelligent questions and I 
think there’s a creative element to that, you know? 
 
5.4.2 Contribution 
The majority of the participants who commented upon originality were of the opinion that 
an undergraduate dissertation should contribute in some way: 
Olivia: I am looking for something that makes me see something in a new way. So 
there has to be some kind of contribution… 
Aidan: I think if you if you if you’re not trying to push the boundaries even if it’s a 
small boundary [inaudible] to look beyond what has already been done then 
you know it’s very hard to say then you have critical thinking… 
It seems that at least some benefit has to be derived from the research. There has to be 
a point to it and an outcome that adds in some way. I took this to mean a contribution to 
knowledge. This is a known requirement, at least at the level of peer-reviewed journal 
articles for which it is a de facto condition of publication; an aspect that reviewers 
obviously look for. Similarly for doctoral theses and their examiners.  
Nine participants discussed having developed their own views of critical thinking from 
engaging in their own research. From this, they learned to interrogate literature, ideas, 
theories and data in a way that helps develop understandings that are more critical. 
They further benefit from being part of research communities made up of academics 
who have different ways of thinking about things, who can freely articulate their thinking 
and who can engage in conversations through which learned discussion can and does 
take place leading to the further development of knowledge: 
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Aiden: I think you have to do research. This is why research, if you want to use the 
kind of trite university slogan of research-led education, I think the more 
research you do the more you understand what is the process of 
knowledge. 
This involves contact between academics within and without institutions, at conferences 
for example, but also through submission of articles to peer-reviewed journals for 
publication. Journal reviewers demand the highest levels of critical thinking for 
publication: 
Zhao: I would say it's getting harder and harder to get published. It's actually for 
the top journals which requires everything: theory, knowledge advancement, 
novelty, unique datasets and appropriate methodology and interesting and 
sometimes and counter-intuitive findings, that's everything. I learned out of it 
it's the critical thinking. 
There is then evident pressure to demonstrate critical thinking in submissions. This is 
something that editors and reviewers expect and will readily comment upon: 
Oliver: … when we write something ourselves referees will read it and perhaps 
savage it, so we are still being assessed on our own critical thinking. 
Participants confirm that they learn from this process of review and feedback. Coupled 
with experience, with time and with practice, this helps them to develop their views of 
critical thinking and thereby improve the standard of their submissions: 
Reuben: And I think for me the more research I’ve done, the more I publish, the more 
I get rejected from journals, which doesn’t do me any good but then you 
read them after the emotion is gone and it’s really helpful to see the peer 
review of your work. 
Mason: I mean the standards that you apply, or the standards that I have applied 
throughout my career, you know I look back at some of those early papers 
and think oh my goodness I've no idea why it got…it wasn't what I would 
now regard as a good piece of work because my standards have changed, 




Returning now to students’ contributions to knowledge, these can be similarly drawn in 
grand terms, for example, in doing something that has never been done before, or never 
before in a particular way, or in making some sort of breakthrough that leads to new 
knowledge. Appreciably, undergraduate students are unlikely to operate at the same 
level as academics or doctoral students and are unlikely to generate new knowledge 
from their research. For participants, such a contribution would stand out and surprise 
because they would not expect it of undergraduate students: 
Isaac: The vast majority of students aren't going to make a breakthrough at that 
particular point in their academic career. That level of originality, a brand-
new idea, you're not going to see those very often at undergraduate levels. 
Florence: It's the sort of thing that perhaps, I think everyone would expect it to be an 
excellent piece of work, but if they're then demonstrating an original 
contribution to knowledge that's what would push it into the outstanding 
range. 
Much of the discussion in interviews of ‘contribution’ was geared towards examining 
what this might constitute in practical terms. It seems that any such contributions from 
undergraduate students could take different forms and be construed at different levels. 
For near half of commenting participants, this starts with the literature and an 
expectation that students will synthesise this to the point of identifying a gap that 
research can then usefully target. This is one way in which undergraduate students 
through their dissertations can make a contribution: 
Mason: …I push my students to say what is it that you're doing that we don't know 
enough about? The literature just doesn't quite cover that area and 
therefore what contribution are you making? What gap is it that you are 
seeking to fill?  
Hanna: I think for the really high, for the 80s, 90s, and if you look at the description 
for the 90s they basically have to come up with a gap. Well I think you 
should get an 88 without having a wonderful gap but I think surely the 90s 
that’s just what the marking descriptors say, you’ve got to come up with 




Other simple ways of contributing incrementally are suggested. One is to adopt a 
different tack, for example, looking at a specific known area and bringing in some 
interesting aspect, or interesting context, or examining an interesting group of people, or 
applying theory that is not normally applied to that context and so on:  
Milo: Well in that it’s not original, it's not that it's something that's coming 
completely out of their own head original, but is that it's original in that it’s 
adding something to what's in existence already. So in that context it is 
original but it's not like an original thought. It's like an addition, if you like, or 
a contribution that adds rather than revolutionises. 
Students are effectively then part of the academic conversation, building upon the work 
of others and making their own contributions:  
Mason: …yes I'm still looking at it advancing our knowledge in a particularly area, 
even though it may be reasonably narrow and so forth. 
Milo: I think some students, the students who are probably best at critical 
thinking, are able to appreciate that their piece is just part of that 
[knowledge base]… 
Students may also demonstrate a contribution and hence, originality by recognising and 
communicating the novelty of their findings, of how and why their findings are special: 
Florence: Students who can go beyond my examples and actually come up with some 
insights as to why their findings are different, that to me is really an elegant 
display of critical thinking. 
Insight can come from students demonstrating that they have thought about and through 
any wider implications of their studies and are then able then to answer the all-important 
‘so what’ question in relation to their findings: 
Oscar: To me the conclusion should think about the wider implications of the 
research, why anyone should care about it. 
Milo: But I'd like to see the better students, they think a bit more about maybe 




Additionally, where students might realistically contribute is in offering suggestions for 
professional applications or policy implications, because business-related research is 
often situated in real-world situations in which protagonists are looking for practical 
solutions to problems not theoretical contributions: 
Oliver: …I am looking for some sort of bridge between the model and then the 
reality say of the accounting and business world. 
Reuben: It's got to have some, in business and management, it's got to have some 
implications for practice, really, is what I suggest for them to think about. 
Milo: …these are the policy implications of my findings, or implications for 
industry or investors, or thoughts for further research. I think all of that is 
critical. 
5.4.3 Original thinking 
Two-thirds of participants who discussed originality considered the idea of students 
demonstrably self-investing in their dissertations, and that this could serve to evidence 
originality: 
Hanna: You haven’t actually told me anything about your own understanding. And I 
think that then ends up really descriptive and not analytical and not critical. 
In essence, if students own original thinking were to come through their work, evidencing 
application of their intellect to the problems under investigation, demonstrating their 
understandings, impressions, perspectives and positions, then that could be perceived 
as offering some original perspectives and hence present as more critical:  
Arthur: The very best students are showing evidence from that literature review 
chapter that they're starting to form their own impression. 
The key concern here is whether the student’s own points of view should be detectable 
in the piece. In the main, it seems that participants are interested in what students think 
and have to say and that this should come through in some way: 
Theodore: The student's own voice I don't think needs to come through in the first 
person. A dissertation doesn't need to be written in the first person. But I do 
think that the student's own voice and view and demonstration of what they 
think about this does need to come through, yes. 
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Arthur: You get the impression of a voice, however raw it might be coming through. 
That shows that they're thinking about stuff and adopting opinions in that 
voice, or adopting views and perspectives. [This came from the document 
elicitation part of the interview, in which Arthur referred here to an 
example dissertation that he chose as being evidentially high in 
critical thinking] 
This helps signify that students are not just working to a dissertation formula, are not just 
regurgitating the ideas of others, but are taking ownership of the material, reconstituting 
it in their own thoughts, forming and articulating their own original ideas: 
Evelyn: …[a critical thinker is] a person who is thinking about it and is sentient, 
rather than going this is a recipe for doing a dissertation and on I go… 
Oliver: It is something that stands out, if somebody is not just replicating a model, is 
not just moving through techniques but is trying to sit back and apply their 
own thought to what they have read and to try to derive some conclusions… 
 
5.4.4 Descriptive accounts 
The majority of participants who discussed originality referred to ‘description’ in quite 
negative terms. It seems this is a well-worn pejorative term denoting the antithesis of 
originality: 
Penelope: What it [originality] isn’t, I know what it isn’t, it’s not being descriptive, so it’s 
not describing something. 
A descriptive account is perceived to be basic, unsophisticated in research terms, 
uncreative, would tend to report or describe findings far more than analyse and interpret, 
would fail to think through the implications and develop the contribution of the study. 
Oscar offers an example: 
Oscar: Pretty much just a descriptive literature review, some findings that are 
described and a conclusion that says this is what the findings were. But it 
then goes no further forward. It’s not saying well why have I found this and 
what informs this? What are the implications of this? It’s just description. It’s 
nicely written, there’s nice engagement with the literature, but it’s very much 
descriptive, descriptive and then the end. 
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[This came from the document elicitation part of the interview, in 
which Oscar referred here to an example dissertation that he chose as 
being evidentially low in critical thinking] 
Description tends towards the superficial, lacking in depth of thinking, with the student 
making little attempt to make sense of it all. Description is thus a label best avoided by 
students who wish to do demonstrate originality and hence, critical thinking: 
Mason: I can't remember now exactly what I said but it would have been along the 
lines of this is pretty much descriptive. It doesn't really do anything that's 
critical. You could almost tell just by looking at the contents here. Literature 
review, page 6. Company introductions, page 8. Ah there's a problem! [This 
came from the document elicitation part of the interview, in which 
Mason referred here to an example dissertation that he chose as being 
evidentially low in critical thinking] 
So what does it mean to be descriptive in this context? How does this present for 
participants? One clear indicator of this is where the student adopts a “furniture sale 
catalogue” approach to a literature review (Haywood & Wragg, 1982, p.2; cited in 
Brennan, 1998, p.14). Here, students provide a list of sources in which they simply state 
that x says this and y says the other, or that this paper does this and finds this and the 
next paper does that and finds that and so on. The sources may have relevance but 
students are not explaining how they compare, or how each adds to our knowledge in 
some way, they are just reporting sources like a shopping list: two carrots, one pack of 
butter, two pints of milk, etc. It is listing, it is repeating, it is not critique, not 
demonstrating their knowledge and understanding, and it is forming much less of a 
holistic view of the literature than would point to critical thinking. Such an approach 
would also then tend to lack original insight. As a result, this could be construed as 
uncritical:  
Florence: To me, it would be very difficult to get to a first-class level if say the 
literature bit was simply X in 2000 said this, Y in 2001 said this, Z in 2002 





Reuben: …and this is where we come into the criticality, a really weak dissertation to 
me would almost be a timeline, a descriptive (INV: chronology?), yes, you 
know that in 1982 somebody did this and you know and there’s no synthesis 
of the thinking. 
An example from psychology might be a literature review that says Freud did this and 
then Pavlov came along and said that. If this is reported chronologically without 
synthesising the sources the student may fail to pick up on the fact that Freud and 
Pavlov were engaged in debate and did not agree. So that rounded understanding of the 
literature that is so needed to evidence critical thinking would be lacking.  
Moving into their findings and analysis, students have to know about what they are 
discussing. They have to demonstrate their knowledge and understanding there too but 
now with regard to their own research. This is in part evidenced through appropriately 
describing what they have found. However, demonstrating originality, and hence critical 
thinking, obviously goes beyond first stage description:  
Olivia: …in things like data analysis when you're going beyond just describing he 
said she said, or they did he did, in like an observation situation, and 
actually trying to then provide an interpretation of that. Ok so they did that 
but what is that? What are they doing here? What's going on with that? 
At a descriptive level the student could write simply that the results were this or the 
results were that, i.e. just describe them as they are. However, participants would expect 
that students have taken a more evaluative approach to the analysis and interpretation 
of the data. There is then more than a simple presentation of results but a deeper 
engagement evident through, for example, an explanation of why the results are what 
they are, how that compares with any prior expectations and how that compares with 
knowledge synthesised from the literature base: 
Olivia: So their evaluation would be starting to give in to that higher level, critical 
thinking. Like when you’re really starting to think about well ok so I saw it, I 
understood it, but what does that really mean in terms of coming back to 
understanding? 
This then is where the student is engaging in critical thinking, going beyond the simplistic 
description of results and really thinking about them leading to insights, which brings us 
back to originality: 
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Florence: But the sort of things with critical thinking, I've talked about literature review 
and what I except from that, but discussion chapters, where they actually 
think about and offer some really insightful evaluation of why their findings 
have diverged. 
5.4.5 Replication-style studies 
Half of participants who discussed originality commented in this context upon replication-
style studies. These are popular in some business-related disciplines, particularly 
Finance. I have labelled this approach ‘replication-style’ because it does not involve a 
straight replication, i.e. repeating a prior study exactly as is. Here, we have a situation 
where a student takes a published study and attempts to re-perform it, but with some 
revised aspect such as the use of fresh data, or situating the study in a different context, 
etc. For example, a student might take a published paper that has investigated herding 
behaviour in financial markets using data collected from US markets and redo this using 
data from another context such as European markets, Chinese markets, Indian markets, 
etc. Alternatively, if the published paper collected data from say 2006-2013, then an 
updated study could focus on 2014-2020. Both would allow for comparisons to be made 
and potential insights to be formed, and carry the added advantage for the student of 
providing a methodological blueprint to follow. All very positive it seems. Nonetheless, 
there was evident disagreement amongst participants on the worth of this approach, with 
a small majority in favour.  
Aiden provides here an example of disagreement with the approach: 
Aidan: I think if you if you if you’re not trying to push the boundaries even if it’s a 
small boundary [inaudible] to look beyond what has already been done then 
you know it’s very hard to say then you have critical thinking, because then 
all you’re doing is you’re doing a kind of like a replication study or somebody 
has given you the idea and you’re just basically applying it. 
This seems to suggest that a replication-style approach inherently lacks originality, that 
what is sought from students is more than simply the (unoriginal) repetition of techniques 
or the ‘cranking of a lever’ to operate a model to produce a different set of numbers 
based on a different dataset: 
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Fiona: Oh a boring method, content analysis using the GRI framework that 
everyone’s used. So, this is something that has been done so many times 
before and written so many times before in a similar way. [This came from 
the document elicitation part of the interview, in which Fiona referred 
here to an example dissertation that she chose as being evidentially 
low in critical thinking] 
Florence: I think it does demonstrate a higher level of critical thinking if they do 
actually go for something that's not just a replication study. I think if they can 
expand that, at the very least add to it, integrate two models together. 
People have tested these hypotheses before but not as part of a broader 
framework or as a broader model. And I think that's what demonstrates the 
critical thinking. [This came from the document elicitation part of the 
interview, in which Florence referred here to an example dissertation 
that she chose as being evidentially high in critical thinking] 
More positively, a replication-style approach is perceived to be less risky for students. A 
safer option then, albeit compromised, for busy time-limited undergraduates. However, 
the support here for this type of approach was for the avoidance of risk. In no way did 




5.5 Theme 1: Summary 
Theme 1 presents a conceptualisation of critical thinking in the host business school, 
interpreted from the accounts of participating academics. This is comprised of skills (of 
argumentation); three headline dispositions (scepticism, open-mindedness and 
flexibility); and originality; simply represented in the following diagram as three corners of 
an isosceles triangle, with skills and dispositions forming the base and originality at the 
top. The dotted line signifies that whilst participants generally agreed upon skills and 
dispositions at the base of the triangle, the inclusion of originality at the level of the 




The student as critical thinker has a developed skillset linked to argumentation. Structure 
and evidence are key to this. Students can demonstrate critical thinking through 
constructing valid, believable and logically structured arguments that avoid 
contradictions and which build from legitimate premises through to sensible and 
substantiated conclusions. What they also need is evidence in support of the 
conclusions. Lack of evidence detracts from the strength of the argument. At one level, 
evidence can take the form of referencing appropriate sources; at another, comparing 
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and contrasting sources; at another, critique of sources; at another still synthesising all 
of this into a coherent picture, as regards the literature, and as regards research findings 
viewed through the lens of the synthesised literature base.  
The student as critical thinker exhibits certain dispositions. A propensity for scepticism 
marks out the student as critical thinker. The sceptical student doubts all, takes nothing 
for granted, questions and probes for answers. The open-minded student is curious and 
inquisitive, open to possibilities, able to see the bigger picture, willing to examine 
alternatives and weigh up the debates before adopting a justifiable position. The flexible 
student is not wedded to beliefs, is willing and able to change views where appropriate, 
is unfazed by problems and is able to adapt.  
The student as critical thinker exhibits originality. This may be framed as creativity, 
exercised in various forms. The creative student demonstrates novel or innovative ways 
in which research can be set up and/or conducted. Originality may also be framed as 
contribution to knowledge, howsoever small. This may be theoretical, methodological, 
practical, professional or policy related, or a combination of these. Finally, originality may 
be framed in terms of students offering some original thoughts of their own, evidencing 
application of their intellect, their understandings, impressions, perspectives and 
positions. What would not constitute originality for participants are descriptive accounts 
and replicative-style approaches to research. Description is a well-worn pejorative term 
for work perceived to be rather basic, possibly superficial, certainly unoriginal, lacking in 
depth of thought and insight. Also cast as unoriginal are replication-style research 
studies. These offer a methodological blueprint to follow and a comparatively low risk 
route, but are subject to negative perceptions of “dissertation(s) by numbers” (Florence) 




6. Theme 2 - Approaches to assessing undergraduate dissertations: 
convergence, difference and mitigation 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 is the second of two chapters in which I report my findings derived from 
thematic analysis of the data. Here, I develop Theme 2 – Approaches to assessing 
undergraduate dissertations: convergence, differences and mitigation.  
Questions 2-4 of the interview schedule served to anchor the interview firmly in a 
situated context, orienting the early part of the discussion towards assessment in higher 
education and more specifically towards assessment of undergraduate dissertations. 
These were supported by Question 8, which targeted discussion at how participants 
have developed their knowledge and practices over time, and which naturally helped 
revisit areas covered by earlier questions.  
Several points of convergence and difference in participants’ approaches to assessing 
undergraduate dissertations became apparent from this analysis. I begin this chapter by 
examining two substantial aspects: firstly, holistic versus additive approaches to 
assessment; and secondly, expectations of originality, broken down into three further 
aspects: originality as contribution to knowledge, originality as fresh literature at the 
findings and analysis stage (evidencing original thinking), and originality as 
methodological creativity.  
Also coming from the analysis are points concerning the institutional mechanisms 
installed in order to mitigate differences in approach and maintain assessment 
consistency, namely use of assessment criteria, support for and the exact application of 
which can and does vary, and internal moderation (double marking for undergraduate 
dissertations at the host business school). Comments relating to a third mechanism, 





6.2 Points of convergence and difference 
6.2.1 Holistic versus additive approaches to assessment 
A third of participants described their approach to assessing undergraduate dissertations 
as holistic. They see a dissertation as constructed from different parts, some of which may 
be good, others less so. Assessment is a matter of balancing these parts and assessing 
the piece as a whole, rather than allowing one good part or one poor part to colour the 
piece and define the result:  
Florence: Definitely more holistically….I'll be looking mainly at, actually all chapters are 
important, I don't think you can say there's any chapter in a dissertation that 
you can skim past, it all has to come together. 
A holistic approach fits with the assessment criteria, which essentially describe the 
overall required performance at and within several undergraduate grade bands: 
Viola: It's holistic. The mark is holistic. Otherwise, we would be in trouble wouldn't 
we? Because we have our criteria, we have to mark on all, right? 
Olivia too advocates a holistic approach, concerned that whilst there is always an 
element of an assessor starting to form a view about a dissertation as they read it, it is 
important to resist allocating a grade too early. Olivia is of the opinion that assessors 
should not put a grade on a dissertation until the end when they can form a holistic 
impression, suspending judgement until the dissertation is viewed in its entirety, 
conscious that quick and perhaps premature judgements are part of human nature:  
Olivia: That's human nature. One thing that I probably am more aware of now is 
not to pigeonhole something absolutely until I've got to the end…I try and 
make sure that I don't consciously pigeonhole it too much because I can 
think of dissertations in the past that I've read which have had I wouldn’t say 
scant literature review but one that could have been much better written, 
much better presented, but then have gone on and collected some highly 
original data, done something with really good methodology, and got some 
really interesting results and analysed them. And if I'd have been doing it in 
a too much an additive way I may have pigeonholed it too early. So I try and 




The difficulty lies at the end, in balancing the good and the less good areas of a 
dissertation to arrive at a holistic determination as represented by the overall awarded 
grade: 
Olivia: Sometimes that's where the problem is because you're like, well, actually 
it's really good here, but it falls down there, so where do you end up giving it 
a mark? 
Judging this balance is thought to be subjective and potentially arbitrary by some 
participants, four of whom consequently eschewed holistic assessment in favour of 
building additive grades:  
Milo: I think marking, in getting the idea that I go through it sequentially in the 
different sections, and if you look, when I look at my feedback that's how I’d 
mark it. 
Zhao: I focus on basically three elements. The first is the theory, secondly the 
methodology and thirdly and very importantly the fit between the theory and 
the methodology. I break down the marks into these three areas, I would 
say, and perhaps theory 40%, methodology perhaps 20 to 30% and the rest 
for the fit. 
What Milo and Zhao are talking about is the construction of an overall grade bit by bit, 
for example, splitting the grade and allocating separate constituent grades for each 
chapter. This may help with standardisation, the assessor constructing a defensible 
grade that builds from separately assessed constituent parts, and which therefore 
accounts for any performance differences at each stage of the dissertation. From a 
practical perspective this may compare favourably with a holistic approach, which has its 
difficulties for the assessor who must mentally balance all aspects of a dissertation into 




Evelyn: I think the marking scheme…I think it really helped us because you were 
able to say, roughly a third for the literature discussion, a third for the 
method, bits of handling the result bits, wasn’t it something like that and 
then a third for the conclusion and discussion and 10% for justifying the 
overall context of it and your professionalism…and because of that if you 
had a brilliant literature review where all the criticism was it compensated, 
and then not such a strong backend at least you got the credit at the front.  
Whereas I tend to think here because it is open it overly, if you’ve got a 
weak place, it overly depresses the marks in all of it…(Note: Evelyn was 
referring here to a marking scheme used at a previous institution she 
had worked for) 
However, participants who advocate a holistic approach to assessment were set against 
this additive-based alternative: 
Harry: …when I say I write comments on each chapter I don't then award marks 
for each of these chapters and then add them up. 
Olivia: I know, and I've seen that [an additive mark] before too. I think sometimes in 
a way that’s “easier” – in finger quotes for your recorder - for an academic 
because you can hide behind that a little bit. Like, oh yes they did well here, 
they did, and then you’re like well that's what the number adds up to so that's 
all I can give it, whereas I'm not sure that that's right. That's not how we think 
about the world and how we engage with the world, so no I'm more holistic. 
Of some concern with respect to the maintenance of consistency and comparability across 
assessors, two participants were evidently using this additive approach of their own 
volition and of their individual devising. Zhao, and now also Florence, seem to apply their 
own individually determined additive assessment schemes on a staged basis, 
notwithstanding the official criteria which as I have commented presuppose holistic 
assessment through describing how the overall performance of a piece should present at 
each of several percentage grade bands: 
Florence: What I did is I created my own marks sheet which basically breaks down the 
key sections, so intro, literature, method, results, analysis, discussion, 
conclusions, referencing, which I think is really important as well, and then a 
few of those little bits and pieces. 
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6.2.2 Expectations of originality 
6.2.2.1 Originality as contribution to knowledge 
There was a definite split of opinion over whether or to what extent originality should be 
required of undergraduate students.  
Of the eighteen participants who commented, a third of participants talked in terms of 
expecting some level or aspect of originality from undergraduate students: 
Florence: I know I've got colleagues in our department, in marketing, who expect to 
see an original contribution to knowledge from even an undergraduate 
dissertation, as well.  
Mason: …contribution to knowledge, originality, you're expecting that. At PGT level 
and then to a lesser extent at undergraduate level, are they able to? Is what 
they're doing actually going to, yes I'm still looking at it advancing our 
knowledge in a particular area, even though it may be reasonably narrow 
and so forth. 
Some even interpret the assessment criteria as actually directing assessors to expect 
originality for the award of higher grades: 
Theodore: I think originality does make a difference because when you start to look at 
the top end of the grade descriptor it talks about such types of work are only 
rarely found, or whatever the exact phrasing is. 
Florence, however, would take issue with this, claiming that the module handbook, which 
includes the applicable assessment criteria, does not specify or imply that originality 
should be required at any percentage band:  
Florence: It's never explicitly outlined in the handbook that they're expected to make 
an original contribution to knowledge, or do something massively different. 
Florence: It's like, yes, some colleagues when they're looking for an original 
contribution from an undergraduate dissertation, like ok, well that's 
interesting, but I don't think that's ever actually going to change my 
perspective unless it's written in the handbook and it changes that's what's 
written in the handbook of what's expected of them. 
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The issue is one of academic levels. Originality obviously becomes more important the 
higher you go up the educational ladder. For example, that originality is required at 
doctoral level is a given and collectively understood: 
Olivia: And that's what required at a PhD level because you're supposed to be 
making an original contribution. You're supposed to, there should be 
something different about our understanding of the world that comes out of 
a PhD. 
Florence: …they're pushing the whole the original contribution to knowledge. In my 
view it's PhDs where I would expect that's where at the level I would expect 
to see… 
However, when it comes to undergraduate students, two-thirds of participants were clear 
that assessors should not expect originality: 
Reuben: I don't think there's any need to be original in an undergraduate or a 
masters dissertation. I wouldn't even see that in a masters by research. 
There are clear differences of opinion therefore as to expectations of originality. 
Differences here can manifest in assessment outlooks and therefore grades. For 
example, ceteris paribus those who require originality but do not see it are likely to 
attach a lower grade to a dissertation than others who do not seek it or expect it in the 
first place. Differences on this issue have come to light for participants in disagreements 
at joint assessors meetings to discuss dissertation grades: 
Florence: And I find that, I contrast with and, they tend to be the most heated 
discussions when it comes to agreeing marks and they're pushing the whole 
the original contribution to knowledge. 
The feeling for some participants is that absent originality, students will struggle to 
demonstrate any real understanding and their research will lack those value-added 
aspects of application, synthesis, insight, etc. that are so important to demonstrating a 
contribution:  
Thomas: …must have some value added, must push something forward. There has 
to be certain amount of originality because otherwise it's really difficult I 
think to gauge whether they fully understood anything, but once they have 
to branch out a little bit, that's how you… 
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Undergraduate students are, however, at a comparatively early stage in their learning. 
With empirical dissertations, for example, students can do competent research work at 
undergraduate level through collecting a fresh dataset and applying established 
methodology and methods to produce verifiable outputs (cf. replication-style studies, 
s.5.4.5). The vast majority of students are not going to make a breakthrough engaging in 
this type of research or indeed at that particular point in their learning and development. 
It would seem inequitable therefore to set the bar so high as to require originality: 
Oliver: …it would be rather unfair to require originality of thought in an 
undergraduate dissertation… 
Olivia: … they [undergraduate students] really don't need to demonstrate a unique 
and significant contribution to knowledge… 
Harry: I think the thing with, going back to the critical thinking thing, with a 
dissertation I think it's about what's the purpose of the dissertation? It isn't in 
itself to get published or anything like that. It isn't at the level of 
undergraduate or masters to make a contribution to knowledge. 
For these and other participants firmly in the ‘originality is not required’ camp, 
undergraduate students simply do not have sufficient time, or indeed the necessary full 
command of the literature in the first place, to branch out and produce something 
original that contributes to knowledge. This is not the preserve of an undergraduate 
dissertation and any expectations of contribution as originality would be unwarranted. 
There is, however, recognition that whilst not mandatory, originality in whatever form 
would inevitably stand out and most certainly impress with that aforementioned 
perception that this is the preserve of higher academic levels: 
Arthur: Well, the doctorate’s the only one that's examined for a contribution to 
knowledge, so I'm not expecting them to discover something amazing, but 
sometimes they do and I've encouraged students in the past to publish. The 






6.2.2.2 Originality as fresh literature at the findings and analysis stage 
One practical question of judgement concerns exactly what literature students should 
bring into the discussion of their findings. Should this adhere rigidly to what is in the 
literature review or should the student now bring in fresh literature? The majority 
emphasis of participants is on the fit from research questions to the literature review to 
the methodology and methods through to findings and analysis, anticipating then clear 
alignment between chapters. For Arthur, however, whilst this approach would be 
indicative of a “good student”, comparatively an “excellent student” at the findings and 
analysis stage would bring in additional literature thereby extending the overall literature 
base: 
Arthur: And then I'm looking for them going into the detail of the findings. A good 
student will relate it back to their literature review. A weak student just tells 
you the results. An excellent student will bring in some new literature at that 
point because they're thinking beyond where they started and they're trying 
to relate the findings to more things out there and then end by posing 
questions for future research as a result of that. 
Would this evidence some originality of thought? That in “thinking beyond where they 
started” and in “posing questions for future research” (Arthur) students are 
demonstrating some of their own original thinking? Two other participants, forming what 
would appear to be a minority view, lent further support to Arthur’s strongly held view: 
Florence: …they've got to be able to reflect. It doesn't necessarily have to be with 
respect to the literature that they covered in the literature review, they can 
be bringing in new stuff, if necessary, but they have to really think about ok 
so how do my findings fit into the wider theoretical perspective, and why 
might my findings diverge? 
Oscar: I’ll say to students don’t be afraid in your discussion to bring various new 
things in that might help you explain that, because in your literature your 
literature review will cover as much of the subject and maybe theoretical 
base that you can but until you’ve got your findings, and then you’re looking 
at explaining them and discussing them, it might be that you’re then bringing 
some new things to say ah this really explain this or helps explain this and 
so there might be a few little new bits that come in. 
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There is sense in this. If students are critically analysing and thinking through their data 
then this could well open up new avenues and take them down routes not covered by 
the literature review, the scope of which is likely to be restricted due to its early staging 
and to achieve the necessary depth within a limited word count. Of course, what 
students may do is return to and augment the literature review to fit with the data 
analysis. This has the advantage of neatness but some would argue that this would not 
give a true picture of the research. In reality, it is unlikely that research is so well ordered 
that the literature review will encompass everything that is necessary to help explain the 
findings in advance of reaching them. 
6.2.2.3 Originality as methodological creativity 
Chapter 5, s.5.4.1 highlighted the suggestions that research could exhibit creativity 
through research questions but also the way in which these are pursued. Research 
could, for example, exhibit creativity and stand out from the crowd if the student has 
taken a risk. In practical terms, this could mean students branching out beyond the 
curriculum by doing something more methodologically complex than taught and 
anticipated: 
Mason: What it did was, it seems to me it gathered data together in a way that had 
simply not been done previously. [This came from the document 
elicitation part of the interview, in which Mason commented on a 
dissertation that achieved an ‘outstanding’ grade of 90% and the 
factors that determined that grade] 
 
Zhao: And we also have a requirement for the methodology, for example, to be 
distinctive. They have to use regression if it’s quantitative analysis. I have 
seen about 80 which uses, as here, structural equation modelling. We don’t 
teach that in the department. Every year, very limited numbers of students 
managed to learn by themselves and they did quite well. 
Mason’s example appeared to involve the student taking research methods from one 
disciplinary area and applying them to good effect to research questions situated in 
another disciplinary area in which such methods were not commonly employed. Mason 
deemed this very creative. However, Zhao’s assertion that distinctiveness is required of 
the methodology is not backed by the assessment criteria of the host business school. 
Hence, this should not be seen as a pre-requisite for higher grades.  
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Now, whilst it is axiomatic that research should be robustly constituted and set up 
appropriately to answer the questions posed by that research, this does not necessarily 
point to creativity. However, the majority view, captured here from Arthur, is that what is 
important is that the methodology fits the study, not that it is creative per se: 
Arthur: I think they don’t have to be innovative. That twenty-first questionnaire that 
I've read this year is fine if that's the right way to do it, and if that's the 
appropriate tool use it, don't try and be clever and screw a shelf on the wall 
with the blade of a kitchen knife instead of a screwdriver.  
This would seem to agree with a further comment from Oliver who was clear that 
technically competent dissertation research would be graded highly irrespective of the 
absence of creativity: 
 
Oliver: It won’t stand out for me but I could still regard it as a piece of first class 
work given the parameters of accounting education. My predilection 
happens to be more for the thoughtful analysis rather than the technical but 
I try not to impose that on the students. I think if students can do an 
excellent technical dissertation then it’s worthy of a first class mark. 
It seems that methodological creativity is not necessarily required then, but where it 
exists it is likely to be appreciated by participants who will reward it as evidence of 
originality and hence critical thinking:  
Viola: I would reward the creativity extremely high. 
Evelyn: If I’d had a creativity mark I would have given them 85. 
Aidan: …it depends on how well it’s executed but then I certainly would, if 
somebody is doing something remotely different, not for the sake of being 
different but you can see that they are working towards something which 






Continuing this theme, in Chapter 5, s.5.4.5, I highlighted the suggestion that research 
that adopts a replication-style approach is unlikely to exhibit originality and hence critical 
thinking. Participants did not dispute this. However, a small majority of respondents on 
this matter were positive of the approach, arguing that it provides a lower risk route for 
students to undertake research. A safer option then, albeit compromised, for busy, time-
limited, assumedly academically under-developed undergraduates. It offers a path of 
less resistance and a relatively safe way of constructing research that will achieve at 
least a pass grade. It just makes sense therefore: 
Milo: Play it safe. Don't stick your head your head up above the parapet. You've 
only got a few months to do this. If it all goes pear-shaped the 
consequences can be dire. The upside, to put it in a finance thing, there's 
massive downside risk and the upside potential is very limited because they 
are not going to, unless they're outstanding or exceptional, there's no 
benefit to taking a…  
Olga: So they go for some very well-researched topics, standard methodology, 
and maybe they choose different datasets from what has been in the 
literature or the same dataset but with the most recent data. On the one 
hand it's a sure bet that they will pass if they don't do anything outrageous 
and then on the other hand it's just plain boring. 
It seems that whilst the apparent safety first approach to methodology and methods of a 
replication-style study may not excite, and may be regarded as unoriginal and therefore 
less than critical, that it is “a sure bet that they will pass” (Olga) might appeal to 
undergraduate students. More than this there was a further suggestion that if this type of 
research is competently set up and executed then this can pay dividends with the grade 
beyond simply passing: 
Milo: And looking at some of the dissertation topics over the past number of years 
the idea of why is everyone doing mergers and acquisitions? They are 
playing it safe. It’s easy. They can replicate a study that’s gone before, 
change the dates, change the companies, and if they do it well they’ll get a 
70, if they do not so well they’ll get a 60 odd. 
Evelyn: …actually in some ways it’s easier to get a first if you’re pragmatic and 
pedestrian than it is if you try and do something that matters and that 
doesn’t seem to be right. 
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Something of a ‘no-brainer’ then? 
What students actually seek to investigate should be embodied within and evident from 
their research objectives/questions (again hereafter referred to simply as questions for 
brevity). Students need to identify and choose suitable methodologies and methods for 
framing and conducting their research in answer to those questions, and they need to be 
clear on exactly why their choices are fitting for their studies. This in itself requires some 
research into alternatives and potentially some critical thinking on the part of students to 
make the approach their own: 
Fiona: I do look to see whether they are able to identify an appropriate research 
method for the question… 
Zhao: …in the methodology chapter, I want to see the students have some 
discussion because no methodology, no method is perfect, so they need to 
argue why I choose this rather than the other. So what's the benefits of 
doing so? What's the cost of not choosing another one? 
In practical terms, it does not or it should not matter if the student has taken a 
quantitative or qualitative approach. Rather it is important to establish that the chosen 
approach was apt for the study: 
Florence: I also really want to see that they've acknowledged why their chosen 
approach is the most relevant one. So not just to dive in and start describing 
a questionnaire but to actually say ok, given the research objectives and the 
hypotheses that have been outlined in the previous chapter, this is why a 
quantitative study is most important or most relevant, how it benefits over a 
qualitative study or vice versa obviously.  
Appreciably, however, this may be an issue and a source of difference for academics 
who have strong views on this and who would tend to favour certain methodologies and 
methods with which they are comfortable, which fit with their epistemologies and which 
fit with their views, often strongly held, of how research ought to be done over others: 
Hanna: I know that some people are always very picky on the methodology. You 





6.3 Mitigating mechanisms 
6.3.1 Use of assessment criteria when assessing undergraduate dissertations 
Half of participants considered that assessing for critical thinking necessarily relies on 
the professional judgement of the assessor: 
Oliver: It’s a case of feel the quality basically, which isn’t very scientific, but then I 
don’t think necessarily that an assessment process should be cut and dried. 
I don’t think it should be a tick box exercise. I think it should involve the 
assessor using judgement. 
Milo would suggest that as an academic this is something that he does intuitively, 
implicitly rather than explicitly. Similarly, over time academics develop “a feel for it” 
(Isaac). Professional judgement combines knowledge, understanding and experience 
with gut instinct, and plays an important role in assessing students’ work. Assessment is 
not just a mechanical applicative process in which instinct is negated: 
Milo: The thing is that I would say that marking those, it is so I can, I wouldn’t say 
it’s a gut feeling because it is based on, I think it’s based a sound marking 
criteria and stuff, well maybe not, but you know you get a gut feeling. 
However, for some participants assessment should not be left to professional judgement 
alone because this would invite inconsistency. Criterion-referenced assessment 
practices serve to mitigate this. The need for students to be ‘critical’ is felt to be integral 
to the assessment criteria for undergraduate dissertations, particularly as the grade 
scale progresses upwards: 
Zhao: So no doubt being critical is part of our standards. 
Olivia: It would be the demonstration of the critical thinking that would really shift I 
think between a merit and a distinction, or a 2:1 and a first. 
There was majority consensus on the overall use of the assessment criteria. Participants 
generally agreed that these ought to be followed, albeit to a greater or lesser extent, 
when assessing dissertations:  
Reuben: I have it in front of me when I mark. I keep it in front of me. When I'm 
assigning a grade I'm thinking about what is the criteria… 
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Florence: I think it can be useful to go back and look at the grade criteria and remind 
myself, certainly at the start of marking process and then periodically going 
through about what those grade criteria actually are and again apply them 
to. 
This apparent willingness to comply is not simply because the institution by virtue of policy 
and process requires it but actually, and more positively, because participants see the 
value in doing so for themselves as assessors, it has utility for them. For example, the 
criteria serve as useful reminders of what is required to achieve different grades, 
particularly for those scripts straddling the border between grade bands:  
Olivia: Sometimes if I'm sitting there going oh is it this or is it that, then having a 
look the grading criteria reminds me ah yes it is that level or it isn’t doing 
that, so it can only be this or whatever. 
Oscar: If I was really struggling with one between let’s say a class boundary, I 
would then go back to the grade [criteria] and think well I’ve got a good idea 
now where this is but that that would probably inform my overall opinion as 
to where the line might be drawn as to whether it just is a good 2:2 or 
whether it’s just enough for a 2:1. 
Reuben, Florence, Olivia and Oscar all profess that they use the assessment criteria but 
appear to take different approaches to this. Reuben is constantly checking against the 
criteria as he assesses (“keep it in front of me”). Florence refreshes her memory of the 
criteria at the outset and then checks against the criteria periodically by way of 
reminders. Olivia looks to apply the criteria to help make a decision whenever she is 
unsure. Oscar similarly but only when deciding borderline cases that straddle grade 
boundaries.  
A third of participants commented that whilst they used the criteria they did this only post 
hoc as a check on their already formed grade rather than as an integral assessment 
tool. Essentially, they first assess a dissertation without recourse to the criteria. They 
then subsequently refer to the criteria purely to help judge if the given grade is 
appropriate and credible. This then forms a valuable checking mechanism helping to 




Isaac: That's like seventeen consecutive years I've marked these things and you 
know what our standards are, you know what you are marking to, you know 
what the [criteria] are. So they're almost there as a second check. Have I 
done this right? Does it accord with the [criteria]? 
Mason: I use it [assessment criteria] at the end if I'm honest…I'm aware that if 
anything I’m probably on the slightly conservative side, so I try to be sure 
that I’m not being unduly harsh on the students. So it’s at the end where I 
wanted to make that overall summary that I then go back and double if, 
sometimes I don't because I just know this is clearly just scraping a pass, is 
clearly 52 so what’s, is it fair or satisfactory or something, what's the key 
word for that? But I will usually reread that grade criteria at that point before 
I make my overall judgement to say yeah that is a good description of this 
piece of work, so therefore it is 68, therefore it's very good. 
Participants who discussed this generally shared this sense of value in applying the 
criteria at the end as a check. However, for Milo it seemed more a case of simply going 
through the motions in retrospectively applying the criteria: 
Milo: The grading, the things, they’re not fit for purpose, I don't think, but we have 
to fit into them. We kind of mainly now make it up after the fact. 
Milo: I fit the grading descriptors afterward. It's fitting that into the grading 
descriptors. I have my own set of what is good and what not and then the 
grading descriptors are an afterthought, if you like. 
Milo seemed to lack faith in the criteria. Nonetheless, he does claim to apply the criteria, 
albeit as a final sense check on his awarded grades.  
Evelyn and Mason expressed concerns over alleged non-use of the assessment criteria 
by some colleagues: 
 
Evelyn: I honestly, don’t you dare tell anybody this, have a suspicion that some 
people don’t even read them at all. 
 
Mason: I actually have very little idea [referring to how colleagues use the criteria]. I 
have some evidence, for example, from this latest bunch of marking of 
people apparently not using them at all… 
142 
 
Five participants seemed to refer to having adopted their own adjusted or alternative 
assessment criteria, for example: 
Milo: I have a system for myself of what I'm looking for because that allows me to 
be consistent. 
Arthur: I'll be looking for particular things in terms of the marking criteria, my own, I 
suppose I've got this unwritten list in my head of things I look for in a good 
dissertation. 
Three participants acknowledged that they did not specifically consult the criteria when 
assessing dissertations. Oliver and Harry were by their own admission conscious of the 
criteria but not reliant on applying the criteria first hand, being confident in their 
knowledge and understanding of the criteria from past assessing experience: 
Oliver: I’ve obviously already done a host of undergraduate exam marking so the 
descriptors, the grade [criteria], are in my mind anyway informally. So I’ve 
got that sort of background but I don’t particularly refer to any…while 
assessing dissertations. 
Harry: I'm not saying that when I'm marking an individual piece I've got the grading 
criteria there. I'm pretty reasonably confident in, I know 60 to 65 is good, 
then I know the other’s very good, and then excellent at 70s, outstanding in 
the 80s. 
Harry’s comment is in itself interesting as ‘excellent’ forms part of the description of a 
grade of 70+ per the criteria but strictly speaking ‘outstanding’ comes in from 76 not 80+. 
This comment then is broadly in line but not fully in accordance with the criteria. Harry is 
seemingly confident in his grasp of the criteria, now apparently internalised from long-
standing use, but perhaps is not quite accurate or up-to-date with any changes made?  
The third participant, Olga, appeared more reliant on a sense of where the grades lie 
based not on application of the criteria but on an iterative scaling process involving 
relative comparisons across scripts applying standards observed from assessing 
dissertations in previous years. This suggests that Olga’s approach is more norm-
referenced than criterion-referenced: 
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Olga: Not very strictly [referring to use of the criteria]. I rely more on my 
experience from the previous cohorts of students. I will probably think first 
more broadly in terms of whether it’s a first class or whether it’s distinction, 
say. First I will place it into a class and then I will think about maybe is it 
closer to the bottom or the middle or the top of the class. 
Collectively, these excerpts would appear to highlight a general commitment to the 
criteria for the most part but not an altogether consistent approach to application. Yet, 
with respect to the students, the widespread use of the criteria by assessors is thought 
crucial in presenting the necessary confidence that assessment is equitable:  
Theodore: Well, we have to stick to our criteria so that we are fair to all students.   
This guards against perceptions of a ‘post code lottery’ effect, whereby the grade a 
student receives for his or her dissertation is subject to the whim of the assessor 
concerned and hence the luck of the draw.  
A third of participants discussed the importance of the criteria in maintaining assessment 
consistency. Views on this were twofold. Firstly, that the assessment criteria helped with 
self-consistency in assessing across dissertations:  
Isaac: So if I've got a batch of twelve I want to make sure that I've marked the 
twelfth one the same way that I've marked the first one. So you use them 
[assessment criteria]… 
Fiona: So after I’d looked at a couple of them [undergraduate dissertations] I did a 
check against the [assessment criteria]. I did look at them again further 
down after I had done a few more just to make sure that I was being 
consistent with them as I went through them. 
Secondly, that this applies equally to consistency across assessors with the assessment 
criteria playing an important role in facilitating this:  
Florence: …well those are the [assessment criteria] that we're given, so I think if we're 
going to have consistency across markers, that's why I've always got to go 
back and refer to, I think. 
Mason: I would say the majority of the time I’m within the typical a few marks 




Zhao: Basically, we have to stick to the criteria, we have to contrast the work 
against the criteria. That's how we can achieve agreement. 
Florence, Mason and Zhao, as advocates of consistency, recognise the importance of 
each assessor approaching the task informed by the criteria. For Oscar, this would 
include assessing for critical thinking:  
Oscar: I think it is important as well that your view of critical thinking, or your view 
when you’re looking down on marks, it is informed by the grade [criteria] 
and you can’t just sort of say well this is my little view and that’s the way it 
is, because then rather you would be criticised for saying well there’s just 
one right answer and that’s yours, but actually there is a bit more of a 
guidance beyond that… 
On questions of readability, a quarter of participants commented in favourable terms on 
the level of clarity afforded by the language used in the criteria and their worth to the 
assessment process as a result: 
Reuben: I think what happens is experience does help clearly but I don't think that 
you can go far wrong on the marking guidelines. They’re pretty clear. 
However, if a key aim of the criteria is to achieve consistency across assessors then a 
potential problem here is the apparent level of subjectivity in participants’ interpretations 
and application of the criteria:  
Isaac: The criteria themselves are a little bit open to interpretation… 
Penelope: I think it [assessment criteria] is quite vague and I always, yeah, it’s like I 
don’t like the terms, it’s satisfactory and fair isn’t it? And I always think well 
what does that mean actually? 
It seems that some participants, whether dismissive of the official assessment criteria or 
not, are choosing instead to judge students’ work against criteria of their own devising, 
internalised from experience and so individualised criteria which may or may not 
incorporate or compare with the official criteria, and which may nor may not be suitable 
for undergraduate dissertations. That said it seems unlikely that individualised criteria 
will deviate much given the likelihood that these will have been informed by the official 
criteria at some point, together with the calibration effects of colleagues’ expectations 
within local assessment communities. Equally, however, it would seem important for 
consistency that assessors follow the guidance offered by the published criteria: 
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Thomas: It's important I think to have a set of guidelines as to what are the 
classifications, what is expected of each level, rather than making it up for 
yourself.  
Assessors will have their own understanding of critical thinking and of how that might 
inform the assessment process. Appreciably, however, for consistency that 
understanding should tie into the official criteria: 
Thomas: I think they [assessment criteria] are pretty critical because they set for me 
an expectation of what I'm marking within. I could come up with my own 
expectation and deliver my own version of it but that wouldn't be fair to the 
students that get me because I mark harder or softer. So I think it's very 
important to have…extremely important, and then I'm trying to work within 
those. 
Absent the criteria, and/or substitution by individuals of internalised or tacit criteria, then 
personal preferences and enthusiasm or lack thereof for disciplinary and/or 
methodological approaches taken by students could override assessors’ objectivity: 
Viola: …if we don’t have those [assessment criteria] then the subjectivity becomes 
even more of a problem…Otherwise, we might be biased. Me because of 
the research question, might be other people because of the methodology, 
you know?  
More credit, perhaps unduly, might be given to research topics and questions or the 
adoption of methodologies that are favoured by the assessor. Correspondingly less 
credit may be given for topics, questions or methodologies of limited interest, or for 
which the assessor has little or no experience or appetite. That would seem unfair to 
students who may choose topics borne of their own interests and who often make 
pragmatic methodological choices on what can be done within the limitations of time and 
available resources. Consequently, the criteria set general expectations applicable 
across the board, seeking to move assessors away from personal biases and towards 




Aidan: But then I think, if everybody was just to train and to be quite neutral, some 
people are more passionate about certain topics than others and then this is 
where the weighting comes in, or they have been to an institution where 
there is a particular emphasis in certain kinds of weighting, right? But I think 
a lot of academics are surprisingly, you know I think if you just get people to 
think and work as neutrally as possible you won’t get marks that are too far 
off, you will actually have quite a harmonised set of marks. 
6.3.2 Internal moderation (via double marking) 
The host business school has a varied academic base: 
Hanna: …we have we got a lot of new colleagues that come from all kinds of 
universities with all kinds of expectations. 
Conceivably, it follows that conceptions of what is required or valued in dissertations, 
more specifically what critical thinking is and how it manifests in dissertations, can and 
does vary.  
Grading variation is particularly observable with newer academic members:  
Theodore: If you mark with some colleagues who are new, or new to the UK system, 
then there might be quite a large divergence. 
Engagement with colleagues in local assessment communities is hugely important to 
developing shared views of critical thinking. Academics can develop through challenging 
themselves, not just in their own research but also by engaging with colleagues, 
particularly experienced ones, having intelligent discussions, perhaps even heated 
debates, whether maintaining an argument of contested points or shifting their thinking. 
Such interactions and experiences are all important for developing an understanding of 
critical thinking: 
Fiona: I think just hearing people with very good brains talk about different 
situations… conversations with academics with really good brains on 




Olivia: Obviously, some people can challenge themselves through their reading 
and so on but I think that actually engaging with your colleagues and having 
discussions around things and being challenged about things and having to 
make an argument or shift your thinking or, those all are important for 
developing your critical understanding, your critical abilities as well, so that 
you can understand a perspective from someone else's viewpoint. You 
might not agree with them but you can see, you develop ways of integrating 
that into your knowledge. And I think that's very difficult to do in a siloed 
position. 
When it comes to the practice of assessment, newer academics learn from more 
experienced colleagues, evolving their understandings and moderating their 
expectations, becoming more confident as assessors. This is part of the fabric of 
academic life. Experts and novices meet, they discuss and debate, and novices grow as 
a result: 
Mason: …from the very early days when you’re a fairly green supervisor and you’re 
not quite sure of stuff and you go through that first batch or two and you 
second mark with people and you're oh right ok, you begin to get a sense of 
where you should be. That's really helpful in those early days. 
Florence: …it evolves, it very much evolves over the years. I think within the first three 
or four years I came to a very, a much more confident place in terms of 
supervision and in terms of having a bit of authority when it comes to 
actually discussing, working out a mark and then discussing and arguing it 
with a colleague. 
Given that the academic base at the host business school is so varied, and given that 
academics can learn from each other, then institutionally there should be mechanisms 
for sharing knowledge to help academics to standardise when it comes to critical 
thinking and assessment. A key mechanism in this context is the double marking 
process, where two academics each assess a dissertation separately and without 
recourse to each other and then meet to discuss their respective grades and the 
rationale for these with the aim of agreeing a final grade. Evidently, questions of whether 
and to what extent students are ‘critical’ do arise when assessors are comparing notes 
and discussing first and second grades on dissertations: 
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Theodore: I would hope that when agreeing dissertation marks with colleagues, we’d 
often talk in terms of how critical students have been… 
Oliver: …talking to colleagues, I came to understand that perhaps my expectations 
were unreasonably high and that I had to acknowledge the fact that I was 
dealing with young people just embarking on their professional education or 
their academic education and I had to tailor my expectations accordingly. 
Two-thirds of participants referred specifically to the importance of the double marking 
process, appreciative of what they can and do learn from it. Meetings bring out 
comparative views, helping assessors to get a sense of what they are each looking for, 
to understand what they are picking out as critical or uncritical in dissertations, to get a 
feel for where they and where their expectations are relative to others: 
Olivia: And also your own marking but the second marking practices and things like 
that so you can see how other people look at the same piece of work and 
what they see in it, and I think that that’s really important and getting that 
thing too. 
Aidan: I think maybe joint dissertation marking, just understanding people’s criteria 
and then getting them to rationalise, so I think I think in a sense like double 
marking for something that is more subjective is important. 
For Theodore, a process of calibration does occur through the internal moderation 
process:  
Theodore: …but no-one had really talked to you about applying these [assessment 
criteria] and the various systems. So I think as an early marker it was very 
much a process of calibration. In the first couple of years you calibrated 
your expectations of work to particular standards by marking with a range of 
different people. It was a process of calibration, unquestionably.  
It follows that the longer academics are part of the host business school, and the more 
they interact in this context, the closer their views will align on what is and is not critical 
in dissertations, and the closer their respective grades will be. This it seems is subject to 
the continuing stability of the academic faculty, as practices and understandings infuse 
through departments:  
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Evelyn: I’ll share what I used to do and used to have. So, I think how I thought about 
it is quite clearly infecting us as a department as we go along. There is sort 
of a virus of this going on. 
Calibration appears inevitable when you work with others over a period. However, 
calibration takes time to take effect and is seemingly reliant upon experienced 
colleagues sharing their views: 
Theodore: I think it depends on colleagues. I find that if I mark with colleagues who are 
experienced it's very often the case that we’re one or two marks apart. 
Isaac: If you mark with somebody who is quite experienced you find that your 
marks aren't that far apart. So you are looking for the same things. But you 
do find, and this is coming back to experience, you do find that there is often 
much more divergence, you definitely see it in dissertations because you 
are blind double marking. So there is no anchoring to the other person's 
marks. And over the last couple of years I marked with [redacted] and we 
were never more than two or three marks apart. Yet I’ve marked with other 
people and you’re 10, 15 on dissertations. They were less experienced. 
Arthur: The interesting thing as I've got older is that I find now, when I sit down to 
agree second marks with people, whether I'm the first or the second marker, 
I'm much closer to other people than I used to be. I used to often be miles 
away when I first started with somebody more experienced as the other 
marker, now I'm much closer. 
6.4 Theme 2: Summary 
Two specific areas of interest where points of convergence and difference were 
apparent came out strongly from the discussions.  
The first is holistic versus additive approaches to assessing undergraduate dissertations. 
Some participants described their approach to assessment as holistic, meaning they 
read a piece of work as a whole and mentally balance its constituent parts into one 
overall grade. Others construct a grade on an additive basis, for example chapter by 
chapter, leading to a composite grade. This inconsistency is of concern, more so taking 
into account the apparently individualised nature of additive approaches with no official 
additive assessment structure to follow.  
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The second is expectations of originality. I have broken this down into three aspects. 
Firstly, opinion was divided on whether undergraduate students should be expected to 
contribute to knowledge. Secondly, participants diverged on the issue of whether or not 
to bring in fresh literature at the findings and analysis stage of a dissertation potentially 
evidencing original thinking. Thirdly, methodological creativity would point to originality, 
at least for some participants; and whilst participants generally held the view that a 
replication-style approach to research is unoriginal, they differed in their support for this 
approach.  
The problems presented by differences in assessment approaches are subject to 
mitigation by established mechanisms, namely criterion referenced practices involving 
the use of assessment criteria, and internal moderation processes (double marking for 
undergraduate dissertations at the host business school). However, the evident 
inconsistencies in approach could undermine these efforts at standardisation and hence 
work against achieving consistency in assessment. 
Most participants agreed with the application of assessment criteria when assessing 
undergraduate dissertations, as mandated by the host business school, noting that this 
is important for consistency. Actual practices varied, however, from applying the criteria 
throughout the assessment process, to applying only after the event as a post hoc 
check, to applying only intermittently as a review mechanism or applying only to help 
decide borderline cases sitting on grade boundaries. Essentially the assessment criteria 
are generally supported but inconsistently applied. Most but not all participants would 
have regard to the official criteria, either current or internalised from long-standing use, 
with some apparently substituting their own criteria. This too would work against 
consistency.  
Engagement with colleagues is hugely important to developing shared views. Internal 
moderation via double marking of undergraduate dissertations facilitates interactions 
between assessors. Questions of whether and to what extent students are ‘critical’ do 
arise in such interactions. Assessors can work through these and other respective 
differences to determine final grades. Subject to the stability of the academic faculty, and 
given enough time, this mechanism can help to develop shared understandings and 







Here, in Chapter 7, I discuss the findings from Chapters 5 and 6 set against the three 
research questions listed in Chapter 1, RQ1-RQ3 inclusive, taken in turn and examined 
in relation to the literature base from Chapters 2 and 3.   
The findings in Chapter 5 cover the ways in which participants conceive of critical 
thinking in relation to undergraduate students, more specifically final year undergraduate 
students given the dissertation context in which interview discussions were located. 
These findings feed into RQ1 and RQ2, enabling me to build a picture of what critical 
thinking is for participants, i.e. a composite of skills, dispositions and originality, to which 
I add knowledge (with reference to RQ1), and of how that concept of critical thinking is 
operationalised through assessment of undergraduate dissertations (with reference to 
RQ2). 
The findings in Chapter 6 sit in response to RQ3, covering the challenges for 
consistency in assessing for critical thinking in undergraduate students' dissertations. 
Drawing on how participants conceptualise critical thinking (RQ1) and how they 
operationalise this through assessment (RQ2), I examine now points of convergence, 
differences and mitigation split into three parts: firstly, differing expectations of originality; 
secondly, holistic versus additive assessment approaches; and thirdly, sharing 
understandings and calibrating assessment.  




7.2 RQ1: How do business school academics conceptualise critical thinking?  
7.2.1 Cognitive elements - skills of argumentation 
Critical thinking in higher education is fundamentally about making reliable and 
persuasive judgements substantiated through sound assessment of evidence from 
various sources (Moon, 2008). Skills of argumentation are central to this. Accordingly, 
these provided the focus of much of the discussions at interview and the core of 
participants’ conceptualisations of critical thinking. This mirrors the first part of the Delphi 
Project consensus statement (See Facione, 1990) and follows the argumentation as 
critical thinking approach of the study skills texts prevalent in higher education (see, for 
example, Cottrell, 2017).  
Participants further discussed what for them would make for good arguments 
demonstrating critical thinking. In the findings, I have grouped relevant points under 
‘structure’ and ‘evidence’. These subheadings echo key areas of focus exhibited by 
standardised tests for critical thinking. The HEIghtenTM critical thinking assessment tool, 
for example, centres on analysing and evaluating the structural integrity and evidential 
credence of arguments, premised on strong arguments being structurally robust and 
evidentially sound (Liu et al., 2016). I suggest that the makeup of such tests reflects the 
views of the academics who construct them. This understanding of critical thinking as 
manifest in argumentation is common in higher education (see, for example, Andrews, 
1995; Davies, 2013, 2015; Mitchell, 1994; Mitchell & Riddle, 2000; Scott, 2000; Wingate, 
2012). The aforementioned critical thinking self-help guides are premised on this widely 
held construction of critical thinking as skills of argumentation. Evidently, the business 
school based participants in my study share such views, echoing the skills-based view of 
critical thinking, which builds on logical reasoning and is characterised in terms of 
cognitive and interpretive skills and mental processes connected with deconstructing 
arguments, and assessing and evaluating existing scholarship (see, for example, Bailin 
et al., 1999a; Carrington et al., 2011; Davies, 2015; Ennis, 1987; Espey, 2018; Fisher & 






The Delphi project consensus statement (see Facione, 1990) covers cognitive skills, 
connected with argumentation and judgement, and dispositions. Similarly, the critical 
thinking in higher education models of Davies (2015) and Halonen (1995), for example, 
take the cognitive thinking skills and add attitudes/dispositions as important elements of 
propensity, meaning “an inclination or tendency to behave in a certain way”, which serve 
to motivate the exercise of the cognitive skills elements (Davies, 2015, p.55). A person 
needs the skills but also the propensity to exercise them to engage in critical thought 
(Butler & Halpern, 2020; Halpern, 2014; Halpern & Sternberg, 2020).  
The literature consolidates a list of dispositions, expanding upon the Delphi Project, inter 
alia open-minded, fair-minded, curious, inquisitive, flexible, reasonable, orderly, diligent, 
persistent, objective, well-informed, honest, prudent, willing to consider and ready to 
self-correct (see, for example, Bailin et al, 1999b; Calma & Davies, 2020; Ennis, 1985b; 
Facione, 1990; Facione et al., 1995; Halpern, 1998; Halpern & Sternberg, 2020; Paul, 
1992). The dispositions that I have interpreted from the data as amalgamated bear 
comparison with the Delphi Project consensus statement (refer s.2.2.1) and the detailed 




My list – comprised of scepticism, open-mindedness and flexibility - is on the face of it 
much less comprehensive. Essentially, I have interpreted a distilled set of dispositions 
from discussions with participants, i.e. scepticism (incorporating curiosity and 
inquisitiveness); open-mindedness (incorporating prudence, tolerance of ambiguity, 
appreciation of individual differences); and flexibility (incorporating persistence and self-
correction). Mine is a summarised list, amalgamated from smaller parts into sections 
carrying more evidential weight. This is not to limit the dispositions that characterise 
critical thinking in higher education. Rather this serves to highlight those that are 
apparently of particular relevance to the participants in this study as business school 
academics.  
7.2.2.1 Scepticism 
Critical thinking is underpinned by a propensity for scepticism towards authorities and 
towards received wisdom (Moore, 2013; Rear, 2019). Students who are sceptical have 
an inquisitive attitude (Lai, 2012). They do not just take things for granted or as given. 
They do not passively absorb knowledge from experts and authority figures (Moon, 
2008). They have the habit of mind to doubt, to question, to challenge. They have a 
desire to be well informed. They ask questions, probe, strive for meanings and 
justifications and consider alternatives (Barnet & Bedau, 2010; Carrithers & Bean, 2008; 
Perkins et al., 1994; Walker & Finney, 1999).  
Invariably, participants viewed scepticism as a positive. Students might “develop a 
cynical attitude” (Aiden). Cynicism - listed as a synonym for scepticism (Collins English 
Thesaurus Online, 2020) – has negative overtones but the scepticism considered here is 
evidently ‘healthy’ not jaundiced (‘healthy’ with reference to Macpherson & Owen, 2010). 
With this mind-set comes a reticence to accept current orthodoxy and a willingness to 
challenge it (James et al., 2010; Jones, 2009; Mingers, 2000).  
7.2.2.2 Open-mindedness 
The critical thinker is predisposed to being open-minded. This also came through 
strongly in discussions with participants. Students as critical thinkers do not simply 
accumulate knowledge, but must work to overcome resistance and uncover that which is 
hidden (James et al., 2010). Necessarily then, students who are open-minded are also 
curious and inquisitive (Lai, 2012). They are appreciative of the fact that they cannot 
know everything, whilst being open to different perspectives and possibilities.  
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Thinking that is critical is applied with deep engagement to complex matters that are 
likely subject to different viewpoints (Moon, 2008). Analysis and interpretation of 
research data may well lead to multiple, alternative, even conflicting explanations. 
Students may, for example, have tested a theory and generally found that it holds to an 
extent but not exactly or fully. There might be areas where it does not quite work or 
where the theory is unable to explain the results adequately. Perhaps it is the wrong 
theory for the situation under investigation. Perhaps it is the right theory but parts of it 
remain underdeveloped. Perhaps there are certain limitations to how or where the theory 
operates. Participants expect students who are thinking critically to be open and alert to 
all such possibilities. The critical thinker is not defensive and is open to possibilities 
(Brown & Rutter, 2008). Students who are open-minded will in the midst of this 
uncertainty question all and actively look for other perspectives to help inform their 
understandings and explanations and to necessarily support their choices. They can, at 
least for a third of participants, also “see the big picture” (Fiona), i.e. they can see 
beyond the immediacy of what is in front of them through to greater concerns. 
7.2.2.3 Flexibility 
Flexibility goes hand in hand with self-correction. Students can demonstrate their 
flexibility by, having exercised their scepticism and open-mindedness, having 
persistently looked for, probed and sifted possibilities before taking positions, they then 
have the presence of mind to self-correct, to change their views and reform their 
positions in light of fresh perspectives and new evidence.  
 
7.2.3 Originality 
Originality in dissertations is said to manifest in various guises, subject it seems to 
disciplinary norms (Guetzkow, Lamont & Mallard, 2004; Lamont, 2009; Lovitts, 2007). 
Guetzkow et al. (2004, p.190) talk of originality in the natural sciences as “the production 
of new findings and new theories”, whereas for social sciences (within which I would 
situate business disciplines), originality more broadly encompasses “using a new 
approach, theory, method, or data; studying a new topic, doing research in an 
understudied area; or producing new findings”. This description is suggestive of 
creativity. Furthermore, Clarke and Lunt (2014) cite intellectual contribution as the mark 




That thinking critically involves thinking creatively was discussed by twelve of twenty-one 
participants. This mirrors the literature, which describes thinking critically as involving 
thinking creatively (Bailin et al., 1996b; Halpern, 2014; Moon, 2008; Paul & Elder, 2006). 
Creativity embodies originality (Brodin, 2016; Dumitru, 2019; Jackson & Shaw, 2006; 
Lovitts, 2008; Winter, Griffiths & Green, 2000). Originality is in turn closely associated 
with critical thinking (Bailin et al., 1996b; Halpern, 2014; Holbrook, Bourke, Fairbairn & 
Lovat, 2007; Moon, 2008; Simpkins, 1987). Certainly being creative in an academic 
research context can evidence critical thinking for participants. Being creative can 
involve exercising ingenuity and innovation in doing something that is novel and 
adaptive (Amabile, 1996; Anastasiadou & Dimitriadou, 2011; Bennich-Bjorkman, 1997; 
Brodin, 2016; Sternberg & Lubart, 1999). Creativity, for participants, relates to students 
thinking differently about their research topics and the problems at hand, evidenced 
perhaps by going beyond the norm in their approaches to research or in their thinking. 
Beghetto (2013) and Bennich-Bjorkman (1997) would differentiate creativity from 
originality on the basis that creativity need only be novel whereas originality must be 
novel but also relevant or applicable. Beghetto (2013, p.15) speaks of students’ original 
contributions being “task-appropriate and thereby creative”. Pope (2005, p.xvi) similarly 
refers to creativity as providing something not only “fresh” but also “valuable”. These 
would suggest that there has to be a point to the research, a worth, a usefulness even 
(see also Halpern, 2014; Halpern & Sternberg, 2020). This brings us to contribution. 
The student as critical thinker engaged in research, even at undergraduate level, is 
anticipated to make a contribution. The majority of the participants who commented 
upon originality were of this opinion. Some benefit has to be derived. There has to be a 
point to it and an outcome that adds in some way. Moore (2013), for example, 
highlighted the importance, as far as participating academics in his study were 
concerned, of students actually going beyond challenging the ideas of others to 
demonstrate some originality of thought in producing their own ideas and of making 






Knowledge in this context encompasses subject knowledge and epistemological 
development. Critical thinking requires a deep knowledge of the subject (Halpern & 
Sternberg, 2020). Participants confirmed this, some indicating the importance of reading 
around the subject and having the base of subject knowledge as a prerequisite for 
thinking critically about it. How knowledge is perceived is also important to thinking 
critically (see, for example, Battersby, 2018; King & Kitchener, 2002; McPeck, 1981; 
Siegel, 1985).  
7.2.4.1 Epistemological development 
The given descriptions of skills and dispositions help describe the student who is 
disposed to critical thinking and whose perspective on knowledge is developed 
sufficiently to engage with critical thinking. Self-invested in seeing the world in a more 
questioning but also more personal way; constructive self-criticism and self-regulation; 
being alive to possibilities; sifting multiple perspectives with openness, fair-mindedness, 
prudence and discipline; having the flexibility to deal with problems and to change 
perspectives and positions. These aspects all resonate with the epistemological 
development depicted in the models of Perry (1970) and Baxter Magolda (1992). They 
are clearly not indicative of the lower scales, essentially dualist positions on knowledge 
at which students hold absolute interpretations of the world, where things are a binary 
choice of, for example, right or wrong, and where ‘truth’ can be known with certainty 
(Carroll, 2007). Rather, they are indicative of Baxter Magolda’s (1992) third domain of 
‘independent knowing’ upwards, similar to Perry’s (1970) relativism. These presuppose 
developed thinking capabilities and relativism on the part of final year undergraduate 
students.  
Where students reach the stage of becoming relativistic in their outlook they move 
towards forming and justifying their own personal perspectives judged in context and on 
the evidence in the midst of uncertainty, opposing viewpoints and alternative frames of 
reference (Baxter Magolda, 2002; Carroll, 2007; Moon, 2008). They recognise that not 
all views are equally valid, that some views are better than others are, and they are able 
to evaluate and judge these comparatively (Hofer, 2001). In taking justifiable positions, 
students will be showing that they view knowledge as constructed and understood in 
context (Baxter Magolda, 2002). Having analytically sifted multiple perspectives they 
construct their own perspectives and adopt a position judged in context and on the 
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evidence (Baxter Magolda, 2002; Carroll, 2007; Evans et al., 2010; Hofer & Pintrich, 
1997; Moon, 2008; Ostorga, 2006; West, 2004). They think it all through, using the 
current bundle of what is known to figure things out for themselves. This is what 
participants expect of final year undergraduate dissertation students. The critical thinking 
student, exercising healthy scepticism, is operating as Brownlee (2004) suggests at 
these higher levels of epistemological development, engaged in a thoroughly disciplined, 
analytical and critical consideration of issues from all sides and with regard to all aspects 
and perspectives both expert and personal.  
Participants further value originality of thought. They are interested in what students 
have to say about their own perspectives, having weighed up the information and 
evidence. This too fits with the higher relativist positions of the models of Perry (1970) 
and Baxter Magolda (1992). Students who demonstrate originality of thought do not 
reside at the absolutist end of the scale. They do not regard truth as known and 
unchallengeable (Brownlee, 2004; Carroll, 2007; Hofer, 2001). They recognise that 
experts do not have all the answers (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Moon, 2008). Rather, they 
demonstrate evaluative recognition of multiplicity, of differing views, of uncertainties and 
conflicts (Brownlee, 2004; Carroll, 2007; Hofer, 2001). They think for themselves, now 
generating their own perspectives and holding these as equally valid (Baxter Magolda, 
1992; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). This signifies that students are not just working to a 
dissertation formula, for example, are not just regurgitating the ideas of others but are 
taking ownership of the material, reconstituting it in their own thoughts, forming and 
articulating their own perspectives. 
These models of epistemological development propose that students progress through 
development stages in how they perceive knowledge. In turn, students’ epistemological 
development and their capacities for critical thinking are thought to be related (Moon, 
2008). Appreciably, however, this is unlikely to influence business school academics, not 
directly at least. In truth, few if any business school academics will possess a detailed 
awareness of epistemological development, more specifically the models of Perry (1970) 
and Baxter Magolda (1992), much less have their views informed by these. My position 
here is not that these models influence business school academics’ perceptions of 
critical thinking as conceived and operationalised through assessment. That is unlikely 
to hold. Rather, I am suggesting that these models mirror what participants want and 
expect from final year undergraduate students in relation to exercising and evidencing 
their critical thinking. Students are enculturated into academic communities in which 
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academics set the tone and ideally communicate their expectations to students, directly 
or indirectly, which students absorb. It follows that in capturing the epistemological 
development of university students, the models of Perry (1970) and Baxter Magolda 
(1992) are also arguably reflective of academics’ expectations of students at different 
stages of their epistemological development. Students in the more developed stages are 
more disposed to engage in critical thinking and more successful in both doing so and in 
evidencing this, in line with participants’ expectations.   
7.3 RQ2: How are business school academics’ conceptualisations of critical 
thinking operationalised through assessment practices?  
7.3.1 Skills of argumentation 
Participants regard effective arguments as being logically structured. Critical thinking as 
argumentation is often connected, as here, with the application of the formal structures 
of logic and reasoning (Bailin & Siegel, 2002; Erikson & Erikson, 2018; Moon, 2008; 
Pithers & Soden, 2000; Swanwick et al., 2014). Several authors have defined critical 
thinking as the ability to interrogate and pick apart an argument, comprehending the 
reasoning behind it, correctly assessing its statements, grasping inferential connections 
made, tracking inconsistencies, detecting fallacious reasoning, etc., i.e. processes of 
logical reasoning (see, for example, Browne &  Freeman, 2000; Ennis, 1962, 1993; 
Halpern & Sternberg, 2020; Kurfiss, 1988; Lundquist, 1999; Pascarella & Terenzini, 
1991; Tsui, 2002).  
Critical thinking is not necessarily defined by logic and reasoning, but with argument 
being such an important skill component of critical thinking, and logic and reasoning 
constituting important components of argument, these are necessarily important tools for 
the student critical thinker. Logic and reasoning provide the spine of an argument and 
the glue that holds it together. Students who are thinking critically will construct 
arguments that build logically from legitimate premises through to valid conclusions. If 
the logic of the argument is clear and cogent then this will go some way to satisfy 
participants as to the critical thinking displayed. Whether the argument is actually 
‘correct’ appears moot. An argument can be entirely logical as constructed but this does 
not necessarily mean that it is correct (de Bono, 1983). Checking the correctness of 
conclusions reached might be implied but was not explicitly stated. However, given the 
subjective nature of much research there may not necessarily be correct answers as 
such. The focus, as regards assessing for critical thinking, appears placed more 
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objectively on the logic of the argument and not on whether the conclusions reached are 
right or wrong in the estimation of academics.   
 
Critical thinking as argumentation involves being able to determine the validity of 
arguments as structured but also involves determining if the evidence supports the 
conclusions (Bailin et al., 1999a; Butler & Halpern, 2020; Davies, 2015). This too came 
out strongly in discussions with participants. If students are to win the argument on 
paper, they must substantiate their conclusions with suitable evidence. ‘Suitable’ means 
referencing apt academic sources at a minimum but more usefully critique of sources. 
Critique must progress beyond simply acknowledging or describing the views of others. 
Critique incorporates interpretation, analysis, evaluation and inference (linking with both 
the Delphi Project consensus statement (see Facione, 1990) and the cognitive skills of 
the critical thinker listed in the models of Davies (2015) and Halonen (1995). Arguments 
must be unpicked, findings evaluated, sources compared, contrasted and synthesised, 
relative strengths and weaknesses examined, information synthesised, relationships 
uncovered, tensions identified, assumptions questioned and positions challenged. 
Exercising these skills will serve to evidence critical thinking for participants. Students as 
critical thinkers deconstruct the arguments of others as part of building their own 
arguments, structured and evidenced appropriately to convince (Buskist & Irons, 2008; 
Jones, 2004; Lundquist, 1999). These skills also operate in the construction of one’s 
own arguments, something that the critical thinking self-help guides focus much less on 
and arguably therefore give insufficient attention to (Moon, 2008). Critical thinkers 
develop their own viewpoints, informed from interrogation, analysis and evaluation of the 
ideas and arguments of others (Hammer, 2017; Jonassen & Kim, 2010; Luque, 2011; 
Ramage et al., 2009). That students can construct their own arguments was clearly 






Critically thinking students are unwedded to their prior beliefs, and should not accept 
information unquestioningly but exercise due caution in absorbing knowledge from 
others after carefully examining their reasoning, conclusions and evidence (Stanovich & 
West, 1997; Browne & Freeman, 2000). In practical terms, this can be evidenced 
through the undergraduate dissertation mechanism. However, for participants scepticism 
is not limited to challenging extant knowledge, cynically or otherwise. The student who is 
thinking critically moves beyond this, opening up and seeing the world in a more 
questioning way but also in a more personal way. This is perhaps more difficult to 
evidence through the undergraduate dissertation mechanism.  
In addition, for participants sceptical students are constructively self-critical. They have 
the courage not only to question others but also themselves (Dominguez, 2019). This 
too links with the cognitive skills aspects of the Delphi Project consensus statement, 
which includes reference to “self-regulatory judgement” (Facione, 1990, p.6). Self-critics 
are self-regulatory, “brave enough to risk being wrong, and wise enough to realize that 
much can be learned from errors and failed solutions” (Nelson, 2005, p. xiv; cited in 
Davies, 2015, p.53). Critical thinkers in any context, not localised or limited to 
undergraduate students, should be alive to deficiencies in their own thinking through 
constantly testing their rationality against differing perspectives (Brookfield, 1987). 
7.3.2.2 Open-mindedness 
Participants are looking for students to adopt a position, having weighed up the 
alternatives, and argue effectively for that position. This requires open-mindedness, but 
also fair-mindedness and organised thinking. Critical thinkers are thoroughly disciplined 
in their approach to thinking through information, arriving at reasoned determinations 
(James et al., 2010). Students should not be impulsive or precipitate in taking positions 
therefore. A degree of prudence is required. This is about students working through 
multiple perspectives, recognising the situated complexity of interpretations that are not 
necessarily right or wrong, addressing the positions taken by commentators, and 
building their own positions. Being open to different interpretations, different 
perspectives, different approaches, enables the student as critical thinker to have 
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greater appreciation of context and a deeper understanding of the position ultimately 
adopted (Browne & Freeman, 2000).  
7.3.2.3 Flexibility 
For participants, flexible students are unfazed by problems with dissertations. Perhaps 
students have scheduled interviews but these have been cancelled because the 
intended interviewees are no longer willing. Perhaps large-scale surveys have yielded 
very few responses, too few for the results to carry the necessary statistical efficacy. 
Perhaps students could not feasibly collect data on a particular variable required for a 
mathematical model. These are examples of practical problems that a flexible and self-
regulatory student will recognise, rationalise and suitably overcome. After all, dealing 
with the pitfalls of research that is “messy” (Evelyn) is a rich part of the research process 
for participants. They expect students to be self-critical of their own research approaches 
(sceptical), alert to problems and adaptable in finding solutions. Flexibility is needed 
therefore, as are complex skills of problem solving, linking with the cognitive skills 
elements of the Delphi Project consensus statement and the critical thinking in higher 
education models of Davies (2015) and Halonen (1995). 
7.3.3 Originality 
Originality manifests in creativity and in contributing to knowledge (see, for example, 
Anastasiadou & Dimitriadou, 2011; Halpern, 2014). Participants concur, although this is 
moderated for undergraduate students at their stage of academic development. 
7.3.3.1 Originality - Creativity 
Creativity, in the context of discussions in and around undergraduate dissertations, 
relates to students thinking differently about their research topics and the problems at 
hand; evidenced by some element of novelty, for example by students going beyond the 
norm in their approaches to research and thereby exceeding participants’ expectations. 
For participants, agreeing with Dumitru (2019), such novelty can come from anywhere in 
a research dissertation, including its context, subject, research questions and methods. 
This is likely to involve some imagination as well as taking on some risk (Frick, Albertyn 
& Bitzer, 2014; Sternberg & Kaufman, 2010). Perhaps understandably, final year 
undergraduate students may want to play it safe when it comes to dissertation research, 
picking from a limited range of topics and devising formulaic questions with a view to 
pursuing an acceptable grade given operational constraints. Economists might label this 
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‘satisficing’. Perhaps it is unfair to complain that many students seemingly pick from the 
“low-hanging fruit” (Olga), their research questions lacking in creativity. In any event, 
creativity could equally be apparent in the creativity with which the questions are 
pursued. As said, even a study based on a well-trodden path with familiar questions can 
be interesting and exhibit creativity in the way in which the student has gone about 
fulfilling these. 
7.3.3.2 Originality - Contribution 
What is different about a dissertation study and its findings? What is unique? What 
insights are offered? What do we now know from a dissertation that we did not know 
previously? What is valuable about it? What is useful about it? What, for example, are 
the implications for policy and practice? Irrespective of whether a contribution is 
theoretical and/or practical, I see this as akin to building a wall, in this case of 
knowledge. Appreciably, undergraduate students are unlikely to generate new 
breakthrough knowledge, i.e. knowledge that advances the disciplinary field (Baptista, 
Frick, Holley, Remmik, & Tesch, 2015). However, the undergraduate student can 
contribute by adding a brick or two to our existing knowledge. Sometimes there is a gap 
in the wall that the student can help to fill, or it may simply be a case of adding at the 
top. Whichever, students are effectively then part of the academic conversation, building 
upon the work of others and making their own contributions.  
In simple and practical terms, an undergraduate student can contribute through finding 
and identifying a gap in the literature. The student assesses the current state of 
knowledge, determining what is known, what is missing and what needs to be known, 
pointing out that the literature has certain limitations, identifying where the literature is 
deficient and where further research is needed to address this. In a sense, the student is 
finding the novel through determining what is and is not there.  
Other ways of contributing include being innovative with approaches and methods 
(Lovitts, 2005), or finding the novelty in contexts, participants and the subject of the 
research (Dumitru, 2019), resulting in incremental additions to what we know. It is also 
worth noting that business research is often situated in real-world situations in which 
protagonists are looking for practical solutions to problems rather than theoretical 
propositions. Contributions can be made, therefore, by offering valuable and useful 
suggestions that are situationally appropriate or meaningful, e.g. for professional 
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applications or policy implications (see Bennich-Bjorkman (1997); Beghetto (2013); 
Halpern, 2014; Halpern & Sternberg, 2020; Pope, 2005). 
7.3.3.3 Originality - original thinking 
Participants are interested in what students think and have to say and ideally this should 
come through a dissertation in some way. In essence, if students own original thinking 
were to come through their work, evidencing application of their intellect to the problems 
under investigation, demonstrating their understandings, impressions, perspectives and 
positions, then that could be perceived by two-thirds of participants as offering some 
original perspectives and hence present as more critical. 
7.4 RQ3: What are the challenges to achieving consistency when assessing 
for critical thinking in undergraduate students’ dissertations?  
7.4.1 Challenge 1: differing expectations of originality 
7.4.1.1 Originality as contribution to knowledge 
Opinion amongst participants was certainly divided on whether originality ought to be 
expected of final year undergraduate students. The division sits with differing 
expectations of educational levels. That originality is required at doctoral level is a given 
and collectively understood in higher education (Baptista et al., 2015). Participants 
would not dispute this. Originality is what gives a doctoral thesis the necessary 
‘doctorateness’ (Wellington, 2013). It is certainly worth noting at this point that some of 
the literature I have cited in and around originality clearly has doctoral research in focus 
(see, for example, Baptista et al., 2015; Frick et al., 2014; Lovitts, 2005; Wellington, 
2013). At master’s degree level, academics who participated in the study by Bettany-
Saltikov et al. (2009) felt that originality should be there and explicitly assessed for and 
that should affect the mark, even though a requirement for originality was not part of the 
University’s applicable assessment criteria. It is worth noting that those participants 
numbered only four and although coming from different disciplines these did not include 
any business disciplines. Moreover, the focus of my research was on final year 
undergraduate students not masters or doctoral students. These are at a comparatively 




Hilberg (2010, p.58) describes originality meaning contribution to knowledge as a “time-
honoured scholarly ideal” but questions its applicability to undergraduate students. Yet a 
third of commenting participants, what I would regard as a significant minority, feel that 
originality should be there even in undergraduate dissertations and that this would 
necessarily evidence critical thinking. The feeling is that without this a dissertation will be 
short of real understanding and value as a piece of scholarly work. One participant 
would go so far as to suggest that the assessment criteria calls for originality for higher 
grades, although this is not corroborated. Others would agree that an original 
contribution would evidence critical thinking, but would not expect it of undergraduate 
students.  
Hilberg (2010) would distinguish originality as it is commonly understood from 
independent work that offers a scholarly contribution. The latter requires of 
undergraduate students some independent working, but does not require innovation per 
se or that the student’s work should break new intellectual ground. I think Hilberg 
recognises that undergraduate students are highly unlikely to make such a 
breakthrough, given their academic stage and the generic approaches to research most 
often pursued. For Hilberg (2010) it is the independent nature of the research 
undertaken by undergraduate students that is important, not originality, arguing that 
such expectations are entirely questionable. There are always exceptional students of 
course, hence, there is recognition that originality if observed would certainly impress.  
Of concern is that differences across participants here feed into assessment practices 
leading to inconsistencies. Assessors who expect originality will actively seek it. Should 
they not find it then that is likely to lower their impression of a piece of work and hence 
the grade awarded. The converse is likely true for assessors with no such expectation. 
The absence of originality will not affect a grade if unsought; however, its appearance 




7.4.1.2 Originality as methodological creativity 
If creativity is doing something unusual per Halpern & Sternberg (2020) then a practical 
way for undergraduate students to demonstrate this in dissertations is through their 
research methodologies and methods. Participants see worth in students reaching 
beyond what they have been taught in class to engage with unfamiliar methodologies 
and methods. Participants value the bravery of students in engaging with the added 
complexity. Always assuming such engagement is successful. Otherwise, if poorly 
executed this will tend to detract, doing more harm than good.  
Participants have their individual predilections for certain methodologies and methods. 
Several participants had quite definite views on where they would place themselves on a 
quantitative versus qualitative research divide driven by background factors such as 
disciplinary and journal preferences. It is conceivable that qualitative approaches might 
afford students more opportunity for demonstrating their critical thinking, as Olivia 
suggested. I can see from my own experience of supervising undergraduate 
dissertations that qualitative approaches would tend less towards the formulaic than 
quantitative approaches, particularly with reference to replicative-style studies, which are 
predominantly quantitative in approach. Of course, colleagues who favour quantitative 
approaches may well disagree.  
Regardless of methodological preferences, all participants are looking for competent 
execution of research. However, that Zhao individually believes methodological 
distinctiveness is required of undergraduate students, and that this would influence his 
assessment, is of concern. This is not supported by the assessment criteria, nor by the 
majority of participants who favour methodological fit over creativity. Zhao may simply 
have been verbalising what he believes to be commonly understood. However, work 
with what you have, use the right tools or techniques for the job, and do not try to be 
creative for the sake of it, appears to be the majority view. Instinctively I would locate this 
within a larger debate around supervisors/assessors’ methodological preferences. 
However, Zhao volunteered his comments tangentially in the course of the conversation. 
These were not explored in detail with him, nor raised by other participants, so I am 
unable to conjecture that this points to a larger issue for consistency. On the evidence of 
the dataset, his appears a lone voice limiting the resultant inconsistency within the local 




7.4.1.3 Description and replication (as unoriginal) 
Participants deem ‘descriptive’ work unoriginal. Descriptive work is generally basic or 
simplistic, perhaps tending to the superficial, lacking in depth of thought, possibly 
unsophisticated in research terms, would report and describe more than analyse, 
interpret and synthesise, would fail to think through implications and develop 
contributions. I feel that such work could point to students operating more at the less 
developed stages of the epistemological development models of Perry (1970) and 
Baxter Magolda (1992) and hence less critical thinking.  
Replication-style research is not automatically descriptive in this sense. It is, however, 
unlikely to be perceived as creative and hence, original. Bennich-Bjorkman (1997) would 
describe replication of research as lacking originality due to the apparent absence of 
novelty. Similarly, participants perceive replication-style studies to be inherently 
unoriginal because the student follows the blueprint of a prior study. In fairness, a small 
majority of participants were positive of replication-style research, which seemingly 
lowers the risk for students in submitting work of at least passable standard. In addition, 
replication-style research can arguably aid knowledge development, helping to support 
the reliability of research findings from and the trust placed in prior studies (Baptista et 
al., 2015). This type of research can provide a contribution therefore, offering originality 
and hence evidence of critical thinking.   
Why students adopt this type of approach, apparently in large numbers in disciplines 
such as Finance, could conceivably come down to their motivation for undertaking 
research. If they view the dissertation as simply a task that they need to get through and 
finish within a limited timeframe, rather than something they care passionately about, 
then doing something that has been done before following a readymade template makes 
a lot of sense. This is especially so if, as suggested by Milo and Evelyn, students can be 
successful with this. There is nothing to prevent students from producing technically 
sophisticated work when adopting this route, which is highly valued by Oliver for 
example. If students can achieve a first class grade from an approach which arguably 
demands less initiative, creativity, originality, etc., because there is a blueprint to follow, 
and which carries less risk with the likely grade, then why wouldn’t they take this 
approach? To do otherwise would seem irrational in Economists’ terms. However, with 
the approach described as “boring” (Olga) and a “dissertation by numbers” (Florence), 
the positive views offered by Milo and Evelyn are unlikely to hold across the board. 
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Perhaps then of concern for assessment consistency the risks for students appear less 
to do with adopting a replication-style approach per se and more to do with variability in 
the cynicism of individual academics for this type of approach and any consequent 
impacts on their assessment outlooks. 
7.4.1.4 Fresh literature at the findings and analysis stage (evidencing original 
thinking through making links with other areas of literature) 
Whilst participants generally expressed the need for fit and alignment throughout a 
dissertation, in particular between the findings and the literature review, a small minority 
of participants were of the opinion that excellent students should be bringing in fresh 
literature at the findings stage, i.e. literature not covered in the earlier review, as 
evidence of original thinking.  
It occurs to me that on the one hand a dissertation could be neatly wrapped with findings 
and analysis clearly referenced back to the literature review. On the other hand, a 
dissertation could bring in additional literature to demonstrate the development of the 
thinking and potentially some originality of thought through the analytical process. In 
reality, it is unlikely that research is so procedurally formulaic that the literature review 
will encompass everything that is necessary to help explain the findings. Some 
participants find the neatness plausible, depending on the nature of the study and the 
research approach taken, for example in certain quantitative traditions where theories 
are operationalised and prescriptively tested. Others, as has been said, find research to 
be quite “messy” (Evelyn). Take, for example, a more open-ended, explorative type of 
research study, perhaps focussed on gathering and analysing qualitative data, in which 
new insights can be gleaned from iterative interpretation of the data unconstrained by 
the chosen parameters of the preceding literature review. Here, participants like Arthur 
would argue for extending the literature at the findings stage if something has emerged. 
In so doing, students are showing that they have then thought about it and have related 
it to other things that they have read, or have sought new avenues of literature to help 





What matters most for this thesis is that this points to differences in approach when it 
comes to assessment. All participants expect congruence between the literature review 
and findings. For the majority of participants that would be that. Conversely, for a 
minority of participants an extension of the literature base in response to findings would 
evidence some original thinking on the part of the student, for which credit would be 
given. It is conceivable that, subject to preference, the addition or otherwise of fresh 
literature at the findings stage could delight or jar for participants, which could then affect 
the grade and challenge consistency. 
7.4.2 Challenge 2: holistic versus additive approaches to assessment 
Participants’ descriptions suggest two categories of approach when assessing 
undergraduate dissertations: holistic and additive (akin to “impressionistic / holistic” and 
“analytic (weighting method)” per Pathirage et al., 2007, p.274). In both cases, a 
dissertation is seen as constructed from different parts, but the way in which a final 
grade is attributed to the piece differs.  
Holistic assessment practices are rife in higher education (Bloxham et al., 2011). With a 
holistic approach, the assessor reads the dissertation as a whole and forms an overall 
impression against the assessment criteria, mentally balancing all aspects, allocated as 
a single grade. This offers maximum flexibility for the assessor (Pathirage et al, 2007) 
and benefits the assessment by suspending assessor judgement until the end when the 
piece can be considered in its entirety. Nightingale et al. (1997) further claimed that a 
process of holistic assessment that encompasses complex assessment criteria 
appropriately aligns with the assessment of higher-order graduate skills such as critical 
thinking. However, the difficulty lies in that mental balancing act. Studies in the field of 
cognition have shown that characteristics inherent to complex decision-making cause 
inconsistencies in academic judgement (Brooks, 2012). Assessors must engage in 
complex mental manipulation of a set of assessment criteria, criteria that can merge and 
interact (Sadler, 2009). The process is one of juggling multiple criteria concurrently in 
multi-layers reducing to a single representation (Bloxham et al., 2011). As human beings 
our capacity to process ‘chunks’ of information simultaneously is limited, and this 
practice inevitably places considerable demands on our cognitive load (Miller, 1956; 
Yorke, 2011). Hence, the cognitive challenge of assessing against and across several 




With an additive approach, an assessor applies criteria to distinct parts of a dissertation, 
e.g. literature review, methodology and methods, findings and analysis, etc., allocating a 
series of grades to individual sections and summing to an overall grade. I anticipate this 
will lessen assessor subjectivity because of the reduced cognitive burden compared with 
a holistic approach, and through building a more detailed picture of the grade awarded. 
Whether this operates so is open to debate, particularly given the added subjectivity of 
some participants apparently devising and applying their own additive assessment 
schemes. Clearly, this would work against the added standardisation which Pathirage et 
al. (2007) claims an additive (or analytic) approach provides. Allocating grades 
analytically against each criterion through separate qualitative judgements is also 
impractical because it is time consuming (Hornby, 2003; Sadler, 2009; Yorke, 2011). 
Unsurprisingly therefore this practice was not observed in a study by Bloxham et al. 
(2011).  
In reality, the choice of approach is not a binary one of holistic versus additive. 
Participants, based on their descriptions, could be placed in either category, or in some 
cases they would blur the distinction by engaging in a hybrid approach of adding 
towards a summed grade but also forming a holistic check, with one acting as 
confirmation of the other. This presents its own difficulties. What happens if, as 
suggested by Sadler (2009), a discrepancy exists, i.e. where the sum of the parts is 
more or less than the assessor’s holistic assessment of the worth of a piece of work? 
Research suggests that an assessor faced with such a discrepancy may trust in the 
latter and override the former (see, for example, Baume et al., 2004; Grainger et al., 
2008). Perhaps they may apply a “fudge factor” to overcome perceived deficiencies in 
the criteria (Walvoord & Anderson, 2010, p.119). This can only add to the subjectivity, as 
does each participant apparently approaching the task of assessment in a way that suits 




7.4.3 Challenge 3: sharing understandings and calibrating assessment 
In principal, mandated application of official assessment criteria, and internal moderation 
of assessment via double marking processes, serve to facilitate the sharing of 
understandings and the calibration of grades. However, there are questions as to their 
effectiveness, both in the literature and in relation to the practices discussed and 
observed at the host business school.  
7.4.3.1 Assessment criteria 
Half of participants think that assessing for critical thinking in undergraduate students’ 
dissertations relies on professional judgement, combining knowledge and experience 
with gut instinct. Professional judgement is an important resource; however placing sole 
reliance on this invites inconsistency across assessors. Criterion-referencing practice 
serves to mitigate this, giving assessors an applicative base from which to judge 
students’ work. ‘Standards-based assessment rubrics’ (grade descriptors) provide 
qualitative descriptions of what is expected at different levels (Kite & Phongsavan, 
2017). The criteria set general expectations applicable across the board, seeking to 
move assessors away from personal biases. I am told that being ‘critical’ is integral to 
the criteria at the host business school, particularly as the grade scale progresses. 
However, critical thinking is an outcome with high-level cognitive demands that is not 
easily defined or measured. Whilst it is plausible to construct criteria that account for 
critical thinking, it is hugely difficult to interpret these on a consistent basis (Neil et al., 
1999; Woolf, 2004). What is ‘critical’ is not precisely specified in the criteria and I bear 
witness to what participants’ view as constituting critical thinking in students, and what 
evidences this in students’  work, can and does vary. This mirrors the literature, which 
would define critical thinking variously with no clear academic consensus on what it is 
and how it should be specified (see, for example, Baril et al., 1998; Bissell & Lemons, 
2006; Butler & Halpern, 2020; Harrell, 2011; Kek & Huijser, 2011; Lok et al., 2016; 





Consistent application of assessment criteria is important in propagating shared 
understandings between assessors to reduce bias and achieve transparency and 
consistency by and across assessors in the quality assured accountability regime of UK 
higher education (Bloxham et al., 2016b; Menendez-Varela & Gregori-Giralt, 2016). Most 
participants agreed with the use of assessment criteria, as mandated by the host 
business school, seeing the value in doing so for assessment consistency both by 
individual assessors over time and across assessors.  
Predictably, the picture is unclear when it comes to the effect of the use of assessment 
criteria on assessment reliability. Criteria are said to provide a supportive crutch to lean 
on, particularly for inexperienced assessors (Jansson et al., 2019). Yet assessors’ 
understandings, interpretations and the ways in which they combine criteria can and do 
vary (Sadler 1987, 2005, 2009). Evidently, assessors may still arrive at different grades 
for the same piece of work whilst applying the same criteria (Grainger et al., 2008). 
Some studies have shown improvements in assessment reliability following the 
introduction of criteria, if only small in extent (see, for example, Jonsson & Svingby, 
2007; Peeters et al., 2014). Others would contend otherwise (see, for example, Baume 
et al., 2004; Price, 2005; Yorke, 2008). Studies on both sides of this divide are premised 
on consistent use of criteria. Here, however, differences were apparent in how 
participants actually use the criteria. This ranges from systematically checking against 
the criteria, to having it to hand as a reminder reviewing it at intervals, to applying it in 
uncertain cases only, for example borderline grades, to applying it after the event as a 
final check on an already determined grade. It is unclear what difference this might make 
to grades and consistency of assessment, although I submit it is unlikely to aid the latter. 
Ultimately, the criteria are being used and whilst exact approaches may vary, each as a 
minimum employs the criteria as a useful check on professional judgement. However, I 
would question the effect on assessment consistency given the evident inconsistencies 
in how the criteria are actually applied.   
Going untested here also are questions of interpretation of criteria. Criteria are claimed 
to be of limited power as agents of consistency; their meaning is ‘fuzzy’ and so not 
effectively or reliably communicated (Bloxham, 2009; Bloxham et al., 2016a; Ecclestone, 
2001; Price & Rust, 1999; Sadler, 2009). Some contend that the way to deal with this is 
to work on the detail, to render criteria as clear and explicit as possible in order to 
improve collective understanding (Bloxham et al., 2016). Others question our reliance on 
criteria, claiming that this is unlikely to lead to consistent decision-making because 
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criteria can never be sufficiently clear or explicit enough to eradicate inconsistencies in 
interpretation (Bloxham et al. 2016; Sadler, 1987). Exercise of professional judgment is 
inescapable, if only to resolve this ‘fuzziness’ (Bloxham, 2009; Yorke, 2011). Criteria are 
interpreted through the lens of personal experience. Interpretations vary and are rarely 
incontestable (Bloxham et al., 2016). Hence, even consistent use of criteria, which I 
have not witnessed from participants, would not necessarily achieve consistency of 
assessment because of the likelihood of differing interpretations. 
Use of criteria has then its problems. Non-use of criteria, or substitution by one’s own 
criteria, are likely to be of even greater concern. Three participants admitted non-use, 
two of whom claimed confidence in their knowledge and understanding of the criteria 
held from long-standing use. They did not have an issue with using the criteria per se, 
rather they did not feel the need to refer to it whilst assessing undergraduate 
dissertations because they considered that they had sufficiently internalised it. However, 
I might question the accuracy of their respective recollections of the criteria. I might also 
question if these are up-to-date with any changes made over time.  
One participant, Olga, seemed ‘off on a frolic’ to use a legal term in apparently basing 
her assessments on a comparative basis across scripts with standards wrought from her 
experience. This suggests more of a norm-referenced approach, which I would think sits 
ill with the modern paradigm of quality-assured accountability, by which a student’s work 
should be assessed strictly on its own merit with reference to assessment criteria and 
without reference to the student’s peers or his or her past work (Sadler, 2009). That said 
there is a view that norm referencing does in any event tacitly inform assessment 
practices (Yorke, 2011). Assessors will inevitably compare, drawing on their knowledge 
of a student’s work and across students in making judgements. Bloxham et al. (2011), 
for example, observed assessors explicitly comparing students’ work whilst engaged in 
an ostensibly criterion-referenced assessment exercise, although the nature of the study 
– participants were required to grade two submissions of the same assignment – may 
have encouraged norm referencing through comparison. Often assessment criteria is 
itself constructed implicitly from norms and normative knowledge, and, given that 
criterion referenced assessment strategies are moored to a specific context, criteria are 
normatively interpreted in that context (Lok et al., 2016; Orr, 2007; Sadler, 2005). The 
reality is that most assessors, consciously or no, are subject to a degree of normative 
influence promoted through normative disciplinary practices (O’Hagan & Wigglesworth, 
2015; Yorke, 2011). In effect, assessors employ a mix of criterion referencing and norm 
174 
 
referencing in allocating grades in the expectation that a grade can be determined with 
reference to the former whilst respectful of the convention of the latter (Lok et al., 2016). 
This is particularly observable with ‘difficult’ decisions such as borderline grades 
(Grainger et al., 2008). From this, it is possible that Olga is not alone in apparently 
employing a degree of norm referencing, although as far as the dataset goes only Olga 
gave any indication of this.   
It is also unclear whether or to what extent the official criteria are included in Olga’s 
assessment practice. “Not very strictly” was her response when questioned as to her use 
of the criteria. It is possible that the criteria have informed Olga’s standards if she has 
used them in the past. I anticipate also that working with colleagues in the local 
assessment community, many of whom will be using the criteria, will have informed 
Olga’s standards. These, although apparently individualised, may or may not in effect 
deviate substantially from others because of such influences. However, such tacit or 
internalised criteria are a particular barrier to consistency across assessors because 
they are owned by an individual, formed from their own preferences, not necessarily 
drawn from official criteria or shared with colleagues (Baume et al., 2004; Grainger et al., 
2008; Hunter & Docherty, 2011; Price, 2005; Read et al., 2005; Shay, 2005; Webster et 
al., 2000).  
Subjectivity is claimed to be inherent to assessment and therefore inescapable (Clegg 
and Bryan, 2006). As if to prove this point, five participants made reference to adopting 
criteria of their own devising, mentally substituting this for the official criteria. Again, as 
with Olga, whilst conceivably these may be shaped by the official criteria in tandem with 
interactions with colleagues this was not explored. That some participants are apparently 
applying their own personal standards or tacit or internalised criteria would inevitably 
point to variability (see, for example Baume et al., 2004; Bloxham, 2009; Bloxham et al., 
2016; Ecclestone, 2001; Hunter & Docherty, 2011; Price, 2005; Price & Rust, 1999; 
Orrell, 2008; Read et al., 2005; Shay, 2005; Smith & Coombe, 2006; Webster et al., 




7.4.3.2 Internal moderation (double marking) 
Shay (2004, p.307) calls assessment in higher education a “socially situated interpretive 
act”. Within a socio-cultural framework, learning is jointly constructed not passively 
acquired. Shared understandings develop from members operating closely together in a 
local context, sharing reflections and engaging in structured conversations (Bloxham, 
2009; Bloxham & Price, 2015; Maxwell, 2010; Menendez-Varela & Gregori-Giralt, 2016; 
Stupans, March & Owen, 2013). The meanings attributable to assessment criteria, for 
example, can only be operationalised in a specific context, with a specific group of 
assessors who calibrate collective understandings through a process of socially situated 
co-construction and interpretation informed by the tacit knowledge of members (Baird, 
Greatorex & Bell, 2004; Bloxham & Price, 2015; Bloxham et al, 2015; O’Donovan et al., 
2004; Rust, O’Donovan and Price, 2005; Shay, 2008). 
The host business school has a system of internal moderation via double marking, 
whereby two assessors independently assess a dissertation and then meet to meet to 
compare, discuss and agree upon a final grade. This, as with any system of internal 
moderation, plays a fundamental role in quality assuring assessment practices (Beutel et 
al., 2017). Ecclestone (2001) refers to the dangers of unconscious bias that each 
assessor may hold built over time in post. The aim of internal moderation is to improve 
consistency (Grainger et al., 2016; Sadler, 2013). Discussions between assessors over 
standards, if collegial, could serve to minimise such biases (Yorke, 2011). Moderation 
meetings between assessors bring out comparative views, helping assessors to get a 
sense of what they are looking for with respect to the assessment criteria, to understand 
what they are picking out as critical or uncritical in dissertations, to get a feel for where 
they and their expectations are relative to others. These discussions, held within local 
disciplinary assessment communities, are key to developing shared understandings and 
so aid assessment consistency (O’Hagan & Wigglesworth, 2015; Price, Carroll, 
O’Donovan & Rust, 2011). This then is a key mechanism for sharing knowledge and 
developing shared understandings amongst assessors (Grainger et al., 2016). 
Participants confirmed this by two-thirds majority. Participants also confirmed that 
questions over critical thinking in undergraduate dissertations are invariably worked 




Moderation thus forms an important element of socialisation through which assessors 
collectively cultivate local standards (Reimann et al., 2010). Meanings are constituted 
through shared practice and dialogue within the particular social context (Bloxham et al., 
2015; Shay, 2004). Members of the local assessment community learn from each other. 
In particular, newer members learn from more experienced members, evolving their 
understandings, calibrating their expectations and developing a ‘feel for the game’ (to 
paraphrase Bourdieu). Calibration of standards is not a technical matter but a shared 
interpretive act bounded by and limited to a local context (Bloxham et al., 2015). It 
follows that the longer a member is a part of this community, interacting with colleagues 
in various ways but particularly through the moderation mechanism, the more 
understandings of critical thinking will converge and the more grades will calibrate. 
Through moderation, assessors gradually absorb criteria that are implicit to their 
community and necessarily rely upon the interpretive support provided by their 
community to form understandings (Jawitz, 2009; O’Connell et al., 2016). This 
necessarily assumes a degree of stability in that local assessment community at the host 
business school, which I have observed from participants backgrounds especially at the 
experienced end.  
In theory then, internal moderation via double marking should generate shared 
understandings and calibrate dissertation assessment. That said there are I think 
impediments at the host business school to how this works in practice. Let us take, for 
example, a limitation on sharing. For the most part, an assessor is paired with only a 
limited number of other assessors, subject to volume. The dissertation module leader 
decides the pairing allocations, not assessors, although they may make representations 
to the module leader as to with whom they would wish to be paired. Occasional 
representations aside, I observed the allocation process to be incremental, i.e. it was set 
some years ago and has largely remained static from year to year, incrementally 
adjusted by the module leader as members join and leave. This limits the degree of 
mixing between assessors and hence the degree of sharing of understandings and 
calibration of assessment outwith small pockets of assessors. Understandings and 
calibration are not necessarily translating across disciplinary and school communities of 
assessors therefore. The effectiveness then of internal moderation as a mechanism for 




7.5 Brief summary 
In this discussion chapter, I returned to the three research questions I posited in the 
introductory chapter, namely: 
RQ1: How do business school academics conceptualise critical thinking?  
RQ2: How are business school academics’ conceptualisations of critical thinking 
operationalised through assessment practices?  
RQ3: What are the challenges to achieving consistency when assessing for critical 
thinking in undergraduate students’ dissertations?  
I began, in answer to RQ1, by presenting the construct of critical thinking for participants 
as business school academics as a composite of skills (of argumentation), dispositions 
and originality, drawing on my findings from Chapter 5. I followed this, in answer to RQ2, 
with consideration of how this concept of critical thinking is operationalised by 
participants when they assess undergraduate dissertations, examining what participants 
look for from students as evidence of their critical thinking, again drawing heavily on my 
findings from Chapter 5 but also aspects from Chapter 6. Responding then to RQ3, I 
discussed the apparent challenges to assessment consistency born of inconstant 
approaches and less than effective institutional mitigating mechanisms, drawing on my 
findings from Chapter 6.     
I now look to conclude this thesis in the following chapter. I begin with an overview from 
initial premises through to a summary of key findings related to the research questions, 
RQ1-RQ3 inclusive, before developing some points of theoretical and practical 
significance arising from this research. I then make recommendations for extension 







In this, the eighth and final chapter, I draw this thesis to a close. I begin with a brief 
overview of this thesis, from the research rationale drawing on aspects of the critical 
thinking and assessment literature building to three key research questions, RQ1-RQ3 
inclusive, then to how the research proceeded through to the development of themes in 
answer to those research questions. Key findings, detailed in Chapters 5 and 6 and 
further discussed in Chapter 7, are then summarised, following which I draw the 
significance of this thesis in terms of theoretical contributions and practical implications 
for the host business school and potentially beyond. Finally, I offer suggestions for 
further research to extend the work of this thesis before concluding with some brief 
closing remarks.   
8.2 Thesis overview 
I introduced this thesis in Chapter 1, outlining its inspiration, parameters and setting. 
Critical thinking may be a defining concept of higher education, and a term used 
pervasively, particularly with respect to assessment, yet it is a difficult term to get to grips 
with lacking as it does clear definition, specification and conceptualisation. High stakes 
assessment is a central function of higher education and significant efforts have been 
made to improve fairness in assessment through greater accountability and 
transparency, yet research continues to demonstrate difficulties and variability, 
particularly with regard to assessment of complex aspects such as critical thinking.  
It seems that critical thinking is of huge importance to assessment in higher education. 
However, what exactly is critical thinking in this context? How is it discerned? How is it 
assessed in undergraduate students’ work? What are the challenges to achieving 
consistency in this? I sought to investigate this through a case study of a UK university 
business school, building a participant sample of academics across five business-related 
subject disciplines who would have an understanding of critical thinking in context, who 
would have experience of assessing for critical thinking in undergraduate students’ 




Data collection produced transcribed data from twenty-one semi-structured interviews, 
the format of which included an element of document elicitation involving assessed 
undergraduate dissertations. From detailed thematic analysis, following the approach of 
Braun and Clarke (2006), I developed two distinct themes: (1) Facets of an 
undergraduate student as critical thinker (detailed in Chapter 5); and (2) Approaches to 
assessment: convergence, differences and mitigation (detailed in Chapter 6). Together 
these themes capture the essence and key aspects of the dataset as I have interpreted 
them. I then examined these themes set against RQ1-RQ3 inclusive in relation to a 
literature base of critical thinking and assessment in higher education (detailed in 
Chapter 7). 
8.3 Key findings summarised 
8.3.1 RQ1: How do business school academics conceptualise critical thinking?  
Theme 1 portrays how participants in this study conceptualise critical thinking in their 
particular higher education context. This concept is comprised of skills (of 
argumentation); originality (creativity, contribution and original thinking); and headline 
dispositions amalgamated from smaller groupings (scepticism, open-mindedness and 
flexibility).  
Firstly, skills of argumentation are central to how participants’ conceptualise critical 
thinking. This mirrors the first part of the Delphi Project consensus statement (See 
Facione, 1990) and follows the argumentation as critical thinking approach of the study 
skills texts (see, for example, Cottrell, 2017) which is prevalent in higher education. 
These critical thinking skills manifest for participants in the way that undergraduate 
students structure their arguments and support these with evidence, i.e. they look for 
arguments that are structurally robust and evidentially sound as indicative of the 
exercise of critical thinking. Students can demonstrate their critical thinking through 
constructing valid, believable, logically structured and reasoned arguments that avoid 
contradictions, and which build from legitimate premises through to sensible and 
substantiated conclusions, supported by suitable evidence such as referencing, 




Secondly, in tandem with the necessary skills, students who are critical thinkers will 
exhibit certain dispositions. Theme 1 portrays a distilled localised list comprised of 
scepticism (incorporating curiosity and inquisitiveness); open-mindedness (incorporating 
prudence, tolerance of ambiguity, appreciation of individual differences); and flexibility 
(incorporating persistence and self-correction). Scepticism – students as critical thinkers 
take nothing for granted and question all. Open-mindedness – students as critical 
thinkers are curious and inquisitive, open to alternatives and willing to examine them, 
weighing up the debates before adopting justifiable positions. Flexibility – students as 
critical thinkers are not wedded to their beliefs, are willing and able to change views 
where appropriate, are unfazed by problems and are able to adapt.  
Thirdly, for some participants, students who are critical thinkers will demonstrate some 
originality, be it creativity through innovation, novelty, etc., or contribution to knowledge 
whether theoretical, methodological, practical, professional or policy related, or original 
thinking evidencing application of their intellect, their understandings, impressions, 
perspectives and positions. However, that originality should be expected of 
undergraduate dissertation students was not universally accepted by participants. 
Opinion was very much divided on this. Originality would certainly impress and, whether 
expected or not for the level, originality was routinely discussed by participants and it 
does form part of the conceptualisation here of critical thinking.  
Fourthly, I offer an addition to what has gone before in terms of conceptualising critical 
thinking in higher education more broadly, i.e. knowledge, comprised of subject 
knowledge and epistemological development. This is fundamental to the abilities of 
students to engage in critical thinking. Deep subject knowledge and the skills and 
dispositions indicative of higher stages of the epistemological development models of 
Perry (1970) and Baxter Magolda (1992). These models speak to what is and is not 
‘critical’ in students’ work, reflecting participants’ expectations of final year 
undergraduate students. This is of particular relevance to assessment of critical thinking 




8.3.2 RQ2: How are business school academics’ conceptualisations of critical 
thinking operationalised through assessment practices? 
Critical thinking as concept is operationalised in assessment practices through what 
participants look for from students as evidence of their critical thinking. The findings in 
Chapters 5 and 6, further discussed in Chapter 7, consider this in the context of final 
year undergraduate dissertations, offering practical examples of what for participants 
would signal critical thinking and how and where such signals might be located.   
Firstly, participants expect that the necessary skills of argumentation are put to use in 
forming cogent arguments that are well structured, with due attention to logic and 
reasoning, and backed by suitable evidence. Participants expect that students, as critical 
thinkers, are able not only to deconstruct the arguments of others, but also to build their 
own arguments, structured and evidenced appropriately to convince. Participants expect 
that students as critical thinkers will develop and promote their own viewpoints, informed 
from their interrogation, analysis and evaluation of the ideas and arguments of others.  
Secondly, participants look for the necessary dispositional elements to be displayed, i.e. 
that students are sceptical, both of the world and of themselves; that students are open-
minded, open to multiple perspectives and alternative arguments carefully weighed to 
arrive at their own defensible positions; that students are flexible, able to solve 
problems, overcome challenges and adapt their thinking.  
Thirdly, that originality ‘may’ be expected of students, manifest in the exercise of 
creativity or in contributing to knowledge or in offering some original thoughts (‘may’ as 
this expectation is contested with respect to undergraduate students). Creativity relates 
to students thinking differently about their research topics and the problems at hand. 
This may be evidenced by some element of novelty, for example by students going 
beyond the norm in their approaches to research and thereby exceeding participants’ 
expectations. Students can contribute to knowledge by identifying gaps in the literature, 
or by offering valuable and useful suggestions that are situationally appropriate or 
meaningful, for example professional applications or policy implications. Participants are 
interested in what students think and have to say and this can evidence some original 





8.3.3 RQ3: What are the challenges to achieving consistency when assessing 
for critical thinking in undergraduate students’ dissertations?  
From Theme 2, the challenges to assessment consistency derive from apparent 
inconsistencies in participants’ assessment practices, born from differences in how 
participants conceptualise and operationalise critical thinking (with reference to RQ1 and 
RQ2 above), and from personal choice of approach. Notwithstanding the efforts of the 
host business school to standardise and communicate the requirements for assessing 
dissertations, inexact conceptualisations of critical thinking and inconstant approaches to 
assessing dissertations were apparent. Differences here would point to the likelihood of 
assessment variation. 
Participants would generally concur on the necessity for students to have the right skills 
(of argumentation) and possess the right dispositions (scepticism; open-mindedness; 
and flexibility) for critical thinking to occur. Participants would also generally concur that 
originality is a further important component of students displaying their critical thinking, 
but would disagree on their expectations vis-à-vis undergraduate students. For practical 
purposes, with final year undergraduate students in mind, differences were evident in 
whether and/or to what extent originality is required; whether and/or to what extent 
methodological creativity is required; whether and/or to what extent replicative-style 
research is acceptable; and if fresh literature should be brought in at the findings and 
analysis stage of a dissertation evidencing original thinking. Differences of opinion here 
manifest in differing expectations of undergraduate students again pointing to the 
likelihood of assessment variation. 
The host business school expects assessors to take a holistic approach to the 
assessment of undergraduate dissertations. This is apparent from communication 
mechanisms, i.e. instructions given to assessors through the dissertation module 
handbook and an annual communications meeting; also through the stipulated 
application of official assessment criteria to a dissertation as a whole and not in parts. 
Nevertheless, individual approaches varied. Some participants employed a holistic 
approach, others additive and others still a combination blurring the distinction, borne of 
individual preference. Most but not all participants would agree with the use of the official 
assessment criteria. However, where some participants would claim to apply the criteria 
religiously, others would claim not at all (substituting their own criteria, or in one case 
comparing across scripts), some in part, and some only as a post-hoc check, 
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corroboration or justification. Even those participants who advocate applying the criteria 
in full may not necessarily interpret the wording of the criteria in quite the same way, 
pointing to potential variation. The evident lack of consistency of approach, coupled with 
differing interpretations of criteria and ways of applying the criteria, would seem to invite 
variation. 
The double marking internal moderation mechanism of the host business school 
potentially has a major role to play in facilitating shared understandings, in filtering 
approaches, and in calibrating assessors’ expectations within the local assessment 
community, in order to offset inconsistencies in interpretation and approach and thereby 
reduce the likelihood of assessment variation. This is subject to the ongoing stability of 
the academic faculty, and given enough time for calibration to occur. However, the 
internal moderation process as enacted at the host business school is subject to 
deficiencies that are likely to reduce its effectiveness. For example, in the relatively static 
pairings of assessors from year to year and concomitant limitations on mixing and 
sharing within the local assessment community. The process does not necessarily fix the 
causes of variation therefore.   
8.4 Significance of the findings 
8.4.1 Theoretical contributions 
Clarification of how participants as business school academics conceptualise critical 
thinking as a set of skills and dispositions (RQ1), and understanding how they 
operationalise this through their assessment practices (RQ2), add to the extant 
knowledge on critical thinking in higher education.   
Whilst skills and dispositions are confirmatory, originality is specifically foregrounded 
here unlike the listings in the Delphi Project consensus statement and subsequently 
developed models of critical thinking in higher education (see, for example, the models 
of Halonen (1995) and Davies (2015)). Participants see originality, and hence critical 
thinking, in students being creative, in students contributing to knowledge and in 
students offering some original thoughts. Whilst the presence of originality was not 
universally required of undergraduate dissertation students by participants, it was clear 
that originality does form an important part of the concept of critical thinking in the higher 




A further addition to this contextualised conceptualisation of critical thinking is the 
suggested link between models of epistemological development and assessors’ 
expectations of critical thinking in final year undergraduate students. This is premised on 
the levels or ‘ways of knowing’ in the models of Perry (1970) and Baxter Magolda (1992) 
speaking to what is and is not ‘critical’ in undergraduate students’ work. I submit that 
these models, in capturing the epistemological development of university students, are 
reflective of academics’ expectations of students and their work at different academic 
stages. Higher levels of these models reflect what participants in this study are looking 
for when assessing for critical thinking in undergraduate dissertations.     
These aspects add to our theoretical understanding of critical thinking in higher 
education, albeit localised to a specific business school setting. However, potentially the 
findings may be transferable to other higher education settings including other business 
schools based on Stake’s naturalistic generalisation (refer to s.4.6.5 and s.4.8.3 for 
further discussion of this point).  
8.4.2 Practical implications 
The practical implications of this thesis are twofold. 
Firstly, I have sought to demonstrate how critical thinking as concept is operationalised 
by participants through assessment. I have shown what participants expect of final year 
undergraduate students as regards critical thinking and what they look for specifically as 
evidence of this when assessing for critical thinking in undergraduate students’ 
dissertations. Business school academics can compare their own understandings with 
this, which could be confirmatory and/or illuminating. Business school students too can 
learn from this illustration of what academics are looking for as evidence of critical 
thinking in undergraduate dissertations, helping them also to develop the necessary ‘feel 




Secondly, I have highlighted several challenges to consistency when assessing for 
critical thinking in undergraduate dissertations. These derive partly from individual 
variations in how critical thinking is conceptualised, for example differences as to what 
constitutes originality, and whether and/or to what extent originality is required; and 
partly from varying approaches to assessment, for example the choice of holistic, 
additive or a combination of approaches. Institutional mechanisms potentially have a 
major role to play in facilitating shared understandings of critical thinking as concept, and 
the operationalisation of this through assessment, serving to reduce variation. However, 
the mechanisms are fallible, which limits their effectiveness.  
Critical thinking is at the heart of a university education, at least in the traditions of the 
Western world. We expect students to move beyond passive reception of that which is 
given as known through to active engagement in critical thinking. High stakes 
assessment is a central function of higher education and a crucial factor in determining 
future study and career opportunities (Lok et al., 2016; O’Hagan & Wigglesworth, 2015).  
Students who demonstrate greater critical thinking necessarily attain higher grades. It is 
crucial therefore that we get this right. I hope that the host business school can learn 
from these points to improve its assessment practices. More broadly, I hope, subject to 
the limits of transferability (refer s.4.6.4), that other higher education institutions, 
including but not necessarily limited to business schools, might find their own resonance 
with these points leading to action and improvements in their practices.  
 
8.5 Further research 
This research is localised to one business school within a UK university. As a single 
case study, this could be useful at the outset of theory generation (Benbasat, Goldstein 
& Mead, 1987) or, as here, for adding to our understanding of existing theory through 
clarification and augmentation. Appreciably the findings cannot be generalised in the 
traditional sense beyond the context of the case, although to repeat I hope that readers 
might find for a degree of transferability with respect to their own contexts through the 
description of the case and discussion of its findings. To aid this further, this thesis might 





 This research could be augmented by additional primary research in the present 
case setting to enable more informed triangulation of findings; for example, 
detailed participant observation of assessment processes including double 
markers’ meetings.  
 
 The pre-interview questionnaire and interview schedule included questions on 
how participants had come to know what critical thinking is and how their 
understandings had developed over time. Participants did offer some interesting 
if occasional views on this. Overall, answers were sparse, insufficient for detailed 
findings and discussion I would say. Personally, I am interested in these aspects 
and feel that it would be worthwhile revisiting these questions with participants in 
more detail in a tangential study.   
 
 This research could be followed by an action research project to build 
improvements into the assessment systems of the host business school and 
monitor success. Findings from such a study could have wider applicability and 
implications for assessment systems more broadly in higher education. 
 
 This research could be replicated at the host business school with larger 
numbers of participants from each of the five academic disciplines of accounting, 
Accounting, Business and Management, Marketing, Finance and Economics. 
This may allow for more nuanced comparisons and findings on disciplinary lines, 
examining also the question of whether critical thinking is a generic skill or 
disciplinary-specific.  
 
 This research could be replicated with student participants to generate 
comparative views of what critical thinking is and how it may be evidenced for 
assessment purposes. The absence of student voices is not a limitation of this 
thesis because the focus is firmly directed at investigating academics’ 
perceptions. However, students’ perceptions are also important, particularly given 
the suggested addition of knowledge incorporating epistemological development 
to the concept of critical thinking as assessed in higher education. Students’ 
perceptions are similarly worthy of investigation and of comparison with the 






 This single case study could be followed by a multiple case study, involving 
several business schools from a variety of universities in the UK and beyond. 
This research in part challenges and amends existing models of critical thinking 
in higher education. The findings could be examined in more detail through 
multiple cases.  
 
 The existing interview dataset might be revisited with a new research question 
focussed on adding to the generalist vs. specifist debate, i.e. whether critical 
thinking is a generic skill or a disciplinary specific one, assessing for patterns 
along business school subject disciplinary lines in conceptualisations of critical 
thinking.  
 
8.6 Closing remarks 
At the outset of this thesis, I reported the personal inspiration behind this research 
coming from my own transition to the higher education sector from professional 
accountancy practice. I wanted to know if my understanding of critical thinking, the 
importance and substance of which I had come to know subsequently over several 
years as an academic, was individual to me or shared with others. Moreover, I wanted to 
know if understandings were shared across a business school, if differences exist and 
how this might influence assessment. I feel I have a better understanding from having 
progressed this research but also now greater appreciation of the complexity. There is 
much commonality but also differences such that whilst I have portrayed a 
conceptualisation that is held generally I recognise that there is no unitary definition or 
conceptualisation held across the host business school. Evident challenges to 
assessment consistency arise from this and other issues as discussed.   
Overall, this research contributes to the discussion of critical thinking in higher education 
as concept, with specific reference to the host business school forming the case study. It 
further contributes by examining the concept of critical thinking as operationalised 
through the assessment of final year undergraduate dissertations, highlighting also the 




I have offered some small theoretical contributions through a contextualised 
conceptualisation of critical thinking in higher education. This confirms what we already 
think we know in many respects but adds by highlighting the contested issue of 
originality for participants, and linking models of epistemological development now with 
assessment of critical thinking and not just the pedagogy of teaching critical thinking, 
which to my knowledge is hitherto untapped.  
I have also suggested some practical implications. Firstly, in specifying what participants 
look for as evidence of students’ critical thinking when they are assessing undergraduate 
dissertations. This could be of use to both academics and students. Secondly, in 
illuminating several challenges to assessment consistency, including differing priorities 
with respect to aspects of critical thinking, differing approaches to assessment, and the 
pros and cons of institutional mechanisms put in place to mitigate variation. These could 
be of use to the host business school and other higher education institutions in 
improving practices. 
Limitations (refer s.4.6) reveal that this study, as with any piece of research, is not 
perfect. However, I have sought to mitigate for the limitations within the operational 
constraints to which I am subject, and I have sought to provide sufficient information to 
enable readers to consider the relevance of the findings for their own settings, potentially 
then informing decision-making, policy and practice. I further set out my own reflexive 
position on this research to allay concerns of subjectivity, which I have in any event 
embraced (refer s.1.3).  
I hope that the findings of this thesis can be used to help improve the sharing of our 
understandings of critical thinking in higher education and for the betterment of 
assessment practices benefiting academics and students at the host business school 











Appendix B: Participant Information Sheet 
Research participant information sheet    
     
Study title: A study of critical thinking: conceptualisation and operationalisation 
in assessment practices.  
 
I would like to invite you to take part in a doctoral research study which is sponsored by 
Durham University Business School. Before you decide I would like you to understand 
why this research is being carried out and what it would involve. This information sheet 
explains the purpose of the study and what will happen if you participate. It also provides 
details about the practical arrangements for the study and how we will ensure that the 
information you provide is treated confidentially. Full contact details are also provided at 
the end of this document in case you would like clarification on any point or if you have 
any questions. 
 
What is the purpose of this study? 
 
Higher education students are ultimately differentiated by their performance in 
summative assessment, the results of which have ramifications for seeking employment 
or access to higher level education programmes. Evidence of critical thinking is generally 
required for higher-level attainment. This study aims to investigate how higher education 
tutors conceptualise critical thinking, to what extent the concept is shared and how tutors 
apply the concept when assessing dissertations. 
 
Why have I been invited? 
 
The study is focused on higher education tutors who supervise and assess dissertations.  
 
Do I have to take part? 
 
No, your participation is entirely voluntary. If you decide to participate, you are free to 
withdraw at any time without any negative consequences for you. 
 
What will I have to do? 
 
Simply confirm your agreement to take part in the study directly with the researcher, who 
will then get in touch to make the interview arrangements. The researcher’s full contact 
details are also provided at the end of this document. If you decide to take part you will 
be asked to complete and return a brief questionnaire in advance of a face-to-face 
interview with the researcher. These will involve answering some questions about 
processes for marking dissertations and discussion of work you identify as evidencing 
critical thinking. The interview should take no more than 45 minutes of your time. The 
process may (if necessary) with your permission be repeated after an appropriate period 
of time, anticipated to be six months to a year. 
 
 
What are the possible disadvantages of taking part? 
 
The researcher does not consider there to be any disadvantages of taking part as your 
responses will be anonymous and confidential. You are not being judged. You can 




What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
 
The researcher hopes this study will aid understanding of critical thinking conceptually 
and as applied in assessment practices. 
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
 
The information that you provide will be anonymous and treated confidentially at all 
stages of the research and dissemination process. You will receive a copy of the 
interview transcription so you can check this for accuracy. 
 
Data storage and access 
 
All data will be stored securely in electronic and hard-copy format in compliance with the 
requirements of data protection legislation and associated Durham University School of 
Education regulations. A coding scheme will be employed to maintain your anonymity; it 
will not be possible to identify you directly or indirectly. No-one except the researcher 
and his academic supervisors will have access to the data. All members of the research 
team are bound by a strict code of ethics as academics of Durham University.  
 
Use of the data 
 
The anonymous data (which will not contain any personally identifiable information) 
collected for this study will form a key component of the researcher’s doctoral thesis. It 





Data will be held securely and subsequently disposed of in accordance with Durham 
University School of Education policy. 
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
 
The research is being organised and funded by Durham University Business School as 
part of a doctoral research programme. Gavin D’Northwood, Associate Professor 
(Teaching) in Accounting and part-time doctoral researcher will be undertaking the 
research. Gavin is supported by his academic Supervisors, Dr. Julie Rattray and Dr. 
Jonathan Tummons of Durham University School of Education.   
 
Expenses and payments 
 




Who has reviewed this study? 
 
This research has received ethical approval from Durham University School of Education 




Further information and contact details 
 
If you would like any additional information about this project or have questions about 
the purpose of the research or how it will be carried out, please contact Gavin 




Appendix C: Pre-interview questionnaire (Pilot 1/Main) 
Research Interview Pre-Questionnaire 
 
Study title: Conceptualising and operationalising assessment of critical thinking in 
Higher Education 
 
Researcher: Gavin D’Northwood, Associate Professor (Teaching) in Accounting,  
Durham University Business School. 
    
Question 1     
 
Evidence of ‘critical thinking’ is generally required for higher marks on dissertations.  












Question 2     
 
Thinking about the most recent batch of dissertations that you have marked, can you tell me 
what you were looking for as evidence of critical thinking (up to 5 points)? 
From your experience of marking dissertations, what would you look for when assessing 














Can you think of a specific example of where you have seen ‘critical thinking’ in a 













How do you think you have come to know what to look for when assessing critical thinking in 


















Appendix D: Pre-interview questionnaire (Pilot 2) 
Research Interview Pre-Questionnaire 
 
Study title: Conceptualising and operationalising assessment of critical thinking in 
Higher Education 
 
Researcher: Gavin D’Northwood, Senior Teaching Fellow in Accounting,  
Durham University Business School. 
    
Question 1     
 
Evidence of critical thinking is generally required for higher marks on dissertations.  













How do you think you first came to understand what is meant by critical thinking in the 















Question 3     
 
Thinking about the most recent batch of dissertations that you marked, can you explain what 
you were looking for as evidence of critical thinking (up to 5 points)? 
From your experience of marking dissertations, what would you look for when assessing 










Can you think of a specific example of where you have seen critical thinking in a 


















How do you think you have come to know what to look for when assessing critical thinking in 
dissertations? What would you regard as instrumental in shaping this from your earliest 























Appendix E: Semi-structured interview guide (Pilot 2) 
Research Interview Guide 
 
Introduction 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this research project, in which I am investigating 
how critical thinking is understood as a concept by higher education tutors like yourself, 
to what extent that concept is shared amongst tutors and how tutors apply the concept 
when assessing dissertations. As indicated when I approached you to set up this 
interview I will be recording this discussion for later transcription and analysis. I trust this 
is ok with you? 
Just to reiterate that your continuing participation is entirely voluntary and you are 
therefore free to withdraw at any time. Are we ok to continue? 
I’m going to start with some questions on the dissertation marking process before re-
visiting your answers to the pre-interview questionnaire, which you kindly completed 
prior to this interview, and finally then consider two examples from your most recent 
batch of dissertation marking.   
Initial Questions 
Q1. As a starting point, could you give me a brief history of your experience of 
teaching and assessing in your particular specialism? 
Q2. Thinking of dissertations in particular, can you describe the process of marking 
and explain how you go about it? 
Q3. What factors are important to you when marking dissertations? 
Q4. What for you differentiates dissertations at different bands or grading levels? 
Q5. How for you do written assessment criteria fit into the process of marking 
dissertations? 
Artefact 1 – Pre-interview questionnaire 
Discussion follows of the pre-interview questionnaire (Critical Thinking and assessment) 
– specifically, any questions and/or clarifications I might have following review prior to 
the interview. The questions from the pre-interview questionnaire are reprised here: 
Q5. Evidence of critical thinking is generally required for higher marks on 
dissertations. Can you describe what this means to you? 
 
Q6. Thinking about the most recent batch of dissertations that you have marked, can 
you explain what you were looking for as evidence of critical thinking (up to 5 
points)? 
Q7. Can you think of a specific example of where you have seen critical thinking in a 
dissertation? Can you identify how critical thinking was shown in that example? 
Q8. How do you think you have come to know what to look for when assessing critical 
thinking in dissertations? Do you feel your knowledge and understanding have 
developed over time? 
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Artefacts 2 and 3 – 2 x example dissertations  
Prior to this interview you have been engaged in marking dissertations and were asked 
to separate out two examples, one which rates highly for critical thinking and one which 
rates low or at least less so. For each of these, can you describe the differing levels of 





Appendix F: Data analysis coding lists 
 
Coding - 1st round 
 
Headings Codes Number of 
interviews 
tagged 
Critical thinking - importance 4 
Facets of critical thinking  
 Facet – argument 18 
 Facet – big picture (able to see) 6 
 Facet – creativity 12 
 Facet – critique 9 
 Facet – independent-mindedness 0 
 Facet – inquisitiveness 5 
 Facet – knowledge 1 
 Facet – logic and reasoning 9 
 Facet – open-mindedness 13 
 Facet – problem solving 2 
 Facet - scepticism 10 
Finding critical thinking in dissertations  
 Critical thinking proxies 2 
 Dissertation (1) Introduction – context 5 
 Dissertation (1) Introduction – negatives 2 
 Dissertation (1) Introduction – positives 7 
 Dissertation (1) Introduction – setting up the 
research 
16 
 Dissertation (2) Literature Review – negatives 
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Sub-codes Number of 
interviews 
coded  
 Dissertation (3) Methodology and methods – 
negatives 
9 
 Dissertation (3) Methodology and methods – 
positives 
18 
 Dissertation (3) Methodology and methods – 
Quants vs. Qualitative 
5 
 Dissertation (4) Findings analysis and 
discussion - negatives 
8 
 Dissertation (4) Findings analysis and 
discussion - positives 
18 
 Dissertation (5) Conclusions - negatives 2 
 Dissertation (5) Conclusions – positives 
(contribution) 
14 
 Dissertation (5) Conclusions – positives 
(limitations) 
12 
 Dissertation (5) Conclusions – positives 
(reflection) 
4 
 Dissertation (5) Conclusions – positives 
(research rigour) 
4 
 Dissertation (5) Conclusions – positives (top and 
tail) 
11 
 Dissertation (6) Holistic points – negatives 11 
 Dissertation (6) Holistic points - positives 17 
 Dissertation – approach 7 
 Dissertation – communication 11 
 Dissertation – originality (no) 11 
 Dissertation – originality (yes) 
 
6 
 Dissertation – structure 16 











 Criteria (and critical thinking) 3 
 Criteria – negatives (feedback match) 8 
 Criteria – negatives (not used) 5 
 Criteria – negatives (tacit or internal) 5 
 Criteria – positives 11 
 Criteria – positives (used) 17 
 Criteria (post hoc) 5 
 Experience counts 9 
 Holistic assessment 7 
 Constructed mark 6 
 Forming a mark 3 
 Professional judgement 11 
Learning what critical thinking is  
 Learning through research 8 
 Learning through subject immersion 2 
 Learning through studying for qualifications 3 
 Learning through supervising and marking 6 
 Learning through working with academic 
colleagues (academic communities) 
7 
 Learning through working with academic 
colleagues (joint marking conversations) 
9 
 Learning through working with academic 
colleagues (mentoring conversations) 
3 
Making tacit knowledge (critical thinking in dissertations) explicit  
 Barriers 1 





Appendix G: Data analysis coding lists 
 
Coding – 2nd round 
 
Headings Sub-headings Codes Number of 
interviews 
tagged 
Category 1 – critical thinking experienced as an aspect of 
assessment processes 
 
 Grading  
  Criteria – link to critical thinking 2 
  Criteria – negatives (feedback 
match) 
8 
  Criteria – negatives (not used) 5 
  Criteria – negatives (post hoc 
check) 
7 
  Criteria – negatives (restrictions) 5 
  Criteria – negatives (subjectivity) 7 
  Criteria – negatives (tacit or 
internal) 
5 
  Criteria – positives (clarity) 5 
  Criteria – positives (consistency) 7 
  Criteria – positives (objectivity) 7 
  Criteria – positives (used) 16 
  Holistic assessment 7 
  Constructed mark 6 
  Forming a mark 3 
  Professional judgement 11 
 Making tacit knowledge (critical thinking in 
dissertations) explicit 
 
  Barriers 1 





Headings Sub-headings Codes Number of 
interviews 
tagged 
Category 2 – critical thinking experienced as facets of a critical 
thinker 
 
 Facets of a critical thinker  
  Facet – argument 18 
  Facet – big picture (able to see) 6 
  Facet – creativity 12 
  Facet – critique 9 
  Facet – inquisitiveness 5 
  Facet – logic and reasoning 9 
  Facet – open-mindedness 14 
  Facet - scepticism 12 
Category 3 – critical thinking experienced as an aspect of 
undergraduate dissertations 
 
 Finding critical thinking in undergraduate 
dissertations 
 
 Dissertation (1) - Introduction  
  Setting up the research 16 
  Contextual base 6 
  Focus – aims, objectives 14 
  Interest and motivation 12 
  Literature base 7 
  Originality – no 11 
  Originality – yes 6 
 Dissertation (2) – Literature review  
  Negative - description 16 
  Negative – focus 2 
  Negative – references 5 
  Negative – selectivity 2 
  Positive – compare and contrast 16 
  Positive – conceptualisation 4 
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Headings Sub-headings Codes Number of 
interviews 
tagged 
  Positive – critique 3 
  Positive – depth 5 
  Positive – evaluation 7 
  Positive – identify the gap 8 
  Positive – references 10 
  Positive – RQ-LR-Methodological 
fit) 
14 
  Positive – scope 11 
  Positive – synthesis 7 
  Positive – thematic 6 
  Positive – theorisation 10 
 Dissertation (3) – Methodology  
  Negative – generic 2 
  Negative – replication studies 5 
  Negative – research rigour 3 
  Negative – RQ-LR-Methodological 
fit 
6 
  Positive – flexibility  5 
  Positive – replication studies 3 
  Positive – research rigour 9 
  Positive – RQ-LR-Methodological fit 
(alignment) 
10 




 Dissertation (4) Findings analysis and discussion  
  Negative – analysis & interpretation 9 
  Negative – description 2 
  Negative – evidence 2 
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Headings Sub-headings Codes Number of 
interviews 
tagged 
  Negative – RQ-LR-Methodological-
F&A fit 
3 
  Negative - synthesis (LR) 2 
  Positive – analysis & interpretation 13 
  Positive – insight 3 
  Positive – theorisation 6 
  Positive – evaluation 2 
  Positive - evidence 3 
  Positive – RQ-LR-Methodological-
F&A fit 
4 
  Positive – synthesis (LR) 15 
 Dissertation (5) Conclusions  
  Contribution 15 
  Limitations 13 
  Reflection 4 
  Research rigour 4 
  Top & tail 12 
 Dissertation (6) Holistic points  
  Consistency 16 
  Negative – basic 6 
  Negative – consistency 9 
  Positive – consistency 13 
  Positive - depth 2 
 Dissertation (7) Presentational aspects  
  Communication 11 
  Structure 16 





Headings Sub-headings Codes Number of 
interviews 
tagged 
Category 4 – Critical thinking experienced as situated learning  
 How participants have learned what critical thinking 
is 
 
  Learning through research 9 
  Learning through subject 
immersion 
5 
  Learning through supervising and 
marking 
6 
  Learning through peer interactions 
(institutional contexts) 
3 
  Learning through peer interactions 
(marking conversations) 
14 
  Learning through peer interactions 
(mentoring conversations) 
3 
  Learning through peer interactions 
(sharing & collaboration) 
2 







Appendix H: Data analysis coding lists 
 
Coding – 3rd round 
 
Headings Sub-headings Codes Number of 
interviews 
tagged 
Category 1 – critical thinking experienced as an aspect of 
assessment processes 
 
 Grading  
  Criteria – link to critical thinking 2 
  Criteria – negatives (feedback 
match) 
8 
  Criteria – negatives (not used) 5 
  Criteria – negatives (post hoc 
check) 
6 
  Criteria – negatives (restrictions) 5 
  Criteria – negatives (subjectivity) 7 
  Criteria – negatives (tacit or 
internal) 
5 
  Criteria – positives (clarity) 5 
  Criteria – positives (consistency) 6 
  Criteria – positives (objectivity) 6 
  Criteria – positives (used) 16 
  Holistic assessment 7 
  Constructed mark 6 
  Forming a mark 3 
  Professional judgement 12 
 Making tacit knowledge (critical thinking in 
dissertations) explicit 
 
  Barriers 1 





Headings Sub-headings Codes Number of 
interviews 
tagged 
Category 2 – critical thinking experienced as facets of a critical 
thinker 
 
 Facets of a critical thinker  
  Facet – argument 21 
  Facet – big picture (able to see) 6 
  Facet – creativity 12 
  Facet – critique 9 
  Facet – inquisitiveness 5 
  Facet – logic and reasoning 9 
  Facet – open-mindedness 15 
  Facet - scepticism 12 
Category 3 – critical thinking experienced as an aspect of 
undergraduate dissertations 
 
 Finding critical thinking in undergraduate 
dissertations 
 
 Dissertation (1) - Introduction  
  Setting up the research 16 
  Contextual base 7 
  Focus – aims, objectives 17 
  Interest and motivation  10 
  Justification 8 
  Literature base 9 
  Originality – no 12 
  Originality – yes 6 
 Dissertation (2) – Literature review  
  Negative - description 17 
  Negative – focus 2 
  Negative – references 4 
  Negative – selectivity 2 
  Positive – compare and contrast 17 
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Headings Sub-headings Codes Number of 
interviews 
tagged 
  Positive – conceptualisation 5 
  Positive – critique 3 
  Positive – depth 5 
  Positive – evaluation 7 
  Positive – identify the gap 8 
  Positive – references 9 
  Positive – RQ-LR-Methodological 
fit) 
14 
  Positive – scope 11 
  Positive – synthesis 8 
  Positive – thematic 7 
  Positive – theorisation 11 
 Dissertation (3) – Methodology  
  Negative – feasibility 1 
  Negative – generic 2 
  Negative – replication studies 5 
  Negative – research rigour 3 
  Negative – RQ-LR-Methodological 
fit 
5 
  Positive – flexibility  3 
  Positive - references 3 
  Positive – replication studies 2 
  Positive – research rigour 7 
  Positive – RQ-LR-Methodological fit 
(alignment) 
10 




 Dissertation (4) Findings analysis and discussion  
  Negative – analysis & interpretation 8 
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Headings Sub-headings Codes Number of 
interviews 
tagged 
  Negative – description 3 
  Negative – evidence 2 
  Negative – RQ-LR-Methodological-
F&A fit 
3 
  Negative - synthesis (LR) 2 
  Positive – analyse 10 
  Positive – insight 4 
  Positive – perspectives 2 
  Positive – theorisation 7 
  Positive – evaluation 4 
  Positive - evidence 4 
  Positive – RQ-LR-Methodological-
F&A fit 
4 
  Positive – synthesis (LR) 16 
 Dissertation (5) Conclusions  
  Contribution 15 
  Limitations 13 
  Reflection 5 
  Research rigour 4 
  Top & tail 12 
 Dissertation (6) Holistic points  
  Negative – basic 5 
  Negative – consistency 9 
  Positive – consistency 13 
  Positive – depth  2 
 Dissertation (7) Presentational aspects  
  Communication 11 
  Structure 16 
  Students’ own thinking 13 
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Headings Sub-headings Codes Number of 
interviews 
tagged 
Category 4 – Critical thinking experienced as situated learning  
 How participants have learned what critical thinking 
is 
 
  Learning through research 11 
  Learning through subject 
immersion 
6 
  Learning through supervising and 
marking 
9 
  Learning through peer interactions 
(institutional contexts) 
3 
  Learning through peer interactions 
(marking conversations) 
14 
  Learning through peer interactions 
(mentoring conversations) 
3 
  Learning through peer interactions 
(sharing & collaboration) 
3 








Appendix I: Data analysis coding lists 
 
Coding – 4th round 
 
Headings Codes Number of 
interviews 
tagged  
(1) Critical thinking as dispositions  
 Inquisitiveness 5 
 Scepticism 12 
 Open-mindedness 14 
 Big picture 5 
 Diss 1 - Intro - justification, interest & motivation 12 
 Diss 1 - Intro - focus, aims, objectives & RQs 14 
 Diss 3 - M&Ms - flexibility 5 
 Diss 5 - Conc - limitations 13 
(2) Critical thinking as argument  
 Argument 18 
 Logic and reasoning 9 
 Diss 4 - F&A – evidence 4 
 Diss 1 - Intro - contextual base 6 
 Diss 1 - Intro - literature base 8 
 RQ-LR-M&M fit 18 
 Research rigour 10 
 Structure 21 
 Communication 11 
(3) Critical thinking as judgement  
 Critique 12 
 Analysis & interpretation 16 
 Diss 2 - LR – focus 16 
 Diss 2 - LR - compare and contrast 16 
 Diss 2 - LR - evaluation 7 
 Diss 2 - LR - identify the gap 8 
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Headings Codes Number of 
interviews 
tagged  
 Synthesis 9 
 Students' own thinking 12 
(4) Critical thinking as originality  
 Originality (no) 11 
 Originality (yes) 5 
 Contribution 15 
 Creativity 12 
 Diss 1 - Intro - focus, aims, objectives & RQs 13 
 Description/basic 18 
 Replication studies 6 
(5) Critical thinking assessment as socially situated  
 Professional judgement in assessing 11 
 Holistic vs constructed mark 6 
 Learning through assessment structures (criteria 
-ve) 
16 
 Learning through assessment structures (criteria 
+ve) 
17 
 Learning through research 9 
 Learning through subject immersion 5 
 Learning through supervising students 6 






Appendix J: Data analysis coding lists 
 




Sub-codes Number of 
interviews 
coded  
(1) Critical thinking as dispositions  
 Inquisitiveness 13 
 Scepticism 18 
 Open-mindedness 15 
 Big picture 5 
(2) Critical thinking as skills/abilities  
 Logic and reasoning 9 
 Critique 19 
 Analysis & interpretation 19 
 Synthesis 9 
 Argument (key skill) 18 
 Argument (evidence) 13 
 Argument (structure) 21 
 Argument (RQ-LR-M&M fit) 18 
 Argument (communication clarity) 10 
 Argument (research rigour) 10 
(3) Critical thinking as originality  
 Originality required (yes) 5 
 Originality required (no) 11 
 Originality is students’ own thinking 12 
 Originality is contribution 15 
 Originality is creativity 12 
 Originality is not description/basic 18 
 Originality is not replication studies 6 
 Originality is not safety first approach 9 





Sub-codes Number of 
interviews 
coded  
(4) Critical thinking learned  
 Through research and publishing 9 
 Through subject immersion 5 
 Through supervising students 6 
 Through interaction with peers 16 
(5) Approaches to assessment: similarities and differences  
 Professional judgement 11 
 Holistic approach 9 
 Constructed approach 6 
 Assessment criteria (used when assessing) 16 
 Assessment criteria (used for feedback) 8 
 Assessment criteria (used as post hoc check) 7 
 Assessment criteria (tacit/internal criteria used) 5 
 Assessment criteria (not used) 5 
 Originality required (yes) 5 
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